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1 Introduction and Preliminaries
1.1 The roots of optimal fiscal policy research and the problem
of time inconsistency
Research on the properties of optimal taxation in the form we know it today reaches
back to Frank P. Ramsey1. The idea of Ramsey, that a government can optimize social
welfare by setting taxes under the constraint of allocations achieved through perfect
market equilibria laid the groundwork for a whole stream of successive literature up
to now. Authors as Anthony Atkinson, Agnar Sandmo2, Joseph Stiglitz3, Christophe
Chamley4, Kenneth Judd5, Robert Barro6, Varadarajan Chari, Lawrence Christiano and
Patrick J. Kehoe7 have developed and extended the approach by Ramsey. The major
part of these quoted works examines optimal fiscal policy in a framework in which the
government sets taxes in order to finance a stream of expenditures and to maximize the
welfare of infinitely lived agents with perfect foresight, who are allocating their resources
on perfectly competitive markets.
1Ramsey, Frank Plumpton, 1927. ”A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation,” Economic Journal 37,
pp. 47-61.
2Atkinson, Anthony B. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1980. ”Welfare Implications of the Taxation of Savings,”
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(359), pp. 529-549.
3Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1986. ”Some Aspects of the Taxation of Capital Gains,” NBER Working Papers
1094, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
4Chamley, Christophe, 1985. ”Efficient Taxation in a Stylized Model of Intertemporal General Equi-
librium,” International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and
Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(2), pp. 451-468.
or Chamley, Christophe, 1985. ”Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with
Infinite Lives,” Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pp. 607-622.
5Judd, Kenneth L., 1985. ”Redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model,” Journal of
Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pp. 59-83. or Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. ”The Welfare Cost of
Factor Taxation in a Perfect-Foresight Model,” Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago
Press, vol. 95(4), pp. 675-709.
6Barro, Robert J., 1991. ”Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth,” NBER
Working Papers 2588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
7Chari, Varadarajan & Christiano, Lawrence & Kehoe, Patrick J., 1994. ”Optimal Fiscal Policy in a
Business Cycle Model,” Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pp.
617-652.
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One property however all this works mentioned above have in common is the implicit
assumption that planners have a commitment technology which allows them to credibly
promise to stick to a once taken policy decision. As this assumption however excludes the
possibility of deviating and reassessing policy measures, even as incentives to do so would
turn up, such an approach is denoted as time-inconsistent. The issue of commitment
and time-consistency was first addressed by Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott.8 In
their seminal work from 1977 they showed that policymakers are often confronted with
a time-inconsistency problem: Past policy measures or the announcement of future
policy strategies strongly shape expectations of individuals and have implications on their
behavior already in the present. If the policymaker however is by some reason forced to
deviate from its initial policy plan or, differently put, he is unable to commit to this initial
plan, outcomes might be worse than if individuals had been left in the dark over future
policy measures. Thereafter many authors picked up the ideas by Kydland/Prescott and
tried to factor time-(in)consistency and therefore the role of commitment in their models.
Subsequent literature tried to substitute for commitment or indirectly control for the
time-consistency problem. For instance Robert Lucas and Nancy Stokey9 simulate the
problem of time-inconsistency by allowing each government to bequeath its successor
a state contingent basket of debts with specific maturity dates. Varadarajan Chari
and Patrick J. Kehoe10 apply reputational mechanisms in order to model and enforce
commitment. Other authors addressing the issue of commitment are Jess Benhabib
and Aldo Rustichini11, who open up the possibility for planners to revise plans but
introduce a punishment mechanism for default, and Catarina Reis12, who chooses a
similar approach as Benhabib/Rustichini. Klein, R´ıos-Rull and Krusell13 directly model
the problem of commitment/default by allowing for a sequential decision mechanism
which evolves in non-cooperative games between different planners in different periods.
Later works as that of Davide Debortoli and Ricardo Nunes refine the approach by Klein,
R´ıos-Rull and Krusell by considering a case where default happens with some probability
8Kydland, Finn E. & Prescott, Edward C., 1977. ”Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of
Optimal Plans,” Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pp. 473-491.
9Lucas, Robert Jr. & Stokey, Nancy L., 1983. ”Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy
without capital,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pp. 55-93.
10Chari, Varadarajan, & Kehoe, Patrick J., 1990, ”Sustainable Plans,” Journal of Political Economy,
vol. 98, pp. 784-802.
11Benhabib, Jess & Rustichini, Aldo, 1997. ”Optimal Taxes without Commitment,” Journal of Economic
Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pp. 231-259.
12Reis, Catarina, 2006. ”Taxation without Commitment,” MPRA Paper 2071, University Library of
Munich, Germany.
13Klein, Paul & R´ıos-Rull, Jose´-Vı´ctor, 2003. ”Time-consistent optimal fiscal policy,” International Eco-
nomic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University, Institute
of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(4), pp. 1217-1245.; Klein, Paul & R´ıos-Rull,
Jose´-Vı´ctor & Krusell, Per, 2003. ”Time-Consistent Public Expenditures,” CEPR Discussion Papers,
No. 4582.
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rather than in every period as in the model by the aforementioned authors.14 But what
exactly is commitment about and how is this issue connected with the problem of time-
(in)consistency? The next section is dedicated to an accurate definition of these two
terms which are central for this thesis. Afterwards it will be discussed which concepts
and model frameworks are suitable to control for the issue of time-(in)consistency.
1.2 Time-inconsistency and commitment
The terms time-inconsistency or dynamic-inconsistency, as it is alternatively denoted,
describe a ”...situation in which the optimal plan of a decision-maker made at one point
in time is no longer optimal later in time”15 It accounts the very likely case that future
planners would find it optimal to reassess and readjust initially taken policy decisions.
In behavioral economics the observation of time-inconsistent attitudes in reality is of-
ten explained by assuming a sort of intertemporal schizophrenia: Economic agents are
assumed to be made up by ”...many different ’selves’. Each self represents the ...[eco-
nomic agent]... at a different point in time.16 These selves are characterized by ”differ-
ent intertemporal utilities” and ”are playing a non-cooperative intrapersonal game.”17
against each other. Kyland and Prescott’s famous example to illustrate the problem of
time-inconsistency is about the question whether a government should build flooding
protections or not:
Since the construction of dikes is very costly, a government might not find it desirable
that houses are built in an area, which is constantly menaced by flooding. Therefore
the government’s ex ante policy might be not to take anti-flooding measures in order
not to set wrong incentives. In the absence of laws prohibiting the construction of
houses in this area, rational agents would however know that if just enough people
built their houses there, the government would be forced to deviate from its initial
policy decision and start constructing dams.18 It is important to note however, this
is regarded as the major accomplishment by Kydland and Prescott, that the problem
of time-inconsistency cannot be traced back to myopia only. It is rather a result of
intratemporal incentives and how these are shaped by expectations. An example, put
forward by Stanley Fischer, illustrates this in the context of optimal tax policy, as
14Debortoli, Davide & Nunes, Ricardo, 2007. ”Loose Commitment,” International Finance Discussion
Papers, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Number 916.
15Black, John & Myles, Gareth D. & Hashimzade, Nigar, 2009. ”A Dictionary of Economics,” Oxford
University Press, pp. 126-127.
16ibid.
17Brocas, Isabelle & Carillo, Juan D. & Dewatripont, Mathias, 2004. ”Commitment Devices under Self-
Control Problems: An Overview”, in: Brocas, Isabelle & Carillo, Juan D. (ed.), ”The psychology of
economic decisions. Volume 2. Reasons and Choices,” Oxford University Press, p. 50.
18Kydland/Prescott 1977, p. 477
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discussed in this thesis: A government has to finance its expenditures in two consecutive
periods with either labor-income- or capital-income-taxation. Both fiscal instruments are
distortionary: capital income taxation negatively effects capital formation, labor income
taxation has the drawback of a reduced labor supply. If the government’s objective is to
enforce economic activity, it would choose the least distortionary policy mix; that means
to tax labor income in the first and capital income in the second period. Economic
agents would invest and start to produce in the first period, not being hindered by
capital income taxation. In the second period labor supply is needed to fire economic
activity. It is therefore optimal to readjust fiscal policy and now tax capital instead of
labor income. Such a strategy would of course not work out repeatedly, as the private
sector would start to anticipate government’s caprices.19
Both above given examples first of all reflect the ”temporal dimension” of policy deci-
sions. But they also underline another important point: Policymakers have a high degree
of discretion in their decision taking. Legal enforcement of past policy promises or legal
recourse in the case of a deviation from the initially announced policy is for the most
part not possible.20 This leads directly to the second part of the question: Are there
strategies to overcome the time-inconsistency problem? If governments want to avoid
being subject to incentives leading to policy readjustments which are prior regarded as
not desirable, they may want to commit themselves to certain policy measures. In the
example put forward by Kydland and Prescott, mentioned above, a useful commitment
strategy would simply be to ban by law house construction in areas which are likely to be
flooded. In other cases however, beside the fact that policymakers in modern democra-
cies have to move in the scope of a legal framework, appropriate commitment strategies
are less obvious. Kenneth Shepsle identifies two sources of commitment: Commitment
can either be traced back to a certain motivation, it is then ”incentive compatible and
hence self-enforcing.”, or commitment roots in an imperative, which means that dis-
cretion is fully or partly limited.21 In fields like taxation policy and monetary policy,
the discussion in literature mainly focuses on the role of institutions and institutional
mechanisms for commitment and policy credibility and therefore on the second source
for commitment along the distinction by Shepsle 22. From a historic perspective such
institutions were constitutional arrangements and laws safeguarding basic rights as the
property right protecting citizen from arbitrary confiscation of their property through
the state: Barry Weingast and Douglass North famously argued that the achievement
of binding arrangements securing political rights and regulating social interaction in
England after the the revolution of 1688 allowed economic advancements that paved
19see Crain, Mark W., 2004. Dynamic Inconsistency, in: Rowley, Charles K. & Schneider, Friedrich
(ed.)., ”The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Volume II”, Springer, pp. 157-160.
20ibid.
21North, Douglass C., 1993. ”Institutions and Credible Commitment,” Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics, vol. 149, pp. 11-23.
22Crain 2004, pp. 157-160
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the way to english world dominance.23 David Stasavage extended this hypothesis and
explained english advantages in the issuance of state securities (in comparison with its
main competitor France) with the commitment creating features of democratic repre-
sentation: checks and balances, party formation and delegation.24 In political economy
literature commitment in taxation policy is often discussed in the context of political
budget cycles, which are induced by strategic fiscal policy adjustments prior to elections.
The magnitude of this phenomenon can be plausibly interpreted in the light of different
political institutions as for example electoral systems: Systems which offer less incentives
for strategic fiscal policy adjustments exhibit a higher degree of commitment.25 Under
the classification by Shepsle this might however be considered as a borderline case as here
incentives as well as rules take effect. The most important contribution in the discussion
about time-inconsistency and commitment however comes from Kydland and Prescott.
The two authors suggest that, in the absence of a commitment technology, monetary
policy should be rule based in order to find a compromise between the two conflict-
ing goals of price stability and employment as postulated by the Phillipps-curve: The
negative relation between unemployment and inflation described by the Philipps-curve,
which was empirically observable until the 1960ies, was explained by the higher degree
of bargaining power by labor unions in wage negotiations during times of high employ-
ment. In politics this empirical relation was understood as a kind of mechanic law, which
allowed to control employment by monetary policy. In assuming rigid nominal wages
it was thought, that well-directed inflationary pressure on output prices, given constant
input prices, would lower real wages and therefore stimulate labor demand. Authors
as Friedman, Phelps and Lucas however pointed out that this view neglects the role of
expectations. Expected inflation is factored in wage negotiations and therefore renders
the concept of stimulating employment via inflation inoperative. Based on this critique
of the Philipps-curve Kydland and Prescott showed that expectations behave even more
sensitive: Expectations are not only shaped by the evaluation of evidence, if for example
some inflationary pressure on prices is already observable, but also by possibility. If the
government fails in credibly committing to a policy of price stability the mere possibility
that the government could find it optimal to choose an inflationary policy in the future
is accounted for in wage negotiations. This in turn forces the government to satisfy
expectations for inflation in order to avoid an increase in real wages which would have
negative effects on employment. Strangely the existence of action alternatives there-
23North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry, 1989. ”Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of
institutions governing public choice in 17th century England,” Journal of Economic History, vol.
49(4), pp. 803-832.
24Stasavage, David, 2002. Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State. France and Great Britain,
1688-1789,” Cambridge University Press.
25Klasˇnja, Marko, 2008. ”Electoral rules, forms of government, and political budget cycles in transition
countries,” Panoeconomicus, vol. 55(2), pp. 185-218.; Karpf, Andreas, 2008. ”Wechselwirkungen
von Demokratie und Finanzpolitik,” Thesis, University of Vienna, Austria.
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fore limits the possibilities of the government to shape economic development actively.
Time-inconsistency and the possibility of discretion assign a more reactive rather than
an active role to the government. If policies are assumed to be time-inconsistent they
simply play no role in the evaluation of the choice of actions by private agents and
the government loses its ability to influence economic development. To overcome the
problem of time-inconsistency in policy making Kydland an Prescott recommend that
policies should be rule based in order to better prepare economic agents for possible
future policy deviations and reestablish a maneuvering room for the government. Kyd-
land and Prescott’s ideas were extremely influential. The stability pact of the European
monetary union is one out of many examples in which rule based policymaking found
it’s way into practical politics where true commitment is not achievable.26
The matter of time-inconsistency is omnipresent in policymaking. As long as appropriate
commitment technologies are not existent, it is plausible to assume that situations will
originate in which a deviation from optimal policy might be reasonable or even optimal.
How commitment can be enhanced or which mechanisms could be applied to substitute
for commitment is however not central to this thesis. These questions were already
even though rudimentary addressed in the paragraph above in which the issue of time-
inconsistency and commitment was introduced. This thesis first and foremost aims to
show how the matter of time-inconsistency is accounted for in optimal taxation literature
and which influence the degree of commitment, which will further on be assumed to be
given, has on the specific results. The next section discusses how the the problem of
time-inconsistency is addressed in the modeling of optimal taxation problems.
1.3 Time-consistent and time-inconsistent equilibria
In the section before the problem of time-inconsistency was discussed in the context
of commitment. To understand the different approaches used in the models which are
about to be presented in the next chapters and how the factor commitment is controlled
for in those models it seems useful to clarify the terms introduced above, which might
be a little bit confusing, and to consider the implications of commitment for the process
of decision taking and the finding of equilibria.
In the here examined cases the term commitment is just relevant in the context of
the government or social planner. Assuming full-commitment therefore implies that a
government possesses the technology, however this may look like, to credibly commit
itself to a sequence of policy decisions once and for all. Hence, under the assumption of
full commitment the policymaker can decide upon a sequence of policies once and for all
26Lucke, Bernd, 2004. ”Rationales Verhalten und dynamische Makroo¨konomie. Zur Verleihung des
Nobelpreises an Fynn E. Kydland und Edward C. Prescott,” online: www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de.
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future periods and possesses the commitment technology not to deviate from this policy
plan. Although the assumption of commitment doesn’t remove the time-inconsistency
problem, the government can bind itself to a bundle of policy decisions and becomes
immune to incentives to reassess it. Suchlike model solutions are considered as being
time-inconsistent and not incentive compatible, as they simply exclude the possibility
that over the course of time situations might originate in which the policymaker might
be forced to a reevaluation of policies.
A time-consistent approach however, in consideration of the time-inconsistent nature of
policy decisions, controls for this dynamic decision phenomenon and allows a deviation
from before chosen policy decisions. In optimal policy literature this normally goes along
with the assumption that commitment technologies are not available to the government
or simply that a new government comes into office periodically. In such a context the
decision process upon an optimal policy is not non-recurring, as in the full-commitment
scenario, but repeats itself sequentially. In reference to the example cited above, one
could say it evolves in the form of a non-cooperative game between different selves of
the government.
The assumptions of full- and no-commitment respectively therefore ask for differentiated
modeling approaches: In the full-commitment scenario the decision over future policies
takes place once and for all periods, while the decision process in a scenario with no
commitment is sequential. Equilibria in both scenarios are respectively found in a Ram-
sey and a Markov approach. The specific solution methods and equilibrium definitions
are going to be outlined in the concerning chapters 2 and 3 respectively.
1.4 Structure
The goal of this thesis is to study the role of commitment in the context of optimal
fiscal policy. Therefore three different scenarios are considered. In the first scenario
full-commitment is assumed. Along the discussion from above the solutions in such
an environment are found in a Ramsey equilibrium and are time-inconsistent. In the
second scenario it is assumed that the policymaker cannot commit to a certain sequence
of policies. The sequential decision process which is characterizing for such an approach
is captured in a Markov perfect equilibrium. Solutions found in such an environment
are considered to be time-consistent. The third, the loose commitment, scenario is a
compromise between the first and the second type. It is assumed that default on past
policy promises occurs with a certain probability. Solutions in such an environment are
equally found by a Markov approach. The structure of the thesis follows automatically.
7
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Chapter 2 bases on the seminal works by Kenneth Judd27 and Christophe Chamley28
which were already mentioned introductorily. Their classical result that capital taxation
should be zero in the long run is derived and interpreted. Following the works of the
two authors optimal fiscal policy is studied over the dynamic path and it is examined if
capital taxes would be an appropriated instrument for redistribution. Further the model
is extended to a stochastic environment as well as to a scenario where the government
has to honor a balanced budget constraint each period. In chapter 3 on the other hand
optimal fiscal policy is examined under the assumption that in contrast to the second
chapter the government doesn’t have access to a commitment technology. A Markov
equilibrium is defined which controls for the resulting sequential decision process and
a basic two period model is derived. Its results are discussed and interpreted in the
context of those gained in chapter two in order to get some intuitive understanding
for the mechanisms in force in the no-commitment environment which lead to policy
outcomes different to that in the full commitment case. The second part of the third
chapter concentrates on the work by Paul Klein and Jose´-Victor R´ıos-Rull who assume an
economy in which the government cannot commit on capital income taxation but rather
inherits a set of state contingent capital income tax rates from the former office holder.
Further alternative approaches to control for a lack of commitment in optimal fiscal
policy models are discussed and it is reconsidered if the results in the standard literature
on no-commitment in fiscal policy could hinge on the assumption that governments
have to honor a balanced budget constraint. Chapter 4 studies the model of Davide
Debortoli and Ricardo Nunes. In their setting, commitment and default are subject to
a certain probability. At first the probability is exogenously given. In a second step this
probability is endogenous and depends on the state of the economy.
The models, it was attempted to keep the model frameworks as similar as possible, are
described and derived in detail. For the definition of the equilibria which control for the
different degrees of commitment assumed, mentioned above, the reader is referred to the
respective chapters. In chapter 5 all results are recapitulated, compared and interpreted.
The advantages and drawbacks of the different models are discussed.
27Judd 1985
28Chamley 1985
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2 Optimal Fiscal Policy with Commitment
The following chapter bases on the seminal works by Kenneth Judd1 and Christophe
Chamley2. The Chamley-Judd result, as it is often referred to in literature, states that
under an optimal policy, capital should not be taxed in the long run. The derivation of
this result and a number of possible extensions is conducted under a single discrete time
framework in the following chapter. Section 3.1 is dedicated to a detailed description
of the model framework. Building on this model framework a Ramsey equilibrium is
defined in section 2.2 which takes account of the central full-commitment assumption
effective in this chapter. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 derive the central results of Chamley and
Judd: In section 2.3 the zero capital tax result in its basic form is derived. Along Judd
section 2.4 then concentrates on the redistributive qualities of capital taxation in an
economy with heterogenous agents. Section 2.5 examines fiscal policy aside the steady
state assumption. Following Chamley it is shown that optimal capital taxation under
the assumption of full commitment is characterized by two regimes: There is a regime
of high taxation in initial periods which is later on replaced by a regime of zero capital
taxation. Section 2.6 formally argues the results gained in section 2.5 by the fact that
such an implied front-loading of distortions is strictly welfare increasing. Sections 2.7
and 2.8 extends these examinations to an economy with stochastic shocks and to an
environment without public debt respectively.3
2.1 The Model Environment and Notation
2.1.1 Preferences, Constraints and Technology
The representative consumer maximizes his utility by choosing streams of consumption
and leisure. His preferences are given in equation (2.1.1). The variables ct and ht denote
1Judd 1985
2Chamley 1985
3Chapter 2 bases in wide parts on chapter 15 of the standard textbook ”Recursive Macroeconomic
Theory” by Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent; Ljungqvist, Lars & Sargent, Thomas J., 2004.
”Recursive Macroeconomic Theory. Second Edition,” The MIT Press.
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consumption and hours worked respectively. The variable β denotes the discount rate.
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, ht) where β ∈ (0, 1) (2.1.1)
The utility function (2.1.1) is increasing in ct and decreasing in ht and fulfills the INADA
conditions limct→0 uc(ct, ht) = ∞ and limct→∞ uc(ct, ht) = 0. The output produced in
the economy, the input factors are labor ht and capital kt, is either consumed, used by
the government or used to increase the capital stock. The economy faces the following
resource constraint:
ct + gt + kt+1 = F (kt, ht) + (1− δ)kt (2.1.2)
The variable δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the depreciation rate of capital. {gt}∞t=0 represents an
exogenous stream of government purchases. Concerning the production function it is
assumed that the production technology of the economy exhibits constant returns to
scale. It therefore holds that:
F (kt, ht) = Fk(kt, ht)kt + Fh(kt, ht)ht (2.1.3)
Further it is assumed that both production factors are complementary, hence that it for
example holds that F (0, ht) = 0. The notation Fk(.), in example, implies the partial
derivative of the production function F (.) with respect to k. This style of notation will
be used throughout the whole thesis.
2.1.2 The government
The government finances the exogenous stream of government expenditures {gt}∞t=0 by
the levy of labor income taxes τt, capital income taxes θt as well as by the issuance of
government bonds bt maturing at the beginning of period t. Returns on government
bonds are assumed to be free of taxes. The government budget constraint is denoted
as:
gt = τtwtht + θtrtkt +
bt+1
Rt
− bt (2.1.4)
In the government budget constraint, equation (2.1.4), wt and rt denote the factor
prices for labor and capital respectively. The variable Rt denotes the gross return of
a government bond issued in period t and maturing at the beginning of period t+ 1.
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2.1.3 The households
Households face the following per period budget constraint:
ct + kt+1 +
bt+1
Rt
= (1− τt)wtht + (1− θt)rtkt + (1− δ)kt + bt (2.1.5)
The household’s problem is therefore to maximize (2.1.1) subject to the budget constraint
(2.1.5) with respect to {ct, ht, kt+1, bt+1}∞t=0.
max
ct,ht,kt+1,bt+1
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, ht)
s.t.
ct + kt+1 +
bt+1
Rt
= (1− τt)wtht + (1− θt)rtkt + (1− δ)kt + bt
This maximization problem can be written in Lagrange form with βtλt as the Lagrange
multiplier on the household’s budget constraint (2.1.5).
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
u(ct, ht) + λt
[
(1− τt)wtht + (1− θt)rtkt + (1− δ)kt + bt − ct − kt+1 − bt+1
Rt
]}
The first order condition associated to the household problem are thus:
∂L
∂ct
: uc(ct, ht) = λt (2.1.6)
∂L
∂ht
: uh(ct, ht) = −λt(1− τt)wt (2.1.7)
∂L
∂kt+1
: λt = βλt+1[(1− θt+1)rt+1 + (1− δ)] (2.1.8)
∂L
∂bt+1
:
λt
Rt
= βλt+1 (2.1.9)
Mergin equations (2.1.6) and (2.1.7), (2.1.6) and (2.1.8), as well as equations (2.1.8)
and (2.1.9) allows to summarize household’s first order conditions in the optimality
conditions (2.1.10), (2.1.11) and (2.1.12) respectively.
− uh(ct, ht)
uc(ct, ht)
= (1− τt)wt (2.1.10)
uc(ct, ht) = βuc(ct+1, ht+1)[(1− θt+1)rt+1 + (1− δ)] (2.1.11)
Rt = (1− θt+1)rt+1 + (1− δ) (2.1.12)
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Equation (2.1.10) denotes the intratremporal substitution behavior between consump-
tion and labor. Equation (2.1.11), also denoted as the household’s Euler equation,
captures the intertemporal choice of the households concerning consumption and capi-
tal accumulation (saving). Constraint (2.1.12) rules out arbitrage possibilities in trades
between bonds and capital, which would exist if the rates of return on these two assets
would be different. The role of this constraint will be discussed in more detail later
on. By forward iteration the budget constraint faced by the households in each period
can be summarized to one present value budget constraint. This is done by iteratively
eliminating the common term representing government debt of budget constraints in two
consecutive periods.
ct + kt+1 +
bt+1
Rt
= (1− τt)wtht + (1− θt)rtkt + (1− δ)kt + bt
ct+1 + kt+2 +
bt+2
Rt+1
= (1− τt+1)wt+1ht+1 + (1− θt+1)rt+1kt+1 + (1− δ)kt+1 + bt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ct +
ct+1
Rt
+
kt+2
Rt
+
bt+2
RtRt+1
= (1− τt)wtht + (1− τt+1)wt+1ht+1
Rt
+
[
(1− θt+1)rt+1 + (1− δ)
Rt
− 1
]
kt+1 + [(1− θt)rt + (1− δ)]kt + bt (2.1.13)
The consolidated budget constraint for periods t and t + 1 clarifies the role of the no-
arbitrage condition (2.1.12): The right hand side reflects the household’s resources while
the left hand side reflects the use of resources, be it for consumption, the accumulation
of capital or the acquisition of bonds. In the case the equality (2.1.12) doesn’t hold,
households would be able to accomplish arbitrage transactions between capital and bonds
and could thus overstretch their budget constraint: In the case of (1−θt+1)rt+1+(1−δ) >
Rt households would have incentives to carry out short sales with bonds and to invest the
profits of such transactions into capital. There would be an excess of supply in the bond
market. In the other case (1− θt+1)rt+1 + (1− δ) < Rt bonds would be the dominating
investment instrument as they provide higher returns. The demand for bonds would
thus be in excess of supply. For the markets of these two assets to be in equilibrium
condition (2.1.12) has to hold. With (2.1.12) equation (2.1.13) can be rewritten to the
form displayed below. Consequently bt+2 is substituted for with the help of the period
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t+ 2 budget constraint. Note that condition (2.1.12) holds in each period.
ct +
ct+1
Rt
+
kt+2
Rt
+
bt+2
RtRt+1
= (1− τt)wtht + (1− τt+1)wt+1ht+1
Rt
+ [(1− θt)rt + (1− δ)]kt + bt
ct+2 + kt+3 +
bt+3
Rt+2
= (1− τt+2)wt+2ht+2 + [(1− θt+2)rt+2 + (1− δ)]kt+2 + bt+2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ct +
ct+1
Rt
+
ct+2
RtRt+1
+
kt+3
RtRt+1
+
bt+3
RtRt+1Rt+2
= (1− τt)wtht + (1− τt+1)wt+1ht+1
Rt
+
(1− τt+2)wt+2ht+2
RtRt+1
+ [(1− θt)rt + (1− δ)]kt + bt (2.1.14)
Expression (2.1.14) can be finally written down in a generalized way. Period t = 0 is
assumed to be the initial period.
T∑
t=0
(
t−1∏
i=0
R−1i
)
ct +
(
T−1∏
i=0
R−1i
)
kT+1 +
(
T−1∏
i=0
R−1i
)
bT+1
RT
=
T∑
t=0
(
t−1∏
i=0
R−1i
)
(1− τt)wtht + [(1− θ0)r0 + (1− δ)]k0 + b0 (2.1.15)
Taking the limit and imposing the following transversality conditions,
lim
T→∞
(
T−1∏
i=0
R−1i
)
kT+1 = 0 (2.1.16)
lim
T→∞
(
T−1∏
i=0
R−1i
)
bT+1
RT
= 0 (2.1.17)
one can write down the household’s present value budget constraint as:
∞∑
t=0
(
t−1∏
i=0
R−1i
)
ct =
∞∑
t=0
(
t−1∏
i=0
R−1i
)
(1− τt)wtht + [(1− θ0)r0 + (1− δ)]k0 + b0 (2.1.18)
The role of transversality conditions Which role do the transversality conditions play?
Additional to the household’s optimality conditions and the household’s budget con-
straint, optimality demands to impose transversality conditions of the form displayed in
(2.1.16) and (2.1.17). In general the Euler equation (2.1.11) defines the optimal alloca-
tion path over periods. Without a fixed terminal point however there might be various
paths satisfying the Euler equation, but not all of them necessarily have to be opti-
mal. Transversality conditions are therefore imposed as additional constraints to rule
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out suboptimal paths.
In the here examined example the household’s saving/consumption behavior is con-
cerned. At the outset it will be assumed, contrasting to the model under consideration,
that the time horizon is finite. Supposable there are two cases: 1. The households
could spend too little over their lifecycle. This would lead to an over-accumulation of
assets, bonds and capital, which would be connected to a lower than possible lifetime
consumption and is therefore not optimal. 2. Spending too much on the other hand
would eventually leave back a negative stock of assets at the end of the lifecycle. A sce-
nario like this can however be excluded as it is supposed that nobody would be willing
to participate in transactions which would be implied in such a case.
Related to case 1. transversality conditions (2.1.16) and (2.1.17) imply that the present
discounted value of assets, bonds and capital, should be zero at infinity. Or, to state
it differently, referring to the above assumed finite horizon, an optimal lifetime sav-
ing/consumption path wouldn’t leave back any assets at the end of the household’s life.
To translate this intuitive interpretation of transversality conditions into the mathemat-
ical formalism in our model economy it is important to note that strictly speaking two
additional constraints should have been included in the original derivation of the house-
hold’s first order conditions: Namely, physical capital cannot become negative, hence
kt > 0 ∀t, and households are not allowed to decease with a positive stock of debt (a neg-
ative stock of bonds), hence bT > 0. At first a case with finite horizon is examined: The
household thus dies at the end of period T . The above mentioned new conditions are to
be included into the household’s maximization problem via a Kuhn-Tucker approach.
max
ct,ht,kt+1,bt+1
T∑
t=0
βtu(ct, ht)
s.t.
ct + kt+1 +
bt+1
Rt
= (1− τt)wtht + [
Rt−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− θt)rt + (1− δ)]kt + bt
0 6 kt ∀t and 0 6 bT
Written down in Lagrange form:
K =
T∑
t=0
βt
{
u(ct, ht) + λt
[
(1− τt)wtht + [(1− θt)rt + (1− δ)]kt + bt − ct − kt+1 − bt+1
Rt
]
+ηt[kt − 0]
}
+ φT [bT − 0]
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The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
∂K
∂ct
= 0;
∂K
∂ht
= 0;
∂K
∂kt+1
= 0;
∂K
∂bt+1
= 0;
∂K
∂λt
= 0
as well as
kt > 0; βtηt > 0; and βtηt[kt − 0] = βtηtkt = 0
bT > 0; βTφT > 0; and βTφT [bT − 0] = βTφT bT = 0
The only first order conditions which change are those associated to k and b (in period
t = T ). At first the focus rests upon the derivation of the transversality condition
associated to capital. By inclusion of the constraint kt > 0 the first order condition
associated to kt+1 now looks as follows:
∂K
∂kt+1
: −βtλt + βt+1λt+1Rt + βt+1ηt+1 = 0 (2.1.19)
Since the Kuhn-Tucker condition βtηtkt = 0 holds, above condition (2.1.19) is only
fulfilled if kt > 0 and hence ηt = 0. As the third term drops out in period T this
assertion is true for all periods t = 1, . . . , T − 1. What is the intuition behind this?
Since production is a necessary precondition for consumption and it was defined that
F (0, ht) = 0, households have an incentive to carry at least some capital from one period
to another: without capital there is no production and hence no consumption. As defined
in section 2.1.1 the utility function fulfills the INADA condition limct→0 uc(ct, ht) = +∞.
The marginal utility of some small increment of consumption would thus be infinitely
high. To consume nothing in some periods can therefore never be optimal. In the last
period T in contrast households would have incentives to choose kT = −∞, because
according to the budget constraint in period T ,
cT = (1− τT )wThT + [(1− θT )rT + (1− δ)]kT + bT
this would allow them to choose cT = +∞ (saving in period T would be pointless anyway
as there is no period T + 1). This is however not possible by the imposed constraint
kt > 0. In the last period the constraint therefore binds and kT = 0. Households dissolve
all their asset holdings in the last period in order to maximize consumption. As there is
no period T+1 it would make no sense to save/invest anymore. The first order condition
associated to capital for period T can be written down as follows:
∂K
∂kT
: βTλTRT−1 + βT ηT = 0 (2.1.20)
Expression (2.1.20) is multiplied by kT and, with the help of Kuhn-Tucker condition
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βT ηTkT = 0, rewritten as follows:
βTλTRT−1kT = 0 (2.1.21)
Further it can be substituted for λT from the first order condition associated to c,
equation (2.1.6).
βTuc(cT , hT )RT−1kT = 0 (2.1.22)
As argued above the constraint kt > 0 binds in the last period T , thus ηT > 0 and
kT = 0. Further it was assumed that uc(cT , hT ) > 0 (see section 2.1.1). If there would
be capital left at the end of the household’s life, hence kT > 0, this would imply that
βTuc(cT , hT )RT−1kT > 0. Obviously this is not optimal. It would be better to consume
all capital which is left.
In an infinite horizon case the intuition is slightly different since there is no last period.
Nevertheless over-accumulation of assets, capital in the here examined case, cannot be
optimal and has to be avoided. Equation (2.1.22) can be rewritten for the infinite horizon
case by taking the limit from T →∞:
lim
T→∞
βTuc(cT , hT )RT−1kT = 0 (2.1.23)
Equation (2.1.23) implies that the present discounted value of capital held in the distant
future should be zero. In contrast, if limT→∞ βTuc(cT , hT )RT−1kT > 0, the household
would accumulate too much capital. In such a case it would be better to increase
consumption at the expense of saving in order to bring down the discounted marginal
utility of consumption at a faster rate than capital is growing. How does one now get to
the form of the transversality condition which was used in the derivation of the present
value budget constraint? Successive Euler equations, see (2.1.8), are used to eliminate
the common term λt+j until arrived in period T . Note, the net-rate of return on capital
was substituted for along the no-arbitrage condition (2.1.12).
λt = βλt+1Rt
λt+1 = βλt+2Rt+1
}
λt = β2λt+2RtRt+1
λt+2 = βλt+3Rt+2
}
λt = β3λt+3RtRt+1Rt+2
. . .
}
. . .
One can finally write the process of forward iteration in a general way.
λt = βTλt+T
T−1∏
i=t
Ri (2.1.24)
Assigning t = 0 as the starting period, equation (2.1.24) can be used to substitute for
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λT in equation (2.1.21).
βT
λ0
βT
T−1∏
i=0
R−1i RT−1kT = 0→
T−1∏
i=0
R−1i RT−1kT = 0 (2.1.25)
Taking the limit T → ∞, as before, one finally arrives at the form of transversality
condition (2.1.16):
lim
T→∞
(
T−1∏
i=0
R−1i
)
RT−1kT = 0→ lim
T→∞
(
T−1∏
i=0
R−1i
)
kT+1 = 0 (2.1.26)
From the perspective of the household, bonds are just an alternative investment instru-
ment, which along the no-arbitrage condition (2.1.12) has to yield the same return as
investments in capital. The interpretation and derivation of the transversality condi-
tion concerning government bonds is very similar to the derivation of the transversality
condition for capital with the difference that there are no restrictions concerning bond
holdings of households in periods t = 1, . . . , T − 1: Government bonds play the role of
an investment and credit instrument but don’t have such a crucial role for production
as capital does. In the last period T however households would have, equally to the
case with capital, incentives to choose a period T stock of bonds equal to −∞, as this
would allow, just like in the case of period T capital, to set cT = +∞. Such implied
transactions, it was supposed, are however debarred by market mechanisms as credit
markets would not allow households to accumulate debt stocks like that. As in the case
of capital it can therefore be supposed that the constraint bT > 0 binds, which means
that bT = 0: Keeping a positive stock of government bonds beyond one’s lifetime makes
no sense and decreases household’s lifetime utility. The period T first order condition
associated to b is:
∂K
∂bT
: βTλT + βTφT = 0 (2.1.27)
Multiplying expression (2.1.27) with bT it can be rewritten with the Kuhn-Tucker con-
dition βTφT bT = 0, yielding:
βTλT bT = 0 (2.1.28)
The result is a terminal condition similar to the case of capital, which states that it is
not optimal to hold government bonds beyond death. Equation (2.1.28) implies that
either bT = 0 or the shadow price of government bonds λT = 0. Since it is however
known that λT = uc(cT , hT ) > 0 the second possibility can be excluded. This implies
that optimally bT = 0: It would be irrational to invest in bonds in period T , as there
is no period T + 1. Taking the limit T → ∞ gives the infinite horizon version of the
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terminal/transversality condition:
lim
T→∞
βTλT bT = lim
T→∞
βTuc(cT , hT )bT = 0 (2.1.29)
Equation (2.1.29) implies that the present discounted value of household’s stock of gov-
ernment bonds should be zero when T →∞. Otherwise the households would save too
much and limT→∞ βTuc(cT , hT )bT > 0 implying that an increase of consumption at the
expense of investment in government bonds would be utility augmenting. As before,
forward iteration applied on the Euler equation, this time the one which is associated to
bonds (2.1.9)(by the no-arbitrage condition (2.1.12) it is equivalent to the Euler equation
associated to capital), can be used to express λT in a general way.
λT =
λ0
βT
T−1∏
i=0
R−1i (2.1.30)
Taking the limit T → ∞ of terminal condition (2.1.28) and substituting for λT by
expression (2.1.30) yields a transversality condition in a general form equivalent to the
transversality condition for capital and the form which was used in the derivation of the
present value budget constraint (see (2.1.17)).
lim
T→∞
βT
λ0
βT
(
T−1∏
i=0
R−1i
)
bT = 0
→ lim
T→∞
(
T−1∏
i=0
R−1i
)
bT = lim
T→∞
(
T−1∏
i=0
R−1i
)
bT+1
RT
= 0 (2.1.31)
From the perspective of the government condition (2.1.31) can be interpreted as a no-
ponzi condition ruling out chain-letter behavior by the government, which would mean
that ever-increasing amounts of money are raised by bond issuance in order to acquit
interest payments: This implies, similar to before, that the present discounted value of
debt has to be zero as T →∞, or that the debt is growing at a smaller rate than there
is interest on bonds.4
4De la Fuente, Angel, 2000. ”Mathematical methods and models for economists,” Cambridge University
Press, p. 572.; Holger, Gerhardt, 2007. ”Angewandte Makroo¨konomie/Konjunktur- und Wachstum-
spolitik,” Lecture Notes, www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de.; Krauth, Brian, 2004. ”Macroeconomic Theory”,
Lecture Notes, www.sfu.ca.
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2.1.4 The firms
Taking factor prices for labor wt and capital rt as given firms are maximizing their
profits.
Π = F (kt, ht)− rtkt − wtht (2.1.32)
The firms first order conditions are hence,
Fk(kt, ht) = rt (2.1.33)
Fh(kt, ht) = wt (2.1.34)
This means that in an equilibrium the price for one additional unit of labor/capital has
to equal the marginal product of labor/capital. As it was assumed that the production
technology exhibits constant returns to scale, pure profits are zero in an equilibrium:
Π = 0. The size of firms is undetermined and plays no role for the model economy.
2.2 Defining a Ramsey equilibrium
After having sketched the model framework one is about to define the full commitment
Ramsey equilibrium.5
1. Let pit = {gt, θt, τt, bt} denote government policies for period t, and pi the sequence
of government policies for all t.
2. Let xt = {ct, ht, kt+1, bt+1} denote household’s allocations for period t, and x the
sequence of allocations for all t.
3. Let {w, r,R}denote the economy’s price system for all t.
Since it is assumed that the government possesses a commitment technology, it can bind
itself to a certain sequence of policy choices once for all at period t = 0, anticipating
its implications for allocations of the private sector and the price system. Household
allocations and the price system are described by rules: On the one hand there are
allocation rules, which are sequences of functions x(pi) = {x(pit)} that map government
policies pi into household’s allocations x(pi). On the other hand there are price rules,
which are sequences of functions w(pi) = {w(pit)}, r(pi) = {r(pit)}, R(pi) = {R(pit)} which
map government policies pi into the economy’s price system.
5Compare: Atkeson, Andrew & Chari, Varadarajan V. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 1999. ”Taxing Capital
Income: A Bad Idea,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, vol. 23(3), pp. 3-17.;
Chari/Christiano/Kehoe 1994, pp. 617-652.
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A Ramsey equilibrium is thus a policy pi, an allocation rule x(pi) as well as price rules
w(pi), r(pi) and R(pi), such that
1. pi maximizes (2.1.1), subject to the government’s budget constraint (2.1.4) taking
allocations and prices as given by x(pi), w(pi), r(pi) and R(pi).
2. The utility (2.1.1) is maximized subject to the household’s budget constraint (2.1.5)
by the allocation rule x(pi′), for every pi′ and it’s corresponding prices w(pi′), r(pi′)
and R(pi′).
3. Prices w(pi′) and r(pi′) satisfy (2.1.33) and (2.1.34) for every pi′.
The conducted definition above establishes a competitive Ramsey equilibrium. Should
there be multiple competitive equilibria which correspond to a policy, the one which
yields the highest utility is selected. Further it is assumed for the moment that θ0 is
fixed. Otherwise no restrictions on θ are imposed at the moment. k0 and b0 are assumed
to be given.
2.3 The zero capital tax
In the following section the zero capital tax result is derived which is central to the
works of Chamley and Judd. Along the formulation of Chamley, it is assumed that the
government sets the taxes indirectly by net of taxes rental rates for capital and labor
respectively, denoted by:
r¯t ≡ (1− θt)rt → θtrt ≡ rt − r¯t (2.3.1)
w¯t ≡ (1− τt)wt → τtwt ≡ wt − w¯t (2.3.2)
Next the firms first order conditions, expressions (2.1.33) and (2.1.34), and the definitions
from above for net of taxes factor prices are used to express government’s tax revenues.
θtrtkt + τtwtht = (rt − r¯t)kt + (wt − w¯t)ht = (Fk(kt, ht)− r¯t)kt + (Fh(kt, ht)− w¯t)ht
= Fk(kt, ht)kt + Fh(kt, ht)ht − r¯tkt − w¯tht (2.3.3)
Since the production technology, as assumed in subsection 2.1.1, exhibits constant re-
turns to scale, hence F (kt, ht) = Fk(kt, ht)kt + Fh(kt, ht)ht, expression (2.3.3) can be
further rewritten to give:
θtrtkt + τtwtht = F (kt, ht)− r¯tkt − w¯tht (2.3.4)
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The government’s policy choice in order to maximize aggregate welfare is constrained
by its budget constraint (2.1.4), the aggregate resource constraint (2.1.2) and the house-
hold’s first order conditions derived before, (2.1.10) to (2.1.12). The problem of the
Ramsey planner can be written down in the form of a Lagrangian. The net of taxes
factor prices are substituted for according to definitions (2.3.1) and (2.3.2).
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
u(ct, ht)
+ψt
[
F (kt, ht)− r¯tkt − w¯tht + bt+1
Rt
− bt − gt
]
+λt
[
F (kt, ht) + (1− δ)kt − ct − gt − kt+1
]
+µ1t
[
uh(ct, ht) + uc(ct, ht)w¯t
]
+µ2t
[
uc(ct, ht)− βuc(ct+1, ht+1)(r¯t+1 + 1− δ)
]}
(2.3.5)
The variables ψt, λt and µ1t, µ2t are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the gov-
ernment’s budget constraint (the tax revenues were replaced by expression (2.3.4)), the
economy’s resource constraint and the household’s first order conditions (here the net of
taxes factor prices are replaced with expressions (2.3.1) and (2.3.1)) respectively. Note
that the no-arbitrage condition (2.1.12), Rt = (1− θt+1)rt+1 + (1− δ) = r¯t+1 + (1− δ),
holds. As the resource and the government’s budget constraint are satisfied through the
inclusion in the above maximization problem, it is not necessary to include the house-
hold’s budget constraint: It is automatically satisfied by Walras’ law. The main interest
lies upon the the optimal choice for capital taxation which has direct consequences for
the accumulation of capital. It is therefore sufficient to derive the first order condition
associated to kt+1. Note that dividends on government bonds are not taxed in this
model.
∂L
∂kt+1
: βt+1ψt+1[Fk(kt+1, ht+1)− r¯t+1] + βt+1λt+1[Fk(kt+1, ht+1) + (1− δ)]− βtλt = 0
→
λt = β{ψt+1[Fk(kt+1, ht+1)− r¯t+1] + λt+1[Fk(kt+1, ht+1) + (1− δ)]} (2.3.6)
Equation (2.3.6) summarizes the culminate effect of a marginal investment in the factor
capital. The term [Fk(kt+1, ht+1) + (1− δ)] represents the quantitative increase of avail-
able goods in the economy in period t+ 1 by a marginal capital investment in period t.
The social marginal value of this increase is represented by the Lagrange multiplier λt+1.
The term [Fk(kt+1, ht+1)− r¯t+1] gives the increase in capital tax revenues in period t+ 1
caused by the additional capital investment in period t, allowing to lower other taxes,
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in our model the tax on labor income τ . The social marginal value of an increase in
tax revenues or of a possible reduction of other taxation instruments is denoted by the
Lagrange multiplier ψt+1. Both period t+ 1 effects of the increase in capital investment
in period t are discounted by the factor β. They equal the social marginal value of cap-
ital investment in the initial period t, represented by the Lagrange multiplier λt. It is
now supposed that the model economy converges to a steady state after a hypothetical
period T . Examining this model after this time period, all endogenous variables can be
set constant and the time subscripts can be omitted. The first order condition associated
to capital kt+1 for periods t > T can thus be rewritten to:
λ = β{ψ[Fk(k, h)− r¯] + λ[Fk(k, h) + (1− δ)]} (2.3.7)
Substituting by Fk(k, h) = r from (2.1.33) in equation (2.3.7) allows to further rewrite
it.
λ = β{ψ[r − r¯] + λ[r + (1− δ)]} (2.3.8)
The assumption of a steady state from period T on and the identity r¯t ≡ (1− θt)rt (see
identity 2.3.1) allows to also rewrite the household’s Euler equation (2.1.11).
uc(c, h) = βuc(c, h)[(1− θ)r + (1− δ)]→
1 = β[r¯ + (1− δ)] (2.3.9)
Combining (2.3.9) with (2.3.8) finally yields:
λ[r¯ + (1− δ)] = ψ[r − r¯] + λ[r + (1− δ)]→ λ[r¯ − r] = ψ[r − r¯]→
(λ+ ψ)(r¯ − r) = 0 (2.3.10)
The marginal social value of goods available to the economy, represented by the Lagrange
multiplier λ, is strictly positive. The marginal social value of a reduction of taxes ψ is
nonnegative. Therefore to satisfy equation (2.3.10), in steady state it has to hold that
r¯ = r. Following from the identity r¯ ≡ (1 − θ)r (2.3.1), the tax rate on capital income
θ consequently has to be zero when the economy has converged to a steady state. An
interpretation of this result will be discussed later on in this chapter. It is important to
note that a balanced budget assumption would not have changed the result. This can
be easily seen by setting the terms bt and bt+1 to zero in equation (2.3.5).
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2.4 Capital taxation with heterogenous agents and
redistribution
2.4.1 An Economy with a finite number of heterogenous agents
In contrast to before it is now assumed that the economy consists of a finite number
of heterogenous rather than identical households. It will be shown that the result of
a zero tax on capital income in steady state also holds in such an environment. Let
there be a finite number N of classes i. Each class is assumed to have the same size.
The control variables concerning class i are denoted with a superscripted i: cit, h
i
t, k
i
t,
bit. The utility function for class i is hence denoted u
i(cit, h
i
t). The government has the
possibility of lump sum transfers Sit > 0 to households of type i. This lump-sum transfer
consequently enters the government’s as well as the household’s budget constraint. It is
further assumed that the government attributes weights ai > 0 to the welfare of classes
i = 1, . . . , N . All classes share the same discount factor β. Aggregate values are denoted
as xt ≡
∑N
i=1 x
i
t for x = c, h, k, b, S. Approach and notation are otherwise the same
as in section 2.3. The government problem, analogously to before, can now be written
down in the form of a Lagrangian. Since it is assumed that the economy consists of
heterogenous households an inclusion of the government’s budget constraint and the
resource constraint alone is not sufficient. The budget constraints of all N households
have to be included as well as their optimality conditions.
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
N∑
i=1
aiui(cit, h
i
t)
+ψt
[
F (kt, ht)− r¯tkt − w¯tht + bt+1
Rt
− bt − gt − St
]
+λt
[
F (kt, ht) + (1− δ)kt − ct − gt − kt+1
]
+
N∑
i=1
it
[
w¯th
i
t + r¯tk
i
t + (1− δ)kit + bit + Sit − cit − kit+1 −
bit+1
Rt
]
+
N∑
i=1
µi1t
[
uih(c
i
t, h
i
t) + u
i
c(c
i
t, h
i
t)w¯t
]
+
N∑
i=1
µi2t
[
uic(c
i
t, h
i
t)− βuic(cit+1, hit+1)(r¯t+1 + 1− δ)
]}
(2.4.1)
The variables ψt, λt, it and µ
i
1t, µ
i
2t are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the
government’s budget constraint, the economy’s resource constraint, class i′s budget con-
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straint and the first order conditions of class i respectively. The tax revenues in the
government’s budget constraint were replaced along a version of equation (2.3.4) which
fits into the here examined model environment: θtrtkit + τtwth
i
t = F (k
i
t, h
i
t)− r¯tkit− w¯thit.
The net of taxes factor prices were replaced along expressions (2.3.1) and (2.3.2). Note
that the no-arbitrage condition (2.1.12), Rt = (1− θt+1)rt+1 + (1− δ) = r¯t+1 + (1− δ),
holds. To better illustrate the conditions which refer to aggregate values or to a class i
respectively the Lagrangian (2.4.1) can also be written in the form:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
N∑
i=1
aiui(cit, h
i
t)
+ψt
F ( N∑
i=1
kit,
N∑
i=1
hit)− r¯t
[
N∑
i=1
kit
]
− w¯t
[
N∑
i=1
hit
]
+
[∑N
i=1 b
i
t+1
]
Rt
−
[
N∑
i=1
bit
]
− gt −
[
N∑
i=1
Sit
]
+λt
[
F (
N∑
i=1
kit,
N∑
i=1
hit) + (1− δ)
[
N∑
i=1
kit
]
−
[
N∑
i=1
cit
]
− gt −
[
N∑
i=1
kit+1
]]
+
N∑
i=1
it
[
w¯th
i
t + r¯tk
i
t + (1− δ)kit + bit + Sit − cit − kit+1 −
bit+1
Rt
]
+
N∑
i=1
µi1t
[
uih(c
i
t, h
i
t) + u
i
c(c
i
t, h
i
t)w¯t
]
+
N∑
i=1
µi2t
[
uic(c
i
t, h
i
t)− βuic(cit+1, hit+1)(r¯t+1 + 1− δ)
]}
(2.4.2)
Deriving the first order order condition associated to kit+1 and substituting along (2.1.33)
yields (the calculation steps are merely the same as before and are therefore omitted):
∂L
∂kit+1
: λt + it = β{ψt+1[rt+1 − r¯t+1] + λt+1[rt+1 + (1− δ)] + it+1[r¯t+1 + (1− δ)]}
(2.4.3)
It is sassumed that the economy converges to a steady state with a hypothetical period
T . Hence time subscripts can be omitted for periods t > T . After some manipulations
the steady state version of equation (2.4.3) can be written as:
λ+ i[1− β(r¯ + (1− δ))] = β[ψ(r − r¯) + λ(r + (1− δ))] (2.4.4)
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As in the last section, under the assumption of a steady state and using (2.3.1) Euler
equation (2.1.11) can be rewritten to the form (compare to 2.3.9):
1 = β[r¯ + (1− δ)] (2.4.5)
Equations (2.4.4) and (2.4.5) can now be merged. The resulting condition applies to
all households and therefore all classes in the steady state. Consequently the term with
i, which represents class i′s social marginal value for an increase in the quantity of
available goods in period t + 1 caused by a marginal increase of capital investment in
period t, disappears. After some manipulations the resulting expression is the same as
before in the last section(compare (2.3.10)):
(λ+ ψ)(r¯ − r) = 0 (2.4.6)
Since λ is strictly positive and ψ is nonnegative, as already argued in the section before,
to satisfy above expression (2.4.6) it has to hold that r¯ = r and hence that θ = 0.
Hence, in an economy which has converged to a steady state, with a finite number of
heterogenous agents and the possibility of redistribution via lump sum transfers, the
optimal Pareto efficient tax policy is to set taxes on labor income to zero.
2.4.2 An economy with capitalists and workers
In his paper from 1985, on which the here done examinations partly base, Kenneth Judd6
assumes an extreme case of heterogeneity; there are two classes , workers and capitalists,
where the former group doesn’t save and consequently owns no capital or bonds, while
the latter group doesn’t work but owns all of the assets within the economy. The budget
constraints for the two respective groups captures this. The budget constraint for the
working class, here labeled as class 1, reads as follows:
c1t = (1− τt)wth1t + S1t (2.4.7)
The budget constraint for the capitalists class is:
c2t + k
2
t+1 +
b2t+1
Rt
= (1− θt)rtk2t + (1− δ)k2t + b2t + S2t . (2.4.8)
6Judd 1985
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Consequently both groups, workers and capitalists respectively, also have different utility
functions. As before they however share the same discount rate βt.
∞∑
t=0
βtu(c1t , h
1
t ) (2.4.9)
∞∑
t=0
βtu(c2t ) (2.4.10)
Workers maximize their utility (2.4.9) subject to their budget constraint (2.4.7) with
respect to {c1t , h1t }∞t=0. Capitalists maximize their utility (2.4.10) subject to their bud-
get constraint (2.4.8) with respect to {c2t , k2t+1, b2t+1}∞t=0. The maximization problems of
workers and capitalists respectively written in Lagrangian form therefore read as fol-
lows.
workers
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
u(c1t , h
1
t ) + λt
[
(1− τt)wth1t + S1t − c1t
]}
(2.4.11)
Taking the partial derivatives of L, (2.4.11), with respect to {c1t , h1t }∞t=0 yields:
∂L
∂c1t
: uc(c1t , h
1
t ) = λt (2.4.12)
∂L
∂h1t
: uh(c1t , h
1
t ) = −λt(1− τt)wt (2.4.13)
Combining first order conditions (2.4.12) and (2.4.13) and using the definition w¯t ≡
(1− τt)wt, compare (2.3.2), yields the working class’s sole optimality condition:
uh(c1t , h
1
t ) = −uc(c1t , h1t )w¯t (2.4.14)
capitalists
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
u(c2t ) + λt
[
(1− θt)rtk2t + (1− δ)k2t + b2t + S2t − c2t − k2t+1 −
b2t+1
Rt
]}
(2.4.15)
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Taking the partial derivatives of L, (2.4.15), with respect to {c2t , k2t+1, b2t+1}∞t=0 yields:
∂L
∂c2t
: uc(c2t ) = λt (2.4.16)
∂L
∂k2t+1
: λt = βλt+1{(1− θt+1)rt+1 + (1− δ)} (2.4.17)
∂L
∂b2t+1
: λt = βλt+1Rt (2.4.18)
By combination of first order conditions (2.4.16) and (2.4.17), (2.4.16) and (2.4.18)
as well as (2.4.17) and (2.4.18) one receives the optimality conditions concerning the
capitalist’s class maximization problem. Definition r¯t ≡ (1 − θt)rt, compare (2.3.1), is
used to substitute for the net of taxes return on capital.
uc(c2t ) = βuc(c
2
t+1)[r¯t+1 + (1− δ)] (2.4.19)
uc(c2t ) = βuc(c
2
t+1)Rt (2.4.20)
Rt = r¯t+1 + (1− δ) (2.4.21)
The optimality condition (2.4.21) is equivalent to the well known no-arbitrage condition
(2.1.12). As (2.4.21) holds only one of the two other capitalist’s optimality conditions
has to be included in the government’s problem. The problem of the government now
is to maximize aggregate utility subject to the government’s budget constraint (2.1.4),
the resource constraint (2.1.2), the optimality conditions of the workers and capitalists
respectively, (2.4.14) and (2.4.19) to (2.4.21), as well as the budget constraints of these
two classes, (2.4.7) and (2.4.8). Aggregate values are denoted, as before, as xt = x1t +x
2
t
for x = c, h, k, b, S. The government attributes the weights a1 > 0 and a2 > 0 to
the welfare of workers and capitalists respectively. The government’s problem can be
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denoted in the form of a Lagrangian:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
a1u(c1t , h
1
t ) + a
2u(c2t )
+ψt
[
F (kt, ht)− r¯tkt − w¯tht + bt+1
Rt
− bt − gt − St
]
+λt
[
F (kt, ht) + (1− δ)kt − ct − gt − kt+1
]
+1t
[
w¯th
1
t + S
1
t − c1t
]
+2t
[
r¯tk
2
t + (1− δ)k2t + b2t + S2t − c2t − k2t+1 −
b2t+1
Rt
]
+µ1t
[
uh(c1t , h
1
t ) + uc(c
1
t , h
1
t )w¯t
]
+µ2t
[
uc(c2t )− βuc(c2t+1)[r¯t+1 + (1− δ)]
]}
The variables ψt and λt are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the government’s
budget constraint and the resource constraint respectively. 1t and 
2
t are the Lagrange
multipliers for the budget constraint of workers and capitalists respectively. µ1t and
µ2t are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the optimality conditions of workers and
capitalists respectively. Deriving the government’s first order condition associated to
k2t+1 and using Fk(kt, ht) = rt, compare (2.1.33), yields:
∂L
∂k2t+1
: λt + 2t = β{ψt+1[rt+1 − r¯t+1] + λt+1[rt+1 + (1− δ)] + 2t+1[r¯t+1 + (1− δ)]}
(2.4.22)
It is now assumed that the economy converges to a steady state from the period T
on. Hence the government’s first order condition (2.4.22) and the capitalists optimality
condition (2.4.19) for periods t > T after some manipulations can be denoted in the
form of equations (2.4.23) and (2.4.24) respectively. The calculation steps are the same
as in the two sections before and are therefore omitted.
λ+ 2[1− β(r¯ + 1− δ)] = β[ψ(r − r¯) + λ(r + 1− δ)] (2.4.23)
1 = β(r¯ + (1− δ)) (2.4.24)
Combination of (2.4.23) and (2.4.24) and some manipulations finally yields the well
known expression7:
(λ+ ψ)(r¯ − r) = 0 (2.4.25)
7compare to (2.4.6) and(2.3.10)
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Since λ, the marginal social value of available goods, is strictly positive and ψ, the
marginal social value of reducing taxes is nonnegative, it has to hold that r¯ = r, hence
that θ = 0 once the economy converged to a steady state. A benevolent social plan-
ner maximizing a paretian social welfare function for a heterogenous society with the
possibility of lump sum transfers would therefore always set capital taxes to zero in the
limiting steady state. This is also true if the planner would only attribute weight to the
welfare of workers, hence if he would set a1 = 1 and a2 = 0 . Like in the case before it
has no influence on the result of a limiting zero capital tax if one allows for government
debt or not.
2.5 Capital taxation aside the steady state
2.5.1 The household’s problem in a present value formulation
Hitherto tax policy was just analyzed under the assumption that the economy had
converged to a steady state. To examine tax policy aside the steady state one has to
choose an approach which is slightly different to the one used in the sections above.
Namely, we are going to hark back to the present value formulation of the household’s
problem from section 2.1.3. The household’s present value budget constraint (2.1.18)
can be rewritten using Arrow-Debreu prices.
q0t =
t−1∏
i=0
R−1i ∀t > 1; with the numeraire q00 = 1 (2.5.1)
The Arrow-Debreu price q0t here, in a deterministic version of the model, denotes the
price of consumption and net-of-taxes-labor-income in period t in terms of period zero.
With (2.5.1) at hand the present value budget constraint (2.1.18) can be denoted as
follows.
∞∑
t=0
q0t ct =
∞∑
t=0
q0t (1− τt)wtht + [(1− θ0)r0 + (1− δ)]k0 + b0 (2.5.2)
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Accordingly, the household’s maximization problem in a present value formulation reads:
max
ct,ht
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, ht)
s.t.
∞∑
t=0
q0t ct =
∞∑
t=0
q0t (1− τt)wtht + [(1− θ0)r0 + (1− δ)]k0 + b0
In the present value formulation one has to control for consumption and labor supply
only. The initial values k0 and b0 are assumed to be given and capital and bond holdings
in the limit are prescribed by the transversality conditions (2.1.16) and (2.1.17) respec-
tively derived in subsection 2.1.3. As the budget constraints households are facing in
all future periods are given in present value terms the discount factor β only applies to
the utility function and the time subscripts on the Lagrange multiplier can be omitted.
The Lagrangian formulation of the household’s maximization problem hence reads as
follows:
L =
∞∑
t=0
{
βtu(ct, ht) + λ
[
q0t (1− τt)wtht − q0t ct
]}
+ [(1− θ0)r0 + 1− δ]k0 + b0 (2.5.3)
Taking the partial derivatives with respect to ct and ht yields the household’s first order
conditions.
∂L
∂ct
: βtuc(ct, ht) = λq0t (2.5.4)
∂L
∂ht
: (1− τt)wt = −β
tuh(ct, ht)
λq0t
(2.5.5)
Combining (2.5.4) and (2.5.5) yields:
(1− τt)wt = −uh(ct, ht)
uc(ct, ht)
(2.5.6)
Rewriting (2.5.4) for period t = 0 and using the the definition of the numeraire q00 = 1
yields:
λ = uc(c0, h0) (2.5.7)
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Substituting for λ by expression (2.5.7) allows to rewrite the original first order condition
(2.5.4) to the form of:
βtuc(ct, ht)
uc(c0, h0)
= q0t (2.5.8)
Expressions (2.5.6) and (2.5.8) represent the relevant household’s optimality conditions
in this formulation of the problem. Analogously to (2.1.12) the no-arbitrage conditions
here reads as:
q0t
q0t+1
=
∏t−1
i=0 R
−1
i∏t
i=0R
−1
i
= Rt = (1− θt+1)rt+1 + (1− δ) (2.5.9)
All conditions and constraints concerning the household’s problem, which will be rel-
evant for the government in maximizing overall welfare in the next step, can now be
collapsed into one single constraint, the so called implementability constraint. There-
fore the optimality conditions (2.5.6) and (2.5.8) are substituted into the present value
budget constraint (2.5.2) to give.
∞∑
t=0
βt
uc(ct, ht)
uc(c0, h0)
ct = −
∞∑
t=0
βt
uc(ct, ht)
uc(c0, h0)
uh(ct, ht)
uc(ct, ht)
ht + [(1− θ0)r0 + (1− δ)]k0 + b0
(2.5.10)
After some manipulations and substituting along Fk(k0, h0) = r0, (2.5.10) can be rewrit-
ten to:
∞∑
t=0
βt[uc(ct, ht)ct + uh(ct, ht)ht]−A = 0 (2.5.11)
with
A = A(c0, h0, θ0) = uc(c0, h0) {[Fk(k0, h0)(1− θ0) + (1− δ)]k0 + b0}
2.5.2 The problem of the Ramsey planner in primal formulation
In the primal formulation of the Ramsey problem the planner chooses allocations con-
sistent with it’s budget constraint, the resource constraint, firms optimization behavior
and household’s optimization behavior, which was sketched in the preceding subsection
2.5.1. The proceeding is pretty much the same as before. In contrast to sections 2.3
and 2.4 however factor prices and tax rates are not summarized in net-of-taxes-factor
prizes. Referring to here examined model economy the Ramsey planner maximizes the
social welfare function (2.1.1), subject to the implementability constraint (2.5.11), which
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was derived in the last subsection, and the economy’s resource constraint (2.1.2) with
respect to {ct, ht, kt+1}∞t=0. Since the household’s budget constraint and the resource
constraint are included in the maximization problem it is not necessary and would be
redundant to include the government’s budget constraint. It is automatically satisfied
through Walras’ law. One can now define the function:
V (ct, ht, φ) = u(ct, ht) + φ[uc(ct, ht)ct + uh(ct, ht)ht] (2.5.12)
The variable φ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the implementability constraint
(2.5.11). The government’s problem in Lagrangian form reads:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt{V (ct, ht, φ) + λt[F (kt, ht) + (1− δ)kt − ct − gt − kt+1]} − φA (2.5.13)
b0 and k0 are assumed to be given and θ0 to be fixed. λt is the Lagrange multiplier
of the economy’s resource constraint. Taking the partial derivatives of L with respect
to {ct, ht, kt+1}∞t=0 yields the first order conditions of the government’s optimization
problem:
∂L
∂ct
: Vc(ct, ht, φ) = λt t > 1 (2.5.14)
∂L
∂ht
: Vh(ct, ht, φ) = −λtFh(kt, ht) t > 1 (2.5.15)
∂L
∂kt+1
: λt = βλt+1[Fk(kt+1, ht+1) + (1− δ)] (2.5.16)
∂L
∂c0
: Vc(c0, h0, φ) = λ0 + φAc (2.5.17)
∂L
∂h0
: Vh(c0, h0, φ) = −λ0Fh(k0, h0) + φAh (2.5.18)
Merging expressions (2.5.14), (2.5.16) and (2.5.17); (2.5.14) and (2.5.16); (2.5.14) and
(2.5.15); as well as (2.5.17) and (2.5.18) yields the government’s optimality conditions
respectively:
Vc(c0, h0, φ)− φAc = βVc(c1, h1, φ)[Fk(k1, h1) + (1− δ)] (2.5.19)
Vc(ct, ht, φ) = βVc(ct+1, ht+1, φ)[Fk(kt+1, ht+1) + (1− δ)] t > 1 (2.5.20)
Vh(ct, ht, φ) = −Vc(ct, ht, φ)Fh(kt, ht) t > 1 (2.5.21)
Vh(c0, h0, φ) = [φAc − Vc(c0, h0, φ)]Fh(k0, h0) + φAh (2.5.22)
Optimality conditions (2.5.19) to (2.5.22) together with the implementability constraint
(2.5.11) and the economy’s resource constraint (2.1.2) would now allow to solve for
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allocations {ct, ht, kt+1}∞t=0 and the Lagrange multiplier φ. This in turn would allow to
solve for prices rt, wt and q0t as well as taxes τt and θt. As the main interest however
lies on tax policies only, there are other, easier ways to find solutions.
2.5.3 Capital taxation over the dynamic path
Assuming that the economy converges to a steady state for t > T > 0 yields exactly
the same result as before: In the steady state the variables gt, ct, ht and kt are time
invariant, hence the term Vc(.) is constant. For t > T > 0 the optimality condition
(2.5.20) can thus be rewritten to
1 = β[Fk(k, h) + (1− δ)] (2.5.23)
Since ct is assumed to be invariant in the steady state household’s first order condition
(2.5.8) for t > T implies that q
0
t
q0t+1
= 1β . This together with the no-arbitrage condition
(2.5.9) gives:
1 = β[(1− θ)r + (1− δ)] (2.5.24)
Merging expressions (2.5.23) and (2.5.24) finally yields expression,
Fk(k, h) = (1− θ)r (2.5.25)
which can only be satisfied if θ = 0. This result is equivalent to the these derived
in the preceding sections: The tax rate on capital income is zero in the steady state.
Examining the implications of the taken steady state assumption however delivers a more
pronounced result: Since ct, ht and kt+1 are constant in a steady state it was postulated
that Vc(.) has to be constant too. Recalling equation (2.5.12) it is easy to see that it
was thereby implicitly assumed that the expenditure elasticity,
Vc(ct, ht, φ)
uc(ct, ht)
= 1 + φ[1 + (ucc(ct, ht)ct + uhc(ct, ht)ht)/uc(ct, ht)] (2.5.26)
is also constant within a steady state equilibrium, hence:
Vc(ct, ht, φ)
uc(ct, ht)
=
Vc(ct+1, ht+1, φ)
uc(ct+1, ht+1)
(2.5.27)
Equality (2.5.27) implies that equation (2.5.20) can be rewritten to:
uc(ct, ht) = βuc(ct+1, ht+1)[Fk(kt+1, ht+1) + (1− δ)] (2.5.28)
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Combining household’s first order condition (2.5.8) and no-arbitrage condition (2.5.9)
yields,
q0t
q0t+1
=
1
β
uc(ct, ht)
uc(ct+1, ht+1)
= Rt →
uc(ct, ht) = βuc(ct+1, ht+1)[(1− θt+1)rt+1 + (1− δ)] (2.5.29)
Equations (2.5.28) and (2.5.29) in turn imply that capital income tax is optimally zero
in period t + 1: θt+1=0. This is however not necessarily true for period t = 1. Even if
Vc(c0, h0, φ) = Vc(c1, h1, φ), above established result doesn’t hold as equation (2.5.19),
which applies for periods t = 0 and t = 1, contains an additional term. What is the
intuitive explanation for the zero capital tax in period t+ 1 especially in the context of
our conclusion that capital taxation should be zero in a steady state? In an economy, as
examined above, where capital accumulation comes solely from lifecycle savings, levying
a capital income tax would imply a permanent intertemporal distortion as it would
make consumption tomorrow pricier than consumption today: Taxing capital in period
t+ 1 implies to implicitly tax private good consumption at a higher rate in period t+ 1
than in period t. This is equivalent to a permanently increasing implicit taxation of
consumption which is not compatible with the assumption of a steady state equilibrium.
The literature speaks in such a case of differential commodity taxation instead of a
uniform commodity taxation which would be optimal. Referring to the result of a zero
capital tax in the steady state, this means: When the economy converges to a steady
state in period T , capital taxes are optimally zero for all periods t > T +1, or differently
expressed, the decision to accumulate capital is not distorted for all periods t > T .8 The
interpretation of this results will be discussed in more detail in the next section where
an alternative formal derivation of the Chamley-Judd result is conducted.
For utility functions of the class,
u(ct, ht) =
(cth−αt )1−σ
1− σ (2.5.30) u(ct, ht) =
c1−σt
1− σ + V (ht) (2.5.31)
it can directly be shown that the expenditure elasticity is constant for periods t > 1:
Vc(ct, ht, φ)
u(ct, ht)
= 1 + φ(α− 1)(σ − 1) (2.5.32) Vc(ct, ht, φ)
u(ct, ht)
= 1 + φ(1− σ) (2.5.33)
Along the above derived results this means that for utility functions of the class (2.5.30)
and (2.5.31) capital taxes optimally should be zero for all periods t > 2. By the same
argumentation as before this is however not true for periods t = 0 and t = 1, since the
optimality condition (2.5.19) which is dedicated to these periods contains an additional
8Atkeson/Chari/Kehoe 1999
34
2.5 Capital taxation aside the steady state
term. This result implies that for utility function of the class (2.5.30) and (2.5.31)
the decision to accumulate capital is only distorted for period t = 1, with an initially
positive rate of taxation. The returns on capital received in period t = 2 already fall
under the zero capital tax regime. To see this it is crucial to differentiate between
the date the decision on capital accumulation is taken and the date this accumulated
capital is subject to taxation: If there is a positive capital tax in period t + 1 capital
accumulation is distorted in period t as its returns in the next period will be subject to
capital taxation. It can therefore be stated: For the examined class of utility functions
it is not optimal to distort capital accumulation for periods t > 1 and therefore capital
taxes should be zero for periods t > 2.
To underline this hitherto just intuitively argued assumption that capital initially should
be indeed taxed we turn back to the maximization problem of the government (2.5.13) in
the last section. The assumption that θ0 is fixed is relaxed. It is now assumed that the
government could freely choose θ0. To explore the impact of an increased t = 0 capital
tax rate on social welfare, the Lagrange function L (2.5.13) is derived with respect to
θ0.
∂L
∂θ0
= −φ ∂A
∂θ0
= φuc(c0, h0)Fk(k0, h0)k0 (2.5.34)
The sign of the term (2.5.34) hinges on the sign of φ which can be interpreted as the social
cost of financing government expenditures by the available financing instruments. If the
government doesn’t have to resort to distortionary financing means this value would be
zero, otherwise it is strictly positive. The first scenario can be obviously neglected since
both financing instruments the government has at its disposal, capital and labor taxes,
are distortionary. What however is the logic behind this derivation to be positive and
hence that taxation in the initial period could have positive welfare effects? Note that φ
is not only the Lagrange multiplier for A but also for the term [uc(ct, ht)ct+uh(ct, ht)ht]
from the function (2.5.12) which measures the distortions induced by taxation on labor
and capital. In period t = 0 this term is however not relevant. The idea is now that
the government could use high levies on initial capital in order to build up a capital
base which allows to to lower the need of distortionary taxation in the future. Along
this rationality the government should lower φ, the social cost of financing government
expenditures, permanently by a short period of very high capital taxes: Following the
argumentation in the last paragraph, taxation of initial capital implies no intertemporal
distortions. Interest earnings of the capital base built up in the high taxation regime can
thereafter be used to at least partially finance government expenditures and substitute
for distortionary taxation.
The original paper by Chamley9 comes to similar if also qualitatively different results
9Chamley 1985
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to what was derived above: Along Chamley for utility functions of the class (2.5.30)
and (2.5.31), capital taxes are positive and constant until they converge to zero after
a finite number of periods. This difference hinges on the fact that Chamley imposes
an upper limit for capital taxes as an additional constraint in his model. Following
Atkeson/Chari/Kehoe10 Chamley’s result shall be reproduced subsequently in a discrete
time environment.
As in the original paper by Chamley an upper bound on capital taxes is introduced:
θt 6 1. Using household’s optimality condition (2.5.8) and the no-arbitrage condition
(2.5.9) allows to express θt+1.
1−
[
uc(ct, ht)
βuc(ct+1, ht+1)
− (1− δ)
]
1
rt+1
= θt+1 (2.5.35)
Imposing the constraint θt+1 6 1 on expression (2.5.35) and rearranging it yields the
constraint.
uc(ct, ht) > βuc(ct+1, ht+1)(1− δ) (2.5.36)
This inequality has to be included into the problem of the Ramsey planner as an ad-
ditional constraint. What does it do? This additional constraint opens up the option
to agents to hold their capital without renting it out to firms. This can be understood
as a kind of possibility for tax evasion in the case taxes are too high. Agents can hide
their capital in order to escape confiscation, as it was shown before the planner has clear
incentives to confiscate capital in the initial period, and are then not subject to capi-
tal taxation. The constraint can therefore be understood as a lower bound of after-tax
returns on capital at 1− δ.
The Ramsey problem can be as usually written down in Lagrangian form, where γt
represents the Lagrange multiplier on the additional constraint (2.5.36). The rest stays
the same as in the case without the upper bound on capital taxation.
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt {V (ct, ht, φ) + λt[F (kt, ht) + (1− δ)kt − ct − gt − kt+1]
+γt[uc(ct, ht)− uc(ct+1, ht+1)(1− δ)]} − φA (2.5.37)
The first order conditions with respect to consumption and capital respectively are there-
10Atkeson/Chari/Kehoe 1999
36
2.5 Capital taxation aside the steady state
fore:
∂L
∂ct
: λt = Vc(ct, ht, φ) + [γt − γt−1(1− δ)]ucc(ct, ht) (2.5.38)
∂L
∂kt+1
: λt = βλt+1[Fk(kt+1, ht+1) + (1− δ)] = 0 (2.5.39)
The argumentation of Chamley11 and Atkeson/Chari/Kehoe12 hinges on three assump-
tions:
1. It is impossible that the constraint (2.5.36) doesn’t bind in period t, starts to bind
in period t+ 1 and is relaxed again later on in period t+ h.
2. Constraint (2.5.36) cannot bind in every period. Assumption 1. and 2. together
imply that constraint (2.5.36) binds at the beginning and ceases to bind forever
after a finite number of periods.
3. Being t the last period in which constraint (2.5.36) binds, it is assumed that, along
the before derived results for the class of utility functions (2.5.30) and (2.5.31), the
rate of capital income tax is zero for periods s > t+ 2. In period t+ 1 the tax rate
might be at some intermediate level.
Note that, as shown before, for the class of preferences (2.5.30) and (2.5.31) it holds that
V (ct, ht, φ)/uc(ct, ht) = V (ct+1, ht+1, φ)/uc(ct+1, ht+1). Subsequently each of the above
assumptions will be assessed.
1. In contrast to assumption 1. it is now supposed that constraint (2.5.36) doesn’t bind
in period t and t + h but binds in periods t + 1, . . . , t + h − 1. This would imply that
γt = γt+h = 0 while γt+1, . . . , γt+h−1 are without exception greater than zero. Now the
time period from t+ 1 on, where the constraint starts to bind, up to period t+h, where
the constraint ceases to bind (doesn’t bind anymore), is examined on the first order
condition associated to consumption (2.5.38).
λt+1 = Vc(ct+1, ht+1, φ) + γt+1ucc(ct+1, ht+1) (2.5.40)
λt+h = Vc(ct+h, ht+h, φ)− γt+h−1ucc(ct+h, ht+h)(1− δ) (2.5.41)
In these periods the government exhausts its tax limit. The after tax return on capital is
at its lower bound (1− δ). First order conditions (2.5.40) and (2.5.41), for time periods
t + 1 and t + h respectively, together with constraint (2.5.36)(which is binding in the
11Chamley 1985
12Atkeson/Chari/Kehoe 1999
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examined phase) imply:
Vc(ct+1, ht+1, φ) + γt+1ucc(ct+1, ht+1)
> βh−1(1− δ)h−1[Vc(ct+h, ht+h, φ)− γt+h−1ucc(ct+h, ht+h)(1− δ)]
(2.5.42)
For time periods t+1, . . . , t+h the constraint (2.5.36), it is binding in this phase, together
with the fact that V (ct, ht, φ)/uc(ct, ht) = V (ct+1, ht+1, φ)/uc(ct+1, ht+1) implies:
Vc(ct+1, ht+1, φ) = βh−1(1− δ)h−1Vc(ct+h, ht+h, φ) (2.5.43)
Combining equation (2.5.42) and (2.5.43) yields:
Vc(ct+1, ht+1, φ) + γt+1ucc(ct+1, ht+1)
> Vc(ct+1, ht+1, φ)− βh−1(1− δ)hγt+h−1ucc(ct+h, ht+h)→
γt+1ucc(ct+1, ht+1) > −βh−1(1− δ)hγt+h−1ucc(ct+h, ht+h) (2.5.44)
Since however by definition ucc(.) < 0, see section 2.1.1 (the utility functions fulfills the
INADA conditions), (2.5.44) is a contradiction. Constraint (2.5.36) therefore cannot not
be binding in one period, be binding in a finite number of periods thereafter, and then
cease to be binding again.
2. It can easily be shown that it can neither be true that the constraint binds forever.
If so the capital stock in the economy would step by step dissolved at the rate (1− δ).
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt
Since by definition Fk(0, ht) = 0 this would finally violate the resource constraint
(2.1.2).
3. If, as supposed, the constraint (2.5.36) ceases to bind in period t the same mechanism
as discussed before (for the class of preferences (2.5.30) and (2.5.31), without upper
bound on the capital tax rate and seen from period zero) lets the capital income tax
converge to zero within two periods. Therefore for periods s > t + 2 one can write the
first order conditions (2.5.38) and (2.5.39) in combination as
uc(cs, hs) = βuc(cs+1, hs+1)[Fk(ks+1, hs+1) + (1− δ)] (2.5.45)
With V (cs, hs, φ)/uc(cs, hs) = V (cs+1, hs+1, φ)/uc(cs+1, hs+1) or V (cs, hs, φ)/V (cs+1, hs+1, φ) =
uc(cs, hs)/uc(cs+1, hs+1) respectively expression (2.5.45) implies that the capital income
tax is zero for all periods s > t+ 2, where t is the period in which the constraint θ 6 1
ceases to bind.
38
2.6 The front-loading argument
In this section the result from the preceding sections that in the steady state the tax
on capital income should be optimally zero was confirmed. Moreover it was shown
that in the initial period the planner indeed has an incentive to tax capital: In the
initial period, in contrast to all periods thereafter, the taxation of capital causes no
intertemporal distortions. The government thus has the incentive to tax capital at very
high, confiscatory rates in the initial period in order to lower necessary distortionary
taxation in the future. Following Chamley13 it was shown that for the class of preferences
(2.5.30) and (2.5.31) and with an imposed upper bound on capital taxes θ 6 1, taxation
on capital income is positive for a finite number of periods and thereafter converges to
zero. The explanation for the behavior of the government was by now rather intuitive.
The next section will provide a more formal and pronounced argument for the front-
loading of taxation/distortions.
2.6 The front-loading argument
In this section the intuition that governments front-load taxation/distortions in order to
lower tax-caused distortions in the future will be examined in a more formal way. I will
therefore follow the argumentation of Stefania Albanesi and Roc Armenter14. Consider
the Euler equation of households (2.1.11) under the assumption that the economy has
converged to a steady state (the steady state is here denoted by the super/subscript
ss).
ussc = βu
ss
c [(1− θ)rss + (1− δ)] (2.6.1)
In contrast to the results derived before it is now supposed that, although the economy is
assumed to be in steady state, capital taxes are positive. Further the return on capital rss
is replaced along (2.1.33) by the marginal product of capital. This implies for equation
(2.6.1) that,
β−1 < F ssk + (1− δ) (2.6.2)
which contrasts to the identity 1 = β{(1 − θ)rss + 1 − δ} which formed the basis of
our conclusion that capital taxation should be zero in the steady state (compare to
equation (2.3.9)). Equation (2.6.2) represents the intertemporal wedge. As long as
there are positive capital taxes the intertemporal substitution behavior and therefore
the decision over present and future consumption is distorted: As already mentioned
13Chamley 1985
14Albanesi, Stefania & Armenter, Roc, 2007. ”Understanding Capital Taxation in Ramsey Models,”
Manuscript, Columbia University.
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in section 2.5.3, the existence of positive capital taxes implicitly implies a differential
taxation of consumption.
Equally one can write down the intratemporal wedge by using the household’s optimality
condition (2.1.10). Households equate the marginal rate of substitution between labor
and consumption with the after-tax labor income. Again it is supposed that the economy
has converged to a steady state.
−u
ss
h
ussc
= (1− τ)wss (2.6.3)
A positive tax rate on labor therefore implies that the intratemporal substitution behav-
ior between labor and consumption is distorted. Substituting for the marginal product
of labor this implies:
−u
ss
h
ussc
6 F ssh (2.6.4)
Distortions implied by equations (2.6.2) and (2.6.4) corresponding to a tax policy regime
limt→∞ θt = θ > 0 and limt→∞ τt = τ > 0 can obviously not be optimal. The goal is
now to find an alternative tax policy {τ˜t, θ˜t}∞t=0 which could increase welfare. In the here
examined case the focus rests upon the capital tax rate.
The intertemporal wedge (2.6.2) implies that it would be welfare increasing if the gov-
ernment could implement a policy which could encourage households to reallocate con-
sumption from period t to period t + 1. Note that is exactly the opposite to what a
positive capital tax rate implies incentive-wise for the intertemporal substitution behav-
ior of households: Under the assumption of a steady state with a positive capital tax
rate the incentives to procrastinate consumption are absent. As it was argued before
a positive tax rate on capital implies a differential and therefore an ever-increasing im-
plicit tax on private good consumption and is thus a contradiction to the steady state
assumption. The idea behind Albanesi and Armenter’s approach is now to change the
timing of distortions or, alternatively expressed, to front-load (capital) taxes in order to
allow tax cuts and therefore a lower level of distortions in the future. Note that this
is exactly what was argued in the preceding section. The forthcoming argumentation
more formally demonstrates the rationality behind Chamley’s result that governments
use front-loading of taxation in order to lower distortionary taxation in the future: It
was shown above that capital taxation in the beginning is extremely high, but zero when
the economy had finally converged to a steady state. The government can thus achieve
budget surpluses in initial periods and invest them in order to lower the necessity of dis-
tortionary taxation in the future by the proceeds. With such an approach governments
are able to reallocate resources, in example for consumption, to future periods as it is
implied by the intertemporal wedge (2.6.2), displayed above. It is important to note
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however that the only intertemporal distortions stem from capital taxation, as possible
labor supply effects caused through a positive tax rate on labor income in two succeeding
periods cancel each other out. Now a tax reform is sketched which front-loads distor-
tions along the discussion above and could therefore lead to an improvement of welfare.
The reformed system of taxes is denoted by {τ˜t, θ˜t}∞t=0 leading to the new allocations
{c˜t, h˜t, k˜t+1}∞t=0 in the competitive equilibrium. The proposed tax reform is tested exem-
plary at the hypothetical periods t and t+ 1 only. At all dates t+ 1 and thereafter, with
the exception j 6= t, all allocations and policies are assumed to be identical, therefore
c˜j = cj and h˜j = hj etc. Further it is assumed that the economy under the original policy
had already converged to a steady state at period t, therefore cj = css and hj = hss. The
reformed policy has to match the equilibrium conditions and the government’s budget
constraint valid under the original policy at period t. By Walras’ law it is redundant
to include the budget constraint for the government and the households: As mentioned
before, as soon as the private sector budget constraint and the resource constraint are
satisfied the government’s budget constraint is satisfied too. It is therefore sufficient to
examine the present value budget constraint of the households consolidated with the
household’s optimality conditions denoted as the implementability constraint. This was
already done in section 2.1.5 (see equation 2.5.11). The implementability constraint is
displayed again below.
∞∑
t=0
βt[uc(ct, ht)ct + uh(ct, ht)ht] = uc(c0, h0){[
r0︷ ︸︸ ︷
Fk(k0, h0)(1− θ0) + (1− δ)]k0 + b0}
For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that government purchases gt = g are constant
over time. In order to shift consumption from period t to period t + 1 consumption
in period t has to be reduced. Be the reduction of consumption in period t a small
increment  > 0.
dct = − (2.6.5)
This reduction of consumption corresponds to an intratemporal adjustment in labor
supply. Both effects have to satisfy,
d[uc(ct, ht)ct + uh(ct, ht)ht] = 0 (2.6.6)
in order to fulfill the competitive equilibrium conditions captured by the consolidated
present value budget constraint of the households (implementability constraint), dis-
played above.15 It is assumed that a value α solves the problem in order that (2.6.6)
15compare to equation (2.5.11)
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holds. One can write:
dht = αdct (2.6.7)
It is therefore assumed that α is the ratio at which ht has to change corresponding to a
reduction in ct. One can therefore denote the induced change in ht, dht, as:
dht = −α (2.6.8)
Thus, for the competitive equilibrium condition to hold a reduction in ct has to lead
to an in-/decrease of labor supply. To see which impact this changes have on capi-
tal accumulation the resource constraint (2.1.2) has to be examined, displayed again
below.
ct + gt + kt+1 = F (kt, ht) + (1− δ)kt
Given the change in consumption, the change in investment corresponds to
dkt+1 = F ssh dht − dct (2.6.9)
implying with (2.6.5) and (2.6.8) that:
dkt+1 = − αF ssh = (1− αF ssh ) (2.6.10)
Next the implications of the shift of resources for period t + 1 are examined. It should
be noted that in the absence of a response of labor supply a reduction in consumption
would lead directly to an increase of investment. It is anyway not necessary here to
make an assertion over how investment changes in response to a change (reduction)
in consumption. As in period t in period t + 1 a change in consumption has to be
accompanied by a change in labor supply in order that the competitive equilibrium
conditions holds.
d[uc(ct+1, ht+1)ct+1 + uh(ct+1, ht+1)ht+1] = 0 (2.6.11)
The relation of a change in consumption and labor supply in period t+ 1 is the same as
in period t.
dht+1 = αdct+1 (2.6.12)
Further the economy’s resource constraint is examined to see which implications the
perturbations in period t have for period period t + 1. Note, that the consumption in
period t was reduced by an increment in order to reallocate resources to period t + 1.
This has implications for the stock of capital in the economy as well as for the labor
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supply. The change in consumption in period t+1 can thus be expressed via the resource
constraint in period t+ 1:
dct+1 = F ssh dht+1 + F
ss
k dkt+1 + (1− δ)dkt+1 = F ssh dht+1 + (F ssk + 1− δ)dkt+1
(2.6.13)
Using the derived change of investment in period t, dkt+1 = (1 − αF ssh ), from (2.6.10)
and equation (2.6.12) describing the relationship between changes in labor supply and
consumption, dht+1 = αdct+1, substituted into the differentiated resource constraint
(2.6.13) allows to rewrite it as follows:
dct+1 = F ssh αdct+1 + (F
ss
k + 1− δ)(1− αF ssh )
= F ssh αdct+1 − αF ssh (F ssk + 1− δ)+ (F ssk + 1− δ)
= αF ssh [dct+1 − (F ssk + 1− δ)] + (F ssk + 1− δ) (2.6.14)
Hence the change in consumption dct+1 can be pinned down as
dct+1 = (F ssk + 1− δ) (2.6.15)
Equation (2.6.15) represents the shift of resources from period t to period t + 1 in the
form of consumption: The reduction in consumption in period t goes into the capital
stock and allows for a higher consumption by the factor (F ssk +1−δ) in period t+1 than
under the original policy. The welfare effects in periods t and t+ 1 can be summarized
as follows:
d[u(ct, ht) + βu(ct+1, ht+1)] = ussc [dct + βdct+1] + u
ss
h [dht + βdht+1] (2.6.16)
As already postulated, the relation dht = αdct holds in both periods t and t + 1. One
can hence write:
dht + βdht+1 = α[dct + βdct+1] (2.6.17)
Expression (2.6.17) allows to rewrite equation (2.6.16), which is capturing the overall
welfare effects.
d[u(ct, ht) + βu(ct+1, ht+1)] = ussc [dct + βdct+1] + u
ss
h α[dct + βdct+1] =
[ussc + αu
ss
h ][dct + βdct+1] (2.6.18)
The overall welfare effect induced by the reallocation of resources depends on the sign
of the term [ussc + αu
ss
h ]. Hence there are two possibilities:
1) [ussc + αu
ss
h ] 6 0: The central point of the hitherto used argumentation was that it
might be welfare increasing to front-load distortions in the form of high taxes on capital
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in initial periods which are later on relaxed. Under the assumption that [ussc +αu
ss
h ] 6 0
the result is however contrary to expectations. If [ussc + αu
ss
h ] 6 0 the intratemporal
wedge (2.6.4), representing the substitution behavior between labor and consumption in
period t, −usshussc 6 F
ss
h , implies that 1 6 αF ssh and hence that dkt+1 = F ssh dht+1 − dct =
(1 − αF ssh ) 6 0 (compare to equation (2.6.10)). This means that shifting distortions
to period t is welfare increasing and that it is not necessary to reduce the distortions
again later in the next periods: As the derived conditions dkt+1 6 0 shows, no increase
in the capital stock in period t+ 1 is needed in order to satisfy the economy’s resource
constraint and thus the other equilibrium conditions. Albanesi and Armenter admit
that one could think of such a situation in an economy which is extremely distorted
through high taxation, so that a small tax cut would allow gains in tax revenues and
a reallocation of resources via capital is obsolete. This case can be regarded as rather
unrealistic and can therefore be discarded.
2) [ussc + αu
ss
h ] > 0: The more interesting scenario is the case [u
ss
c + αu
ss
h ] > 0. Here the
welfare change corresponds to the changes in consumption in periods t and t+1 induced
by the front-loading of distortions via means of capital taxation. Note: The assumption
of positive capital taxes in the steady state corresponds to an ever-increasing (differential)
taxation on consumption implying intertemporal distortions. The idea was to revert
this effect by changing the timing of distortions (capital taxes) in order to reallocate
resources (for consumption) from period t to period t + 1 to show that this delivers a
higher welfare (strictly speaking just the effects and consequences of the front-loading of
distortions were examined). The changes in consumption and welfare respectively can
be denoted in proportions:
d[u(ct, ht) + βu(ct+1, ht+1)] ∝ dct + βdct+1 (2.6.19)
Using dct = − from equation (2.6.5) and dct+1 = (F ssk + 1 − δ) from (2.6.15) allows
to rewrite the overall change of consumption induced by the reallocation of resources to
the form:
dct + βdct+1 = −+ β(F ssk + 1− δ) = (β(F ssk + 1− δ)− 1) (2.6.20)
Result (2.6.20) together with the intertemporal wedge (2.6.2), β−1 < F ssk + (1− δ), sup-
ports the basic, motivational idea that a shift of distortions and therefore a reallocation
of resources from period t to period t + 1 could improve welfare. This leads to two
assertions:
1. The original policy incorporated capital taxation in the steady state which lead
to intertemporal distortions as it is implying an ever-increasing implicit taxation of
consumption outweighing incentives to an otherwise welfare increasing reallocation of
resources from period t to t + 1. The front-loading of distortions (capital taxes) was
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simulated by artificially (against the incentives under the original tax policy) decreasing
consumption in the initial period t. It was shown that the thereby induced change in
capital accumulation, labor supply and in the overall consumption profile (for period t
and t+1) leads to a strictly higher welfare. Since the welfare improving new consumption
profile is not compatible with the original tax policy (positive capital taxes), it can be
concluded that an optimal tax policy in the steady state cannot feature positive capital
taxes. Vice versa it is not logic to have long run capital subsidies, implying a negative tax
rate on capital. This would just mean to use another source of distortions namely labor
taxes, to finance distortionary capital subsidies. The argumentation hitherto adduced
therefore supports the core Chamley-Judd result, which was already discussed in detail
in the previous sections: capital taxes have to be optimally zero in the steady state.
2. Besides this, the exercised front-loading argument gives insight for the second key
result of Chamley which was discussed in section 2.5: The government does have in-
centives to tax capital in the initial period(s): For preferences of the class (2.5.30) and
(2.5.31) and an imposed upper bound on capital taxation, the optimal capital tax policy
over time is characterized by two regimes: A phase at the beginning where capital is
taxed excessively. Governments use this phase to accumulate capital, therefore to real-
locate resources and lower distortions in the future. After a certain time a regime switch
takes place and capital income taxes permanently converge to zero. How long the first
regime lasts depends on the marginal excess burden, meaning the welfare costs caused
by distortionary taxation, as well as on a possible upper limit for capital taxes.16 One
has to note however: The ability of the government to save and therefore to transfer
resources from the present to the future is crucial for this result.
2.7 Fiscal policy in a stochastic environment
2.7.1 The Model Environment and Notation
In the following section the hitherto gained results will be discussed in a stochastic
environment. This is on the one hand done for the sake of completeness, on the other
hand it fits to the models which are going to be discussed in chapters 3 and 4 respectively.
The basic model setup is the same as in the deterministic case presented before. Here
however it is assumed that in each period a finite number of different events st ∈ S can
occur. These events represent shocks on production F (., ., st) and government purchases
gt(st). The occurrence of events from the initial period up to the present represents
a history denoted as st = (s0, s1, s2, . . . , st) where s0 is given. The probability for
the realization of a certain history st is expressed by pi(st). c(st) and h(st) denote
16Chamley 1985, pp. 616 and section 2.5
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consumption and labor supply at period t for history st respectively. kt+1(st) represents
the t+ 1 capital stock, which, as the decision for the capital accumulation was taken in
period t, depends on the history st. The household’s preferences are given by:
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtpit(st)u(ct(st), ht(st)) where β ∈ (0, 1) (2.7.1)
The resource constraint of the economy is standard but accommodates history contin-
gency and the stochastic nature of the economy.
ct(st) + gt(st) + kt+1(st) = F (kt(st−1), ht(st), st) + (1− δ)kt(st−1) (2.7.2)
The government finances its expenditures with taxes on labor income τt(st) and capital
income θt(st). Further the government issues state-contingent bonds: bt+1(st+1|st) de-
notes the stock of public debt in period t+ 1 in the case of shock st+1. Bonds are traded
in period t at the price pt(st+1|st). The budget constraint of the government reads as
follows:
gt(st) = τt(st)wt(st)ht(st) + θt(st)rt(st)kt(st−1) +
∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)bt+1(st+1|st)− bt(st|st−1)
(2.7.3)
The budget constraint of the households reads:
ct(st) + kt+1(st) +
∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)bt+1(st+1|st) =
(1− θt(st))rt(st)kt(st−1) + (1− τt(st))wt(st)ht(st) + (1− δ)kt(st−1) + bt(st|st−1)
(2.7.4)
The households maximize the utility function (2.7.1) with respect to {ct(st), ht(st), kt+1(st),
bt+1(st+1|st)∀st, st+1}∞t=0 and subject to the household’s budget constraint (2.7.4). For
notational simplicity functions will be further on denoted as u(st) instead of u(ct(st), ht(st))
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The maximization process of the households yields the following optimality conditions:
− uh(s
t)
uc(st)
= (1− τt(st))wt(st) (2.7.5)
pt(st+1|st) = βpit+1(s
t+1)
pit(st)
uc(st+1)
uc(st)
(2.7.6)
uc(st) = β
∑
st+1|st
pit+1(st+1)
pit(st)
uc(st+1)[(1− θt+1(st+1))rt+1(st+1) + (1− δ)]
= βEt{uc(st+1)[(1− θt+1(st+1))rt+1(st+1) + (1− δ)]} (2.7.7)
Combining optimality condition (2.7.6) and (2.7.7) gives a no-arbitrage condition similar
to that obtained in the deterministic version(compare to expression (2.1.12)).
1 =
∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)[(1− θt+1(st+1))rt+1(st+1) + (1− δ)] (2.7.8)
The interpretation of the no-arbitrage condition is the same as in the deterministic
case. By forward iteration of the period-by-period budget constraint one obtains the
present value budget constraint (compare to section 2.1 and remember the role of the
no-arbitrage condition (2.1.12)).
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
q0t (s
t)ct(st) =
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
q0t (s
t)[1− τt(st)]wt(st)ht(st) + [(1− θ0)r0 + (1− δ)]k0 + b0
(2.7.9)
where by definition,
q0t+1(s
t+1) = pt(st+1|st)q0t (st) = βt+1pit+1(st+1)
uc(st+1)
uc(s0)
(2.7.10)
with the numeraire q00 = 1. Along the argumentation in the deterministic case two
transversality conditions were imposed prescribing that the present discounted value of
bonds and capital held by the households should be zero at the limit.
lim q0t (s
t)kt+1(st) = 0 (2.7.11)
lim
∑
st+1
q0t+1({st+1, st})bt+1(st+1|st) = 0 (2.7.12)
Again the private sector optimality conditions (2.7.5) to (2.7.7), together with the no-
arbitrage condition (2.7.8) can be used to express prices and taxes in the present value
budget constraint (2.7.9) in order to obtain the implementability constraint. Note that as
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before we assume that factor markets are in equilibrium and that the marginal products
of labor and capital equate to their respective factor prices. Thus, Fk(st) = rt(st) and
Fh(st) = wt(st).
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
{
q0t (s
t)ct(st) + q0t (s
t)
uh(st)
uc(st)
ht(st)
}
= [(1− θ0)r0 + (1− δ)]k0 + b0 (2.7.13)
Substitute for q0t (s
t) from definition (2.7.10) yields:
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
{
βtpit(st)
uc(st)
uc(s0)
ct(st) + βtpit(st)
uc(st)
uc(s0)
uh(st)
uc(st)
ht(st)
}
= [(1− θ0)r0 + (1− δ)]k0 + b0
(2.7.14)
Further simplified, expression (2.7.14) yields an implementability constraint comparable
to that in the deterministic case (2.5.11).
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtpit(st)[uc(st)ct(st) + uh(st)ht(st)]−A = 0 (2.7.15)
with
A = A(c0, h0, θ0) = uc(s0){[(1− θ0)r0 + (1− δ)]k0 + b0}
As already used before but for the sake of completeness: the factor prices of labor and
capital equate, as in the deterministic case, to their marginal products.
rt(st) = Fk(st) (2.7.16)
wt(st) = Fh(st) (2.7.17)
2.7.2 The indeterminacy problem of capital taxes and state contingent debt
Suppose that there is a feasible government policy {gt(st), θt(st), τt(st), bt+1(st+1|st);∀st, st+1}t>0
and corresponding optimal allocations {ct(st), ht(st), kt+1(st);∀st}t>0. The tax on labor
income is pinned down by the household’s optimality condition (2.7.5) and by (2.7.17).
This is however not true for capital tax rates and state contingent debt. To see this
consider the household’s optimality condition (2.7.7) rewritten in (2.7.18):
uc(st) = βEt{uc(st+1)[(1− θt+1(st+1))rt+1(st+1) + (1− δ)]} (2.7.18)
It is obvious that the government has the ability to manipulate the current market
value of after tax returns on capital and thereby keep the expectations constant across
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different states of the world and compatible with the optimal allocations. Such a policy
however would have consequences for tax receipts which could be offset by constructing
a suitable alternative debt policy. Along Zhu17 it is assumed that {t(st)} is a random
process which satisfies
Et[uc(st+1)t+1(st+1)rt+1(st+1)] = 0 (2.7.19)
Now an alternative policy for debt and capital is constructed for all st,st+1 and all t > 0
denoted as θˆt(st) and bˆt+1(st+1|st). In period t = 0 the original and the alternative
policy concerning the capital taxation is equivalent: θˆ0 = θ0.
θˆt+1(st+1) = θt+1(st+1) + t+1(st+1) (2.7.20)
bˆt+1(st+1|st) = bt+1(st+1|st) + t+1(st+1)rt+1(st+1)kt+1(st) (2.7.21)
∀t > 0
To assure this alternative policy would be compatible with the optimal allocations as well
three conditions have to be fulfilled: 1) The alternative policy mustn’t change household’s
intertemporal consumption/saving behavior captured in optimality condition (2.7.7). 2)
The current market value of period t government debt discounted with the equilibrium
price for bonds, see optimality condition (2.7.6), mustn’t be changed. 3) The capital tax
receipts net-of-debt-redemption should be unchanged for any state of the world st+1.
1. The intertemporal consumption/saving behavior, captured in the optimality condi-
tion (2.7.7), under the alternative policy regime concerning capital taxes θˆt(st) reads as
follows.
uc(st) = βEt{uc(st+1)[(1− θˆt+1(st+1))rt+1(st+1) + (1− δ)]}
= βEt{uc(st+1)[(1− θt+1(st+1)− t+1(st+1))rt+1(st+1) + (1− δ)]} (2.7.22)
If the perturbation t+1(st+1) is a random process as defined in equation (2.7.19) the
term, taken expectations, is zero. Obviously condition (2.7.22) stays unchanged com-
pared to under the original policy (2.7.7).
2. For point 2) to be satisfied the current market value of government debt issued at
period t has to be the same under the original and the alternative policy. Hence,∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)bˆt+1(st+1|st) =
∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)bt+1(st+1|st) (2.7.23)
Substitute along the alternative policy bˆt+1(st+1|st) from (2.7.21) and for pt(st+1|st)
17Zhu, Xiaodong, 1992. ”Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Stochastic Growth Model,” Journal of Economic
Theory, vol. 58, pp. 250-289.
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from the optimality condition (2.7.6) on the left-hand side of equation (2.7.23). This
yields:∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)bˆt+1(st+1|st)
=
∑
st+1
β
pit+1(st+1)
pit(st)
uc(st+1)
uc(st)
[bt+1(st+1|st) + t+1(st+1)rt+1(st+1)kt+1(st)]
=
∑
st+1
β
pit+1(st+1)
pit(st)
uc(st+1)
uc(st)
bt+1(st+1|st) =
∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)bt+1(st+1|st) (2.7.24)
Equation (2.7.24) is exactly what point 2) demanded to show.
3. The capital tax receipts net of the redemption of government debt for all states of
the world st+1 under the alternative policy can be denoted as:
θˆt(st)rt(st)kt(st−1)− bˆt(st|st−1)
= θt(st)rt(st)kt(st−1) + t(st)rt(st)kt(st−1)− bt(st|st−1)− t(st)rt(st)kt(st−1)
= θt(st)kt(st−1)rt(st)− bt(st|st−1) (2.7.25)
Hence also condition 3) is fulfilled. This means, as there are infinitely many {t(st)}
which would satisfy definition (2.7.19), that there is not a unique policy plan for cap-
ital taxes and state contingent government debt which is feasible and compatible with
optimal allocations: Instead there are many policy plans which would be suitable. One
can therefore consider a scenario in which one of the two policy instruments is predeter-
mined: 1) The government issues only risk free bonds. The capital tax would then be
contingent to which state of the world materializes. 2) The government sets an ex-ante
capital tax one period ahead leaving government debt be state contingent again.
Scenario 1: The government issues risk-free bonds in period t paying b¯t+1(st) in period
t+ 1 regardless which state of the world is realized. To be compatible with the optimal
allocations and in order to be feasible conditions 1. and 3., which were demanded before,
have to be fulfilled. Hence, the market value of period t government bonds discounted
with the equilibrium price pt(st+1|st) has to be the same under the original debt policy
and under the policy with risk free bonds.∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)b¯t+1(st) =
∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)bt+1(st+1|st) (2.7.26)
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Invoking the equilibrium price pt(st+1|st) from optimality condition (2.7.6) yields:∑
st+1
β
pit+1(st+1)
pit(st)
uc(st+1)
uc(st)
b¯t+1(st) =
∑
st+1
β
pit+1(st+1)
pit(st)
uc(st+1)
uc(st)
bt+1(st+1|st)→
Etuc(st+1)b¯t+1(st) = Etuc(st+1)bt+1(st+1|st)→
b¯t+1(st) =
Etuc(st+1)bt+1(st+1|st)
Etuc(st+1)
(2.7.27)
Such a change to risk free government debt consequently has to be outweighed by a
change of capital taxes. Equation (2.7.21) implies a perturbation of capital taxes in the
form of:
t+1(st+1) =
b¯t+1(st)− bt+1(st+1|st)
rt+1(st+1)kt+1(st)
(2.7.28)
As it was shown before a perturbation in the form of (2.7.28) satisfies conditions 1.
and 3.(that condition 2. is satisfied was a basic assumption in introducing risk free
government debt). Such a policy would therefore be feasible and compatible with the
optimal allocations.
Scenario 2: Assume θ¯t+1(st) to be the ex-ante capital tax, set in period t, conditional
on the information of period t, and valid in period t + 1. By condition 1. such a
policy change must not change the intertemporal consumption/saving behavior or to
put it differently, it must not change expectations over the current market value of after
tax returns on capital in order to be compatible with the optimal allocations. Along
optimality condition (2.7.7) it therefore has to hold that:
Et{uc(st+1)[(1− θ¯t+1(st))rt+1(st+1) + (1− δ)]}
= Et{uc(st+1)[(1− θt+1(st+1))rt+1(st+1) + (1− δ)]} (2.7.29)
Condition (2.7.29) allows to express the ex-ante capital tax rate θ¯t+1(st):
θ¯t+1(st) =
Etuc(st+1)θt+1(st+1)rt+1(st+1)
Etuc(st+1)rt+1(st+1)
(2.7.30)
To pin down capital taxes like that, a perturbation of debt policy to offset the policy
shift is necessary:
t+1(st+1) = θ¯t+1(st)− θt+1(st+1) (2.7.31)
As shown before a perturbation of the form of (2.7.31) fulfills conditions 2. and 3. and
would therefore be feasible and compatible with equilibrium allocations.
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Intuitively it seems reasonable to assume that a government uses preset and there-
fore not-contingent capital taxes to solve for itself the indeterminacy problem described
above. Hence it is the only way to analyze capital tax policy (note that the tax rate
on labor income is uniquely determined by optimality condition (2.7.5) and (2.7.17)).
Merging optimality condition (2.7.6) with equation (2.7.30) gives:
θ¯t+1(st) =
∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)θt+1(st+1)rt+1(st+1)∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)rt+1(st+1) (2.7.32)
Equation (2.7.32) expresses the ex-ante tax rate on capital as the ratio of the current
market value of capital tax receipts to the current market value of capital income.
2.7.3 The primal formulation under uncertainty
Along the procedure in the deterministic case, compare to section 2.5.2, an objective
function with the utility function (2.7.1) and the implementability constraint (2.7.15) is
defined.
V (ct(st), ht(st), φ)
= u(ct(st), ht(st)) + φ[uc(ct(st), ht(st))ct(st) + uh(ct(st), ht(st))ht(st)] (2.7.33)
The variable φ is the Lagrange multiplier on the implementability constraint (2.7.15).
The problem of the government now is to maximize expression (2.7.33) subject to the
economy’s resource constraint (2.7.2). Written in Lagrange form the problem of the
Ramsey planner is:
L =
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtpit(st){V (ct(st), ht(st), φ)
+ λt(st)[F (kt(st−1), ht(st), st) + (1− δ)kt(st−1)− ct(st)− gt(st) + kt+1(st)]} − φA
(2.7.34)
The Lagrange function (2.7.34), with k0, b0 and θ0 being given, is derived with respect
to {ct(st), ht(st), kt+1(st);∀st}t>0. Combination of the respective first order conditions
finally yields the following optimality conditions. The derivation of the first order con-
52
2.7 Fiscal policy in a stochastic environment
ditions resembles the procedure in the deterministic case and is therefore omitted.
Vc(st) = β
∑
st+1|st
pit+1(st+1)
pit(st)
Vc(st+1)[Fk(st+1) + (1− δ)]
= βEtVc(st+1)[Fk(st+1) + (1− δ)] (2.7.35)
Vh(st) = −Vc(st)Fh(st) (2.7.36)
Vh(s0) = −[Vc(s0)− φAc]Fh(s0) + φAh (2.7.37)
Vh(s0) = [φAc − Vc(s0)]Fh(s0) + φAh (2.7.38)
2.7.4 Capital taxation in the stochastic economy for a certain class of
preferences
As in the deterministic case it is easy to show that for a certain class of utility functions,
namely the stochastic versions of the utility functions (2.5.30) and (2.5.31), it is optimal
not to distort capital accumulation for periods t > 1 respectively not to tax capital for
periods t > 2. To see this compare optimality condition (2.7.35) and the household’s
optimality condition (2.7.7) rewritten slightly changed in equations (2.7.39) and (2.7.40)
respectively.
1 = β
∑
st+1|st
pit+1(st+1)
pit(st)
Vc(st+1)
Vc(st)
[Fk(st+1) + (1− δ)] (2.7.39)
1 = β
∑
st+1|st
pit+1(st+1)
pit(st)
uc(st+1)
uc(st)
[(1− θt+1(st+1))rt+1(st+1) + (1− δ)] (2.7.40)
For the deterministic case it was shown that utility functions of the class (2.5.30) and
(2.5.31) exhibit constant expenditure elasticities for all periods t > 1. This is also true
for the stochastic scenario. Hence:
Vc(st)
uc(st)
=
Vc(st+1)
uc(st+1)
or
Vc(st+1)
Vc(st)
=
uc(st+1)
uc(st)
(2.7.41)
With expression (2.7.41) substituted into equation (2.7.39) it can be merged with equa-
tion (2.7.40) to yield after some manipulations:
∑
st+1|st
β
pit+1(st+1)
pit(st)
uc(st+1)
uc(st)
[Fk(st+1)− (1− θt+1(st+1))rt+1(st+1)] = 0 (2.7.42)
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Substituting for the equilibrium price of government debt pt(st+1|st) from household’s
optimality condition (2.7.6) in equation (2.7.42) and using the firm’s first oder condition
Fk(st) = rt(st) to express the marginal product of capital by its factor price yields:∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)θt+1(st+1)rt+1(st+1) = 0 (2.7.43)
Resulting equation (2.7.43) equals the numerator of the before derived ex-ante capital
tax rate from equation (2.7.32): It can therefore be concluded that for the class of
utility functions (2.5.30) and (2.5.31) it is not optimal to distort capital accumulation
for periods t > 1, hence the ex-ante tax rate on capital should be zero for periods
t > 2.18 If one had imposed an exogenous upper bound on capital taxes, as it was done
in the deterministic case, the mechanism would be equivalent: This means that there
would be a finite number of periods with high capital taxation and after one period of
transition the optimal tax rate on capital would converge to zero. Anyhow this case
is not considered here. The introduction of an upper bound on capital tax rates in
the stochastic case would lead to a constraint similar to (2.5.36) in the deterministic
economy.
2.7.5 Stationarity and Capital Taxation
In an economy with preferences unlike represented through the utility functions (2.5.30)
and (2.5.31) one has to turn back to a concept similar to the steady state assumption in
the deterministic economy: In a stochastic environment one speaks of stationarity. For
a stationary equilibrium to materialize the underlying stochastic process has to fulfill
certain criteria. Therefore the following definitions are undertaken:19
1. Be the stochastic process {st} of Markov property where only the most recent of all
foregone events is relevant in predicting the future.
Prob(st+1|st, st−1, . . . , st−k) = Prob(st+1 = s′|st = s) = pi(s′|s) (2.7.44)
2. The Markov chain is time invariant, hence it holds that,
Prob(st+1 = j|st = i) = Prob(st+2 = j|st+1 = i) (2.7.45)
for all t and (i, j) ∈ S2 where S = (1, 2, . . . , n) represents the n-dimensional state
space.
18Chari/Christiano/Kehoe 1994
19Ljungqvist/Sargent 2004, pp. 29.; Stein, Luke C. D., 2009. ”Economics 210. Section 5,” Lecture
notes, Stanford University, http://www.stanford.edu/ lstein/ [25/11/2010].
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3. The transition probabilities can therefore be summarized in a stochastic n×n matrix
P with elements Pij = Prob(st+1 = j|st = i) ∀i, j, t where
∑n
j=1 Pij = 1 ∀i.
4. Be pi0 a n × 1 vector whose ith element defines the Prob(s0 = i) of being in state
i at period zero with
∑n
j=1 pi01 = 1. This can be used to make assertions over the
unconditional probability distributions in other periods for example s1 ∈ S with pi1i =
Prob(s1 = i):
pi1i = Prob(s1 = i) =
n∑
j=1
Prob(s1 = i|s0 = j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pji
Prob(s0 = j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi01
(2.7.46)
One can write this as pi1 = P ′pi0 or in general pit+1 = P ′pit. Forward iteration leads to
pit = (P ′)tpi0. For the probability distribution to be stationary it has to hold that pit+1 =
pit. Along the law of motion for the unconditional probability it therefore has to hold
that pi = P ′pi or differently expressed (I−P ′)pi = 0. Hence the stationary distribution pi
is an eigenvector associated to a unitary eigenvalue of P ′ (with
∑n
i=1 pii = 1). As P was
defined to be a stochastic matrix with
∑n
j=1 Pij = 1∀i and nonnegative elements. This
means there is a positive probability for the transition from any state to any other state,
hence P is an ergodic distribution. From the law of motion of unconditional probability
one can define the limiting distribution across states as:
lim
t→∞pit = limt→∞(P
′)tpi0 ≡ pi∞(pio) (2.7.47)
If the limiting distribution is equal for all initial distributions pi0 then one speaks of an
asymptotically stationary Markov process with a unique invariant distribution, where
the limiting distribution pi∞ is denoted as an ergodic distribution.
What implications does this have for the here examined outcomes of the stochastic
Ramsey model? The optimality conditions (2.7.35) and (2.7.36), displayed again below,
are revisited.
Vc(st) = βEtVc(st+1)[Fk(st+1) + (1− δ)] (2.7.48)
Vh(st) = −Vc(st)Fh(st) (2.7.49)
If the stochastic process as described in 1. is of a Markov property equations (2.7.48)
and (2.7.49) imply that for periods t > 1 allocations for consumption, labor and capital
accumulation are time invariant functions of s and k (variables in the Ramsey planner’s
problem should be understood to be aggregate): c(s, k), h(s, k), k′(s, k). If the stochastic
Markov process {st, kt} now is stationary and ergodic, as described above, there exists a
unique invariant distribution on the compact set S× [0, k¯] (k¯ is the maximal sustainable
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capital stock, S is the state space), P∞, with:
Prob{(kt, st)} = P∞ ∀t (2.7.50)
lim
j→∞
Prob{(kt+j , st+j)|kt, st} = P∞ (2.7.51)
In the case of a stationary Ramsey equilibrium there are two possible outcomes regarding
the ex-ante tax rate on capital.
1. P∞(θ¯t = 0) = 1 (2.7.52)
2. P∞(θ¯t > 0) > 0 or P∞(θ¯t < 0) > 0 (2.7.53)
Deciding for the sign of the ex-ante capital tax rate is its numerator, see equation (2.7.32):
θ¯t+1(st) > (6)0 if and only if:∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)θt+1(st+1)rt+1(st+1) > (6)0 (2.7.54)
Merging equation (2.7.54) with the no-arbitrage condition (2.7.8) implies:
1 6 (>)
∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)[rt+1(st+1) + (1− δ)] (2.7.55)
Substituting for the equilibrium price of bonds by the household’s optimality condition
(2.7.6) and for the factor price of capital by its marginal product yields:
1 6 (>)
∑
st+1|st
β
pit+1(st+1)
pit(st)
uc(st+1)
uc(st)
[Fk(st+1) + (1− δ)] (2.7.56)
or respectively if θ¯t+1(st) > (6)0 then
uc(st) 6 (>)βEtuc(st+1)[Fk(st+1) + (1− δ)] (2.7.57)
Defining H(st) ≡ Vc(st)uc(st) and substituting it into the optimality condition (2.7.48) of the
Ramsey planner yields:
H(st)uc(st) = βEtH(st+1)uc(st+1)[Fk(st+1) + (1− δ)] (2.7.58)
Defining ω(st+1) ≡ uc(st+1)[Fk(st+1)+(1− δ)] and substituting for in equations (2.7.57)
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and (2.7.58) gives equations (2.7.59) and (2.7.60) respectively.
uc(st) 6 (>)βEtω(st+1) (2.7.59)
H(st)uc(st) = βEtH(st+1)ω(st+1) (2.7.60)
Merging these two equations finally yields:
H(st) > (6)Etω(s
t+1)H(st+1)
Etω(st+1)
if θ¯t+1(st) > (6)0 (2.7.61)
As it was assumed that the stationary Ramsey equilibrium, as the stochastic process is
Markov, can be described by time-invariant allocation rules c(s, k), h(s, k) and k′(s, k)
this also has to be true for θ¯t+1(st), H(st) and ω(st). The transition probability is
denoted by pi(s′|s)(see 1. from the definition of the stochastic process). Under the
assumption of a stationary equilibrium equation (2.7.61) can be denoted as:
H(s, k) > (6)
∑
s′ pi(s
′|s)ω(s′, k′(s, k))H(s′, k′(s, k))∑
s′ pi(s′|s)ω(s′, k′(s, k))
≡ ΓH(s, k) (2.7.62)
if θ¯(s, k) > (6)0
The operator Γ is defined as the weighted average of H(s′, k′(s, k)). Γ by definition
satisfies ΓH∗ = H∗ for any constant H∗. The stationary equilibrium is not fixed but
oscillates, hence one can assume that there is a minimum H−(s−, k−) = H− and a
maximum H+(s+, k+) = H+. Hence the limiting distribution for the following two
cases has to be one. H(s, k) fluctuates between the two extremities:
P∞[H(s, k) > H−] = 1 (2.7.63)
P∞[H(s, k) 6 H+] = 1 (2.7.64)
Equation (2.7.62) suggests something similar for the two possible outcomes:
P∞[H(s, k) > ΓH(s, k)] = 1 (2.7.65)
P∞[H(s, k) 6 ΓH(s, k)] = 1 (2.7.66)
Considering case (2.7.65) and assume a state (s, k) = (s−, k−) with the possible state
{s′, k′(s, k);∀s′ ∈ S} in the next period. Equation (2.7.63) also holds in the next period
hence H(s′, k′) > H−. By the fact that H(s, k) = H− and (2.7.65) this implies that
H(s′, k′) = H−. Forward iteration of this argument finally yields H∗ = H− as it
was initially assumed {st, kt} to be a stationary ergodic stochastic process. The same
argumentation can be applied for the pair of equations (2.7.64) and (2.7.66). Given the
state (s, k) = (s+, k+) there are possible states {s′, k′(s, k);∀s′ ∈ S} for the next period.
By equation (2.7.64) it has to hold that H(s′, k′) 6 H+. H(s, k) = H+ together with
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(2.7.66) implies that H(s′, k′) = H+. Further applying this argumentation to successive
periods finally yields H∗ = H+. Hence it can be concluded that there is a constant H∗
for which it holds that:
P∞[H(s, k) = H∗] = 1 (2.7.67)
Expression (2.7.67) and the inequality (2.7.62) imply that in a stationary equilibrium
the optimal ex-ante capital tax rate oscillates around zero, hence P∞(θ¯t > 0) > 0 and
P∞(θ¯t < 0) > 0.
2.8 Fiscal policy under a balanced budget assumption
Another assumption to which the hitherto derived result of an optimally zero capital tax
in the steady state or, in a stochastic environment, in a stationary equilibrium, is robust
to, is that of a period-by-period balanced budget constraint. It can easily be seen and
it was also admitted that the result doesn’t change if one sets all variables concerning
government debt to zero in sections 2.3 or 2.4. If one chooses the primal approach
the procedure is more complicated. In the primal formulation government debt doesn’t
appear explicitly. Therefore an additional constraint has to be introduced controlling
for that. In the case of a balanced budget it obviously has to hold that:
gt = τtwtht + θtrtkt (2.8.1)
This means the government finances its expenditures solely with the current tax revenues.
Substituting for taxes and prices from the household’s optimality conditions (2.1.10)
and (2.1.11), the firms first order conditions (2.1.33) and (2.1.34) and for government
purchases from the economy’s resource constraint (2.1.2) in constraint (2.8.1) leads to
an implementability constraint similar to that in the standard setting with government
debt (compare to equation (2.5.11)).20
uc(ct−1, ht−1)kt = β[uc(ct, ht)(ct + kt+1) + uh(ct, ht)ht] (2.8.2)
It would then be the Ramsey problem to maximize the aggregate welfare function subject
to (2.8.2) and the economy’s resource constraint (2.1.2). The results under the assump-
tion of a balanced budget are qualitatively the same as in the setting with government
debt: If the economy is in a steady state or has converged to a stationary allocation the
optimal capital tax rate is zero or varies around zero respectively21. There are however
20Klein/R´ıos-Rull 2003, p. 1222; Stockman, David R., 2001. ”Balanced-Budget Rules: Welfare Loss and
Optimal Policies,” Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics,
vol. 4(2), pp. 438-459.
21compare section 2.3 to 2.5 and Stockman 2001
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two differences: First, it was shown above that the capital tax rate is automatically zero
for periods t > 2 for the class of utility functions (2.5.30) and (2.5.31). This not true
under a balanced budget regime.22 Second, as the government in the balanced budget
setting is unable to save or to borrow and is hence forced to cover its expenditures
by current tax revenues, there is no excessive tax levy in the initial period which the
government could otherwise use to lower distortionary taxation the future. The front
loading argument in the style presented in section 2.6 therefore fails.23 Albanesi and
Armenter however note that in such a case the government ”...manipulate[s] the path of
consumption and capital...” in a way which has the same effects as the front-loading of
distortionary taxation.24
2.9 Summary and Interpretation
In the chapter 2 optimal fiscal policy was examined under the assumption that the
policymaker can fully commit to a sequence of policies for all future periods. The central
result was that capital taxes are optimally zero once the economy has converged to a
steady state or varies around zero in a stationary equilibrium in a stochastic economy.
This result is robust to wether the government is allowed to issue bonds or if it has to
stick to a period-by-period balanced budget rule. Further it was shown that this is also
true for an economy with heterogenous agents where the revenues from capital taxation
could be eventually used to finance monetary transfers from one group of people to
another. Even in an economy with a strict separation between the ownership of capital
and the supply of labor, hence a capitalist- and a working-class, and where the focus of
the policymaker only lies on the welfare of workers the result of a zero capital tax in the
steady state holds. It was argued that the existence of a positive capital tax implies a
permanent distortionary intertemporal wedge as it amounts to an implicit ever increasing
tax on private good consumption which is obviously not compatible to the assumption
of a steady state. In the initial period however the government does have the incentives
to set capital taxes excessively high: In contrast to all other periods capital in the initial
period is already installed, hence inelastically supplied, and it’s taxation exhibits no
intertemporal distortions for the saving/consumption behavior. Along Chamley it was
shown for a certain class of preferences that optimal policy regarding capital taxation is
characterized by two regimes: In the first regime capital taxes are very high. This phase,
denoted as the tax recovery phase by Chamley, is used by the government to to build
up a capital stock which’s proceeds it can use to lower distortionary taxation the future.
22Stockman 2001, p. 451
23Lansing, Kevin J, 1999. ”Optimal redistributive capital taxation in a neoclassical growth model,”
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 73, pp. 423-453.
24Albanesi/Armenter 2007, p. 12
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The tax recovery phase, depending on wether one assumes an upper bound on capital
taxes or not, lasts between two and a finite number of periods. These findings were
argued formally by showing that it could be welfare increasing to front-load distortions:
As mentioned above, positive capital taxes indirectly imply a differential taxation of
private consumption goods, distorting the consumption/saving behavior. This implies
that consumption is pricier in the future compared to the present, shifting incentives in
favor of consumption than of saving. Along the argumentation of Albanesi/Armenter
it was shown that a transfer of resources from the present to the future, this is exactly
what the front-loading of distortionary capital taxes would do, leads to strictly positive
welfare gains. Since a taxation strategy as described above demands the ability to stick
to a decision over a certain sequence of policies it is obviously only applicable for a
planner who possesses a commitment technology. This is at the same time the reason
why solutions within a Ramsey equilibrium under the assumption of full commitment
are time inconsistent: The fact that it is very likely that in the future a situation arises
again which resembles that in the initial period, hence capital is already installed and
incentives for the planner would be there to tax it, is simply elided. This point will be
clarified in the next chapter were it is in contrast assumed that the policymaker doesn’t
have access to a commitment technology.
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The model hitherto presented in chapter 2 exhibits an important assumption: Basing
on the papers by Judd and Chamley it was presumed that governments possess a tech-
nology to credible guarantee or commit to a certain tax policy for all future periods.
As Chamley indicates in his conclusions1 the assumption of full commitment is how-
ever not very realistic. A huge range of occasions as unforeseen economic shocks or
simply new elections are imaginable, which could tempt future governments to deviated
from the initially implemented policy. Judd also addresses this problem, by suggesting
that some of his result might strongly depend on his assumption that tax changes are
announced and therefore anticipated before they are implemented.2 After the seminal
works by Judd and Chamley, on which chapter 2 bases, a number of papers emerged
which try to model a more realistic optimal taxation environment by incorporating the
time-inconsistent character of most policy decisions. One of these successive studies is
the work by Klein and R´ıos-Rull3, which will be discussed later on in this chapter. Before
however, in the next section, a Markov perfect equilibrium is defined which controls for
the planners inability to commit itself to future tax policies. In contrast to the Ramsey
equilibrium, where the decision over tax policy is taken once for all periods, the decision
process in the Markov perfect equilibrium is sequentially. Governments cannot commit
to tax policies beyond the current period in which they are in office. After the definition
of a Markov equilibrium a simple two period model will be derived. This should give
better insight in the decision problems faced by two sequential policy makers and, as a
foretaste for the thereafter presented model by Klein/R´ıos-Rull, provide some intuitive
explanation for the results gained in a no-commitment environment.
3.1 Defining a standard Markov perfect Equilibrium
In an environment in which the government possesses no commitment technology, the
equilibrium has to be modeled differently than in the Ramsey approach. In contrast
1Chamley 1985, p. 619
2Judd 1985
3Klein/R´ıos-Rull 2003
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to the model in chapter 2 policy decisions are not taken at one point in time, but are
reevaluated sequentially. In optimizing social welfare the government therefore not only
has to consider the best response by the private sector, but also the policy options and
therefore possibilities to deviate from the initial policy future governments will have. The
possibility of discretion in the future already influences allocation behavior of the private
sector in the present. These presumptions are accounted for in a Markov approach. In
a Markov setting the government cannot commit to future tax rates. It is however
conscious about the fact along which rules deviating policies will be set in successive
periods. The government therefore decides upon it’s policy taking the current state of
the economy and the policy rule for the next period as given and respecting the optimal
allocations found on the private sector, which in turn also anticipates the inability of
the government to commit to a future tax policy. It turns out that the problem of
the planners resembles an infinitely repeated game in which all planners face the same
optimization problem.
The basic model and notations The here examined Markov equilibrium bases on
the same model layout used in the Ramsey setting in chapter 2 with a period-by-period
balanced budget restriction for the government. In contrast to before the planner cannot
commit to a future capital income tax policy. He knows however that a future deviation
from the current policy takes place along the policy rule ψ(Kt) = θt. For the formulation
of this problem notations have to be slightly changed. As before perfect factor markets
are assumed: rt = r(Kt, Ht) = FK(K,H), wt = w(Kt, Ht) = FH(K,H). Here k denotes
the individual capital stock. The capital letters K and H refer to aggregate values of
the capital stock and labor supply respectively.
Step 1 - the ”current” government’s maximization problem The solution process of
a Markov equilibrium resembles backward induction, known from game theory. This
is illustrated on two exemplary consecutive periods, denoted as the ”former” and the
”current” period. According to the backward induction method we are going to start
with the ”current” period. The household’s optimization problem in the ”current” period
can be denoted as follows.
v(k,K;ψ) = max
c,k′,h
{u(c, h) + βv(k′,K ′;ψ)} (3.1.1)
s.t. c+ k′ = (1− θ)r(K,H)k + (1− τ)w(K,H)h+ k (3.1.2)
K ′ = DK(K;ψ) (3.1.3)
H = DH(K;ψ) (3.1.4)
θ = ψ(K) (3.1.5)
τ = φ(K;ψ) (3.1.6)
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The notation of the social welfare function as a Bellman equation in (3.1.1) underlines
the multi-period character of the optimization problem faced by the the households
as well as by the government. Governments/households not only have to consider the
present, they also have to account for the optimal decision a successive government
will take based on the state resulting from the former (current) government’s optimal
policy decision. The household’s optimization process, which demands to find the value
function v(k,K;ψ), is subject to the household’s budget constraint (3.1.2), the law of
motion for capital (3.1.3) and the labor supply function (3.1.4). Equations (3.1.5) and
(3.1.6) represent the policy rules along which the government decides upon the capital
income tax rate and the labor income tax rate respectively.
The lack of commitment here is explicitly modeled only for the capital income tax rate.
Since however a balanced budget constraint applies for the government, this assumption
is indirectly also valid for the labor income tax. As the solution strategy here resembles
a backward induction approach, ψ is assumed to be exogenously given in this stage of
the problem. If dh(k,K;ψ) = h and dk(k,K;ψ) = k′ represent the solution for the
individual problem, an overall equilibrium can then be defined, if
• the set of functions {v(k,K;ψ), dk(k,K;ψ), dh(k,K;ψ)} solves the individual op-
timization problem given {DK(K;ψ), DH(K;ψ), φ},
• the individual level is representative for the aggregate level: DK(K;ψ) = dk(K,K;ψ)
and DH(K;ψ) = dh(K,K;ψ),
• and the government’s budget constraint is satisfied:
g = θr(K,DH(K;ψ))K + φ(K;ψ)w(K,DH(K;ψ))DH(K;ψ).
Along the solution for the stationary equilibrium from above an aggregate value function
V (K;ψ) = v(K,K;ψ) can be defined, which is evaluated by the ”current” government,
in anticipation of the private sector behavior, in order to maximize social welfare. Viewed
from a ”current” point of view, separated from other periods, the procedure is similar
to the Ramsey approach.
Step 2 - the optimization problem of the ”former” government or an optimal response
found by backward induction In the next step the problem is examined from the
perspective of one period before, resembling the backward induction method used for
extensive form games. This is just theoretical however and only serves the purpose of
demonstrating how an equilibrium is being found: All planners face exactly the same
optimization problem. The planner correctly assumes that its successor honors the policy
rule ψ(K) and takes the optimal behavior of his successor, defined in the step above,
as given (backward induction). The reference to ”current” or ”former” governments or
periods therefore should only underline the methodological approach.
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The problem for the households in the ”former” period is similar as in the case before
(in the ”current” period).
vˆ(k,K, θ;ψ) = max
c,k′,h
{u(c, h) + βv(k′,K ′, θ′)} (3.1.7)
s.t. c+ k′ = (1− θ)r(K,H)k + (1− τ)w(K,H)h+ k (3.1.8)
K ′ = DˆK(K, θ;ψ) (3.1.9)
H = DˆH(K, θ;ψ) (3.1.10)
τ = φ(K, θ;ψ) (3.1.11)
θ′ = ψ(K ′) (3.1.12)
The laws for labor supply and capital accumulation, DH(K;ψ) = DˆH(K, θ;ψ) and
DK(K;ψ) = DˆK(K, θ;ψ) respectively, as well as the function for the labor income tax
are the same as in the step presented above. Subcondition (3.1.12) implies that the
planner in the ”former” period is aware of the fact that the state in which he bequeaths
the economy to his successor, the ”current” government, influences the policy decision in
the next, the ”current”, period and hence the expectations in the present, the ”former”,
period. Several functions therefore contain θ, the capital tax rate applying in the present
period, and ψ(.) the policy rule according to which the ”current” planner will decide
upon the capital tax rate in the ”current” (the next from the perspective of the ”former”
planner) period.
As before an equilibrium can be defined. The next period’s equilibrium {v, dk(k,K;ψ),
dh(k,K;ψ), DK(K;ψ), DH(K;ψ), φ}, defined above, and the policy rule ψ are taken as
given (are anticipated). It is supposed that dˆh(k,K, θ;ψ) = h and dˆk(k,K, θ;ψ) = k′
represent the solution for the individual problem. Several functions are marked with
hats: Although they fulfill the same role as in the step presented above, they now
depend on the expectations over the next (”current”) government’s policy choice for the
capital income tax rate. An overall equilibrium can then be defined, if
• the set of functions {vˆ, dˆk(k,K, θ;ψ), dˆh(k,K, θ;ψ)} solves the individual optimiza-
tion problem, given {DˆK(K, θ;ψ), DˆH(K, θ;ψ), φˆ, ψ},
• the individual level is representative for the aggregate level: DˆK(K, θ;ψ) = dˆk(K,K, θ;ψ)
and DˆH(K, θ;ψ) = dˆh(K,K, θ;ψ),
• the government’s budget constraint is satisfied:
g = θr(K, DˆH(K, θ;ψ))K + φˆ(K, θ;ψ)w(K, DˆH(K, θ;ψ))DˆH(K, θ;ψ).
The aggregate value function, which is the basis for the ”former” government’s welfare
assessment, is defined as Vˆ (K, θ;ψ) = vˆ(K,K, θ;ψ). A government which expects the
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successive government to honor ψ solves for
Ψ(K,ψ) = arg max
θ
Vˆ (K, θ, ψ) (3.1.13)
If a current (”former”) government therefore knows that the future government (the
”current” government) follows a certain policy, it prefers the same policy. The equilib-
rium under the assumption of no-commitment therefore can be regarded as a fixed point
problem.
A Markov equilibrium in the here examined environment resembles an infinitely repeated
game: All planners mutually give the best responses to the anticipated optimal behavior
of the other. As this results into a Nash-equilibrium in every period (every sub-game),
it is denoted as sub-game perfect. It can be compared to an infinitely repeated prison-
ers dilemma, where the optimal Markov-strategy leading to an unique Markov-perfect
equilibrium is to defect in every period regardless of past moves.4
3.2 An analytical example
Most of the models under a no-commitment assumption are not solvable analytically,
especially if the government underlies a balanced budget constraint as it is considered by
Klein/R´ıos-Rull5, who’s model framework and results will be discussed later on in this
chapter6. To better understand the solution procedure of a Markov-perfect equilibrium
and the intuition behind its result a two-period model by Fernando M. Martin7 is going
to be considered, which gets along without elaborated numerical methods as used by
Klein/R´ıos-Rull or Debortoli/Nunes8.
In contrast to the hitherto used model framework in the Ramsey environment and to the
sketch of the Markov perfect equilibrium above the model by Martin features endogenous
government purchases and full capital depreciation in each period. Further, to arrive at
interpretable results, specific preferences and a specific production function have to be
4Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. ”Game Theory,” MIT Press, p. 502.
5Klein/R´ıos-Rull 2003
6a paper which solves for a Markov perfect equilibrium analytically and allows for government borrowing
is: Azzimonti-Renzo, Marina & Sarte, Pierre-Daniel & Soares, Jorge, 2006. ”Optimal Policy and (the
Lack of) Time Inconsistency: Insights from Simple Models,” University of Delaware, Department of
Economics, Working Papers.
7Martin, Fernando M., 2010. ”Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes,” Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, vol.34(3), pp. 503-521.
8Debortoli/Nunes 2007
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defined. The notation is the same as before. Preferences are given by:
u(ct, 1− ht, gt) = αc ln(ct) + αh ln(1− ht) + αg ln(gt) (3.2.1)
with αc = α(1− αg), αh = (1− α)(1− αg) and α ∈ (0, 1), αg ∈ (0, 1), αc + αh + αg = 1.
The production technology is given by:
yt = F (kt, ht) = k
γ
t h
1−γ
t (3.2.2)
Again perfectly competitive factor markets are assumed: The factor prices of capital
and labor thus equal their marginal products: Fk(kt, ht) = rt and Fh(kt, ht) = wt. The
economy’s resource constraint, the government’s budget constraint and the household’s
budget constraint are respectively given by:
ct + gt + kt+1 = yt (3.2.3)
gt = θtrtkt + τtwtht (3.2.4)
ct + kt+1 = (1− θt)rtkt + (1− τt)wtht (3.2.5)
The optimization process of the households yields standard optimality conditions.
uc(ct, ht) = βuc(ct+1, ht+1)(1− θt+1)rt+1 = 0 (3.2.6)
uh(ct, ht) = uc(ct, ht)(1− τt)wt (3.2.7)
Note that optimality condition (3.2.6) takes into account the full capital depreciation
each period. The different signs in optimality condition (3.2.7) in contrast to the model
presented in chapter 2 are due to the specific definition of the utility function. Now we
are about to characterize a Markov perfect equilibrium in two periods. The equilibrium
is solved for by backward induction starting in period two like in the sketch of the
equilibrium definition in the preceding section.
Period 2 In a Markov perfect equilibrium the government and the households base their
decision over their behavior on fundamentals. As the government lacks of commitment
it cannot influence these, current, fundamentals. This is especially true for the second
and therefore the last period: The government in period t = 2 observes the capital
stock k2 inherited from the last period and sets taxes and government purchases taking
into account private sector allocations and factor prices Fk(kt, ht) = rt and Fh(kt, ht) =
wt. Note that since t = 2 is the last period no more capital is accumulated and all
resources are used for consumption. The resource constraint for period t = 2 is therefore
c2 = y2 − g2. Period two tax rates on capital and labor income can be expressed using
optimality condition (3.2.7), the government budget constraint (3.2.4) as well as the
equilibrium factor prices for capital and labor. For notational simplicity functions like
66
3.2 An analytical example
uh(c2, h2) are simply denoted as uh(2).
τ2 = 1− uh(2)
uc(2)Fh(2)
(3.2.8)
θ2 =
g2
Fk(2)k2
− Fh(2)h2τ2
Fk(2)k2
=
1
γ
g2
y2
− 1− γ
γ
[
1− uh(2)
uc(2)Fh(2)
]
(3.2.9)
The government’s problem in the second period, given k2 > 0, can be denoted as:
max
h2,g2
u(y2 − g2, 1− h2, g2) (3.2.10)
Note that c2 was substituted for in the utility function with the help of the second period
resource constraint. The government’s optimality conditions are:
uc(2)Fh(2)− uh(2) = 0 (3.2.11)
uc(2)− ug(2) = 0 (3.2.12)
Optimality condition (3.2.11) together with (3.2.8) implies that τ2 = 0. Government
purchases in period t = 2 therefore have to be entirely financed by taxes levied on
capital income. The intuition behind this result is similar to the one time capital levy in
the first period in the Ramsey framework (compare to section 2.5): The government aims
to reduce distortions as much as possible. Since the capital stock k2 is already installed,
taxing it is not distortionary. Labor income taxes are however distortionary regarding
the labor (leisure)/consumption decision. The government thus sets labor taxes in period
two to zero and finances its expenditures by capital taxes only. Taking this result as
given it can be solved for the rest of the period two variables. Using optimality condition
(3.2.12) together with the period two resource constraint c2 = y2 − g2 allows to express
c2 and g2. This results together with equation (3.2.9) and the fact that τ2 = 0 allows to
solve for θ2.
c2 =
αc
αc + αg
y2 = (1− p2)y2 with p2 ≡ αg
αc + αg
(3.2.13)
g2 = y2p2 (3.2.14)
θ2 =
p2
γ
(3.2.15)
Equation (3.2.13) together with optimality condition (3.2.11) finally allows to solve for
h2.
h2 =
1− γ
1− γ + αhαc (1− p2)
=
1− γ
1− γ + αhαg p2
(3.2.16)
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Period 1 The capital stock k2 is the economy’s state variable which the period two
government inherits from the period one government. It is determined by the consump-
tion/saving behavior of the households in period one and their anticipation of the capital
tax policy in period two. Thus, to derive k2 the period one Euler equation (3.2.6) is used
together with the period one resource constraint (3.2.3), the decision rules for period two
consumption (3.2.13) and period two capital taxes (3.2.15) (note that this decision rule
is similar to the policy rules ψ(.) in the sketch of the Markov equilibrium in the section
before).
uc(1) = βuc(2)(1− θ2)Fk(2)→
αc
c1
= β
αc
c2
(1− θ2)Fk(2) with c1 = y1 − g1 − k2 →
[y1 − g1] = k2
[
1 +
(1− p2)
β(1− θ2)γ
]
with θ2 = p2/γ →
k2 = [y1 − g1]
[
1− αc
αc[1 + βγ]− βαg[1− γ]
]
= [y1 − g1]v1 (3.2.17)
with v1 ≡
[
1− αc
αc[1 + βγ]− βαg[1− γ]
]
The interpretation of equation (3.2.17) is twofold: First, capital ”saved” for period two
in period one is represented by a fixed fractional part of period one production minus
period one government purchases. Second, one has to note that by definition F (0, h) = 0.
Thus, if there is no capital transferred from period one to period two the economy would
collapse. To get an interior solution a lower bound on the capital transferred to the
second period has to be therefore implemented: k2 > 0. As can be easily verified by
examining equation (3.2.17) this is only the case if θ2 < 1 thus v1 > 0. Using this
restriction on equation (3.2.15) implies for an interior solution that αg ∈
(
0, γα1−γ(1−α)
)
.9
Without this restriction households would have no incentives to transfer capital from
period one to period two. Given k2 = v1(y1 − g1) from (3.2.17) period one consumption
can be expressed using the period one resource constraint (3.2.3): c1 = (1− v1)(y1− g1).
Using results (3.2.13) and (3.2.14) from period two as well as c1 and k2 from above allows
9Setting θ = p2/γ < 1 and using αc = α(1− αg) after some manipulations gives αg < γα1−γ(1−α) .
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to express the period one government’s maximization problem:
max
h1,g1
u(c1, 1− h1, g1) + βu(c2, 1− h2, g2) (3.2.18)
with
c1 = (1− v1)(y1 − g1)
k2 = v1(y1 − g1)
c2 = (1− p2)y2
g2 = p2y2
Deriving (3.2.18) with respect to h1 and y1 under consideration of the interdependencies
of the different variables yields the government’s first order conditions:
uc(1)(1− v1)Fh(1)− uh(1) + βv1Fk(2)Fh(1)[uc(2)(1− p2) + ug(2)p2] = 0 (3.2.19)
− uc(1)(1− v1) + ug(1)− βv1Fk(2)[uc(2)(1− p2) + ug(2)p2] = 0 (3.2.20)
Using first oder condition (3.2.12) from the government’s maximization problem of the
second period and the household’s Euler equation (3.2.6) in the optimality condition
(3.2.20) from the government’s maximization problem of the first period,
v1
[
uc(1)− uc(1)(1− θ2)
]
− uc(1) + ug(1) = 0
and substituting along the definition for v1 yields:
uc(1)Ω1 = ug(1) (3.2.21)
with
Ω1 ≡ β(αc + αg) + αc
βγ(αc + αg)− βαg + αc
By the assumption αg ∈
(
0, γα1−γ(1−α)
)
from before it holds that Ω1 > 1. Expression
(3.2.21) is obviously similar to (3.2.12), an optimality condition of the government in
the second period. In contrast to the second period however the margin between private
and public consumption is distorted by the wedge Ω1 > 1. The second condition crucial
for the problem can be derived by fusion of optimality condition (3.2.19) and (3.2.20):
ug(1)Fh(1) = uh(1) (3.2.22)
As can be seen by combination of optimality conditions (3.2.11) and (3.2.12) this is the
same optimality condition as in the second period. Additionally the government in the
first period in contrast to that in the second period is confronted with intertemporal
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distortions caused by the anticipated positive tax rate on capital income in the second
period, which has, as it was shown before, implications for the consumption/saving
behavior in period one. Now the remaining period one variables can be computed:
Merging equations (3.2.21), (3.2.22) and the household’s optimality condition (3.2.7) for
period one allows to solve for the period one labor income tax rate:
τ1 = 1− Ω1 (3.2.23)
Using equation (3.2.21) together with the before derived preliminary result allows to
solve for g1:
g1 =
αg
αc
[
(αc + αg)βγ + αc − αgβ
(αc + αg)βγ + αc
] [
αc
αc(1 + βγ)− αgβ(1− γ)
]
[y1 − g1]
→
g1 = p1y1 with p1 ≡
[
αg
(αc + αg)(1 + βγ)
]
(3.2.24)
The solution of g1 from (3.2.24) allows to complete the preliminary result for c1 from
before:
c1 = (1− v1)(1− p1)y1 (3.2.25)
The same is true for k2:
k2 = v1(1− p1)y1 (3.2.26)
With these results in hand, especially the period 2 capital stock k2, one can solve for the
first period’s capital income tax rate. Merging (3.2.24) with the period one government
budget constraint yields:
θ1 =
p1 − (1− Ω1)(1− γ)
γ
(3.2.27)
Finally merging (3.2.24) with (3.2.22) leads to the solution of h1:
h1 =
1− γ
1− γ + p1 αhαg
(3.2.28)
Concerning the tax policy in the hitherto presented exemplary Markov model one can
state summarizing that capital taxes are positive in both periods. In both periods
government purchases are financed solely by capital taxes. In the second period labor
taxes are zero, in the first period, see (3.2.23), labor income is even subsidized since
Ω1 > 1.
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Intuition What is the intuition behind the results of this section? In the full com-
mitment case, compare chapter 2, positive capital taxes were only observed in a finite
number of initial periods, the length depending on wether one assumes an upper limit
on capital taxes or not. In section 2.6 this was argued by the front loading argument:
Every tax exhibits some kind of distortion. Distortions by the labor tax are intratem-
poral, while those caused through capital taxes are generally intertemporal. The initial
period however is an exception. Capital is already installed and current capital taxes
can thus have obviously no effect on the capital accumulation behavior (in the preceding
period). The government exploits this fact by levying excessively high taxes on capital
in the initial period to build up a capital base. The government can then use the pro-
ceeds of this capital base to at least partly finance government purchases in the future
and thus lower the distortions through taxation. In the full commitment case, it was
further argued, that capital taxes were optimally zero, either for a certain class of utility
functions10 for periods t > 2 or under the assumption that the economy had converged
to a steady state (or to a stationary equilibrium in the stochastic environment). The
second case was reasoned by the fact that positive capital taxes would indirectly imply
a differential taxation on private good consumption which is contradictory to the steady
state assumption. In the no-commitment scenario in contrast, decisions are not taken
once for all periods but sequentially. Each government, it is assumed to be a new one in
each period, is thus confronted with a situation similar to the initial period in the full
commitment case. Since the capital is perceived to be inelastically supplied in every pe-
riod, the capital is already installed and because of the lack of commitment the preceding
periods are beyond the control of the current planner, current capital taxes are regarded
as non-distortionary by the current government. From the perspective of households on
the other hand one might state that positive capital taxes are partly unforeseen and
therefore not that distortionary. The lack of commitment further has the consequence
that planners are unable to front-load distortions as it was observed in the full commit-
ment case. As will be discussed later on, this hinges however on the considered model
environment. The interpretation of the labor tax rates in the two periods is as follows:
While current capital taxes exhibit no distortions in the no-commitment economy the
anticipated future taxes on capital still do. They imply a differential taxation on con-
sumption, just like they would in the full commitment case as described above. In the
full commitment environment however the planner had the commitment technology to
abolish these intertemporal distortions by eventually setting capital tax rates to zero in
the future (compare section 2.5). This is something the Markov planner is unable to
do. Instead he tries to reduce the distortions on the consumption/labor(leisure) deci-
sion. A positive tax rate on capital in the next period discourages labor supply. The
government counters this effect with zero labor taxes or even labor subsidies as in the
10see (2.5.30) and (2.5.31)
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first period.11
3.3 Time-consistent fiscal policy by Klein/Rios-Rull
3.3.1 The basic model and notations
The model by Klein and R´ıos-Rull studied in this section is in its basis a standard
stochastic growth model like the one examined in section 2.7. A major difference how-
ever is the fact that the government doesn’t have commitment instruments to guarantee
its capital tax policy beyond the next period. In such a setting an equilibrium therefore
cannot be found with the standard Ramsey approach which was applied in the models
in chapter 2. As governments have to consider the chance of a policy reassessment by
successive governments they have to incorporate this in their decision over the optimal
policy. Under such circumstances an equilibrium can be found in a Markov setting. A
standard form of a Markov equilibrium was sketched in section 3.1 introductorily to
this chapter. The here considered concept along the paper by Klein/R´ıos-Rull is a little
bit different. This is difference is going to be discussed in the next section when the
equilibrium for this specific model is defined. Like in section 3.1 and section 3.2, but
in contrast to the stochastic Ramsey model presented in section 2.7, Klein/R´ıos-Rull
assume that the government cannot issue debt. Klein/R´ıos-Rull argue this assumption
by the fact that it would be inappropriate to introduce a no-ponzi rule for a government.
Alternatively a per period upper limit on debt issuance would be necessary. This how-
ever would be incompatible to the linear-quadratic approach they use to calculate the
numerical results.12
In the model economy, the variables g and z stand for government purchases and factor
productivity, which are both finite and driven by a Markov process13. The economy is
subject to the occurrence of possible shocks. This pair of shocks is denoted by s ∈ S,
a n-element set. Γ stands for the transition matrix of shocks, capturing the possibility
of a future shock with respect to the situation today: Therefore, an element Γss
′
of the
matrix Γ would represent the probability of a shock s′ tomorrow having s today. Just
like in section 2.7 Klein/R´ıos-Rull use the notation st to denote a particular realization
of a shock in period t and st = {s0, . . . , st} for a particular history up to period t. The
unconditional probability for history st is denoted by Γ(st).
The representative consumer maximizes his utility by choosing a stream of consumption
and leisure. His preferences are therefore given as follows. The variables c(st)and h(st)
11Martin 2009
12Klein/R´ıos-Rull 2003, p. 1218
13see section 2.7.5
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denote consumption and hours worked as functions of the particular history st.
E
{∑
t
βtu(c(st), h(st))
}
=
∑
t
βt
∑
st
Γ(st)u(c(st), h(st)) (3.3.1)
The optimization process is subject to a feasibility constraint.
F (k(st−1), h(st), z(st)) + (1− δ)k(st−1) = c(st) + k(st) + g(st) (3.3.2)
This constraint states that consumption c(st), government purchases g(st) and cap-
ital stock k(st) have to equal the production via a neoclassical production process
F (k(st−1), h(st), z(st)) minus the depreciation of the capital stock available at st, k(st−1),
by the factor δ. The capital available in period t, k(st−1), was accumulated under con-
sideration of state st−1 in period t− 1. Households underlie a budget constraint and are
subject to labor τ(st) and capital θ(st) taxation.
c(st) + k(st) = (1− τ(st))w(st)h(st) + [1 + r(st)(1− θ(st))]k(st−1) (3.3.3)
The variables w(st) and r(st) denote the factor prices for labor and capital (net of depre-
ciation) respectively. Since perfect competition on the factor markets is assumed we can
express these variables as Fh(k(st−1), h(st), z(st)) = w(st) and Fk(k(st−1), h(st), z(st))−
δ = r(st). The government’s budget constraint can be denoted as:
g(st) = θ(st)r(st)k(st−1) + τ(st)w(st)h(st) ∀ st (3.3.4)
A stochastic policy vector pi = {θ(st), τ(st)} denotes the policy for capital and labor
taxation. A balanced budget equilibrium now would be a set of stochastic processes
c(st), h(st), k(st), r(st), θ(st) and τ(st) which maximizes the consumer’s utility function
(3.3.1) subject to the feasibility constraint (3.3.2), the household’s budget constraint
(3.3.3) and the government’s budget constraint (3.3.4), taking perfect factor markets,
an initial capital income tax rate θ0 and the initial capital stock k0 as given.
The work of Klein and R´ıos-Rull focuses on the examination of time-consistent fiscal
policy, hence on policy results found within a Markov setting. As a kind of reference
model however they consider a full-commitment case of the above presented stochastic
economy. The therefore applied procedure is the same as the one presented in section
2.7. The only difference here is that Klein and R´ıos-Rull, in contrast to section 2.7, don’t
allow for government borrowing. The procedure is hence a mix of that in sections 2.7 and
2.8, where an implementability constraint for the balanced budget case was constructed.
For the sake of completeness the finding of an equilibrium within the full-commitment
case of the above presented model economy is going to be sketched in the following
section.
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3.3.2 A reference example with full commitment
The process of finding an equilibrium in a Ramsey environment is straightforward and
resembles the procedure applied in chapter 2. I therefore refrain from the calculations
already conducted extensively in the aforementioned chapter and limit myself to stating
the problem of the Ramsey planner in primal form:
max
c(st),h(st),k(st−1)
∑
t,st
Γ(st)βtu(c(st), h(st)) (3.3.5)
s.t.
uc(c(st), h(st))k(st−1) = βEt
{
uc(c(st+1), h(st+1))(c(st+1) + k(st))
+uh(c(st+1), h(st+1))h(st+1)]
}
(3.3.6)
F (k(st−1), h(st), z(st)) + (1− δ)k(st−1) = c(st) + k(st) + g(st) (3.3.7)
As defined in section 2.2 the social planner has to find a policy vector pi = {θ(st), τ(st)}
which maximize social welfare, rewritten in equation (3.3.5), under consideration of the
optimal allocations and prices found on the private sector and the household’s budget
constraint all captured by the implementability constraint (3.3.6) and the economy’s
resource constraint (3.3.7). For the construction of the implementability constraint under
a period-by-period balanced budget assumption the reader is referred to section 2.8. In
assuming that the economy converges to a stationary allocation, in the long run the
accumulation of capital is undistorted and capital income is therefore optimally not
taxed. This is the same result as gained in chapter 2. A formal derivation of this result
in an economy with government borrowing as well a specific definition of the underlying
stochastic process was given in section 2.7.
3.3.3 The economy without commitment - Definition of the Equilibrium
In contrast to the setting in chapter 2 with full-commitment analytical solutions in a
no-commitment scenario are not feasible in most of the cases and numerical solutions are
necessary. A very simplified exception was presented before in section 3.2. Analytical
solutions are also inapplicable in the case of the model by Klein and R´ıos-Rull. Since
the description of the numerical/computational techniques would be beyond the scope
of this thesis, I will constrain myself to the definition of the equilibrium. The intuition of
the results is however similar to the one in the simple two-period model presented in 3.2.
The main idea in the paper of Klein and R´ıos-Rull is that each government is just in office
for one period. The government currently in office commits itself to a capital income tax
θ and observes the realization of possible shocks. At the same time it constitutes a vector
of various contingent capital income tax rates corresponding exactly to various economic
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shocks which could occur in the next period. The government following in office has to
stick to the rules for a state contingent capital tax set by the former government.
Hence there a two important differences to the equilibrium sketched in introductorily
to this chapter in section 3.1: First, in section 3.1 each of the different successional
governments decided upon the tax policy for the respective period in which they are in
office while the governments in the model by Klein/R´ıos-Rull inherit/bequeath a vector
of state contingent capital taxes from/to the former/succeeding government to which the
respectively concerned government has to stick. Second, Klein and R´ıos-Rull assume in
contrast to section 3.1 that the government is subject to stochastic productivity and
expenditure shocks. Note, that the assumption of full- or no-commitment is a general
one and doesn’t rest upon the occurrence of shocks. The incorporation of stochastic
shocks has to be rather understood as an additional conceptual instrument to render
the process of policy reevaluation (discretion), which is the central feature also in the
non-stochastic Markov setting, more realistic.
The private sector as before optimizes its consumption/saving and working behavior.
Since the capital tax rate is assumed to be state contingent and the government has to
honor a period-by-period balanced budget constraint the control over the labor income
tax τ is very limited. The economy is subject to expenditure, g, and productivity, z,
shocks summarized in the state vector s = {g, z}. K and θ denote the aggregate capital
stock and the tax rate prescribed by the rules of the former government respectively.
Along Klein/R´ıos-Rull, these variables are pooled in the state vector x = {g, z,K, θ}.
The special feature of this economy is that the tax rate on capital income θ evolves in
an arbitrary manner depending on the current state x, as well as on a particular future
shock s′. The government in office sets, based on the current state of the economy, rules
for the capital income tax θ in the next period depending on a set of shocks which could
possibly occur. Or, to express it the other way around, the future government inherits
a particular capital income tax from its predecessor as a particular shock s′ appears.
The predecessor, who in turn also inherited a tax rate from his predecessor, had before
decided over a set of tax rates fitting to a set of shocks which could occur in the following
period when he is not in office anymore. The available information at this point of time
was just the particular state of the economy x. The law of motion for the capital income
tax rate can therefore be given as θ(s′) = ψ(x). To complete the references for the used
notation here: as before k is the capital stock in per capita terms, H and K denote
the aggregate values for labor supply and capital stock respectively. Taking all these
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assumptions as given households solve the following maximization problem:
max
c,k′,h
u(c, h) + β
∑
s′
Γss
′
v(x′(s′), k′;ψ) = v(x, k;ψ) (3.3.8)
s.t.
c+ k′ = (1− θ)r(z,K,H)k + (1− τ)w(z,K,H)h+ k (3.3.9)
K ′ = DK(x;ψ) (3.3.10)
H = DH(x;ψ) (3.3.11)
τ = φ(x;ψ) (3.3.12)
θ(s′) = ψ(x) (3.3.13)
Equation (3.3.9) gives the individual budget constraint. Sub condition (3.3.10) gives the
law of motion for capital. Equation (3.3.11) captures the determination of the aggregate
labor supply. Equations (3.3.12) and (3.3.13) give the labor income tax rate for the
current period and the state depending capital income tax rate for the next period.
The variables r(z,K,H) and w(z,K,H) denote the factor prices for capital and labor
respectively. ψ is the vector of policy rules set by the former government and has
to be obeyed by the current government and is, at least at this step of the solution,
exogenously given. The functions DK(x;ψ) and DH(x;ψ) and φ are to be determined in
the equilibrium. Assuming that h = dh(x, k;ψ) and k′ = dk(x, k;ψ) are the solutions for
the individual agents maximization problem (3.3.8), the recursive Markov equilibrium
can be defined.
The problem of the ”current” government This sections corresponds to the solution
step 1 of the Markov equilibrium presented in section 3.1. As in the full-commitment case
from chapter 2, the current government takes the optimality conditions of the private sec-
tor, dh and dk, as well as φ as given and maximizes the aggregate welfare with respect to
its feasibility and budget constraint. The set of functions {v(x, k′;ψ), DK(x;ψ), DH(x;ψ),
φ(x;ψ), dk(x,K;ψ), dh(x,K;ψ)} therefore only describes a stationary equilibrium, if
• {v(x, k′;ψ), dk(x,K;ψ), dh(x,K;ψ)} solve the individual optimization problem (3.3.8)
taking {DK(x;ψ), DH(x;ψ), φ} as given
• the assumption holds that the individual solution is representative for the aggregate
level, therefore that DK(x;ψ) = dk(x,K;ψ) and DH(x;ψ) = dh(x,K;ψ),
• and the overall solutions satisfy the budget constraint of the government (3.3.14):
g = θr(z,K,DH(x;ψ))K + φ(x;ψ)w(z,K,DH(x;ψ))DH(x;ψ) (3.3.14)
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The interpretation of the government’s budget constraint (3.3.14) is pretty clear. Gov-
ernment expenditures g have to be financed by capital income taxes (the first term on
the righthand side) and by labor taxes (the second term on the righthand side). The
individual optimal decision over working hours dh(.) and capital accumulation dk(.) de-
termines the aggregate optimal labor supply DH(.) and aggregate capital accumulation
DK(.). It is assumed that the individual level is representative for the aggregate level,
which in turn has implications for wages w(.) and the return on capital r(.). In opti-
mizing the social welfare the benevolent ”current” planner takes the following aggregate
value function.
V (x;ψ) = v(x,K;ψ) (3.3.15)
The problem of the ”former” government and the decision over the bequeathed
policy function This section corresponds to step 2 of the solutions of the Markov
equilibrium in section 3.1: In the style of backward induction we now view the problem
from one period ahead and hence from the position of the ”former” government, taking
the optimum and therefore the optimal response of the households and the ”current”
government in the next period as given (derived in the section above).
The terms ”current” and ”former” government might be misleading. They were chosen
to better point out the solution strategy of the equilibrium. The general problem con-
stellation is the same for every government (except the one in period 0 where no policy
promises were yet made). It should just help to clarify the mechanisms of mutual best
responses by planners in different periods which are not able to commit to a chosen pol-
icy. The basic solution concepts were already discussed in the introductorily section 3.1.
It seems therefore reasonable to examine the models under consideration with reference
to this conceptual outline.
In the here examined case, contrasting to the conceptual presentation in section 3.1,
the ”former” government not only has to formulate its own optimal response to the
discretionary behavior of its ”successor” in the sense of a possible policy reassessment
under consideration of the current economic situation, but also has to decide over a policy
function ψ containing a set of capital income taxes for particular stochastic shocks s′ the
successive government has to follow. Note that in the exemplary equilibrium from section
3.1 ψ(.) was an anticipated decision rule used by the ”current” government rather than
a bequeathed basket of state contingent capital taxes. The problem again resembles a
non-cooperative game between successive governments as it was already described in the
introduction of this chapter. The question therefore arises, how the ”former” government
will decide over such a policy function knowing that agents will adjust their behavior
according to this incertitude in the future as they don’t yet know which shock is about
to occur. In optimizing the social welfare the government faces two major problems: It
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has to decide over the next periods state contingent capital income tax and it has to set
the current labor income tax rate in order to balance the budget. This is exactly the
point where the interaction between future and presence arises which is so crucial in this
model. Also the ”former” government has inherited a state contingent capital income
tax rate from its predecessor to which it is forced to commit and which depends on the
actual shock occurring in the present period. This in turn means that it is not really in
the position to decide over the labor tax rate since these kind of revenues are restrained
to simply balance the budget. The only thing the ”former” government can do is to
decide over a future state contingent capital income tax, to which the next government,
the ”current” one in our denomination, has to adhere, and thereby indirectly influence
allocation behavior of the private sector in the present.
Individual agents are forward looking and so future policies have implications on their
present choice regarding saving, consumption and labor supply. The state contingent
capital income tax for tomorrow is given by ~θ′ = {θ(s′)}s∈S={g,z} and therefore has to be
part of the individual agents decision process. The household’s maximization problem
in the ”former” period can be written down as follows.
max
c,k′,h
u(c, h) + β
∑
s′
Γss
′
v(x′(s′), k′;ψ) = vˆ(x, ~θ′, k;ψ) (3.3.16)
s.t.
c+ k′ = (1− θ)r(z,K,H)k + (1− τ)w(z,K,H)h+ k (3.3.17)
K ′ = DˆK(x, ~θ′;ψ) (3.3.18)
H = DˆH(x, ~θ′;ψ) (3.3.19)
τ = φˆ(x, ~θ′;ψ) (3.3.20)
The role of the different conditions is the same as before with the crucial difference,
signalized by the hat over them, that this optimization problem is forward looking. The
expectation over the future capital income tax rate ~θ′ here is more important than the
policy currently in action, set by the former government. Klein and R´ıos-Rull call the
solution of this problem the intermediate equilibrium. As before the agents take the
function DˆK(x, ~θ′;ψ) and DˆH(x, ~θ′;ψ) as given. The difference here is the intertemporal
character of the equilibrium. Nevertheless private sector optimization follows the same
principles as in the ”current” period. The aggregate private sector optimality conditions
therefore have to satisfy:
DK(x;ψ) = DˆK(x, ψ(x);ψ) (3.3.21)
DH(x;ψ) = DˆH(x, ψ(x);ψ) (3.3.22)
In this intertemporal optimization problem the individual agents have to further respect,
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or better expressed, anticipate the stationary equilibrium of the next period, the ”cur-
rent” period along the here used denomination, defined in the section above and the
policy rule ψ. A set of functions {vˆ(x, ~θ, k;ψ), DˆK(x, ~θ′;ψ),
DˆH(x, ~θ′;ψ), φˆ(x, ~θ′;ψ), dˆk(x, ~θ′,K;ψ), dˆh(x, ~θ′,K;ψ)} therefore only describes an equi-
librium, if
• {vˆ(x, ~θ′, k;ψ), dˆk(x, ~θ′,K;ψ), dˆh(x, ~θ′,K;ψ)} solve the individual optimization prob-
lem taking DˆK(x, ~θ′;ψ), DˆH(x, ~θ′;ψ), φˆ(x, ~θ′;ψ) and ψ as given;
• The assumption holds that the individual solution is representative for the ag-
gregate level, therefore that DˆH(x, ~θ′;ψ) = dˆh(x, ~θ′,K;ψ) and DˆK(x, ~θ′;ψ) =
dˆk(x, ~θ′,K;ψ);
• The overall solution has to satisfy the period-by-period budget constraint of the
government:
g = θr(z,K, DˆH(x, ~θ′;ψ))K + φˆ(x, ~θ′;ψ)w(z,K, DˆH(x, ~θ′;ψ))DˆH(x, ~θ′;ψ) (3.3.23)
As before the individual value functions can be summed up to the aggregate level,
which is used by the benevolent planner to evaluate welfare maximizing policies under
anticipation of the private sector’s optimal response.
Vˆ (x, ~θ′;ψ) = vˆ(x, ~θ′,K;ψ) (3.3.24)
As already mentioned before, in the model by Klein/R´ıos-Rull current governments are
very limited in there policy making: The current capital income tax rate depends on
the state contingent capital income tax rate set by its predecessor in office and the
labor tax rate cannot be set freely since governments are obliged to a period-by-period
balanced budget. Governments are therefore bounded to the decision over a set of
state contingent capital income tax rates for the next period where they will not be
in office anymore. Since the agents in the economy are forward looking, however, the
expectations about future tax policy already influences allocation behavior in the present.
Since ”former” governments expect future (the ”current”) governments to honor their
state contingent policy rules, they have to find a set ~θ′ to maximize the aggregate value
function constituting the present government’s policy, here denoted by a bold Ψ.
Ψ(x;ψ) = arg max
~θ′
Vˆ (x, ~θ′;ψ) = ψ(x) (3.3.25)
As in the conceptual outline in section 3.1 the mechanism of mutual best responses
reduces the problem to a fixed point problem. The faced problem is the same for every
government. If one government knows that its successor follows a certain policy it will
find it optimal to choose the same policy.
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3.3.4 Calibration
Klein/R´ıos-Rull use a linear quadratic approach to calculate numerical results for their
model. Describing these techniques however would be beyond the scope of this thesis. I
therefore limit myself to describe the calibration of the model and then go on to present
the results. Klein/R´ıos-Rull choose a standard constant relative risk aversion utility
function, short CRRA, and a Cobb-Douglas production function.
u(c, h) =
(cα(1− h)1−α)1−σ
1− σ (3.3.26)
F (z,K,H) = zAKvH1−v (3.3.27)
The factor A in the production function normalizes per period output to 1. The average
share of the public sector g of overall production is calibrated to be around 20%. The
preferences concerning leisure were calibrated to result into a labor allocation α of 20%
with respect to the maximum available time, taking into account a realistic proportion
of working age population to total population. The depreciation rate δ is calibrated to
be 0.08% and the share of capital K in the production process v is at 0.36%. In the
baseline model, the rate of substitution between periods is assumed to be 1. The economy
is subject to two different kinds of shocks which eventually occur: A productivity shock
on the variable z ∈ {0.976, 1.024} for which the per period probability is at 1− 0.946 =
1 − Γ11z and an expenditure shock on the variable g ∈ {0.184, 0.216} for which the per
period probability lies at 1− 0.835 = 1−Γ11g . The length of a period corresponds to one
year. Klein/R´ıos-Rull choose this period length since, as they say, a readjustment of tax
policy is normally carried out on a yearly basis and that the time between legislation
and implementation can realistically be assumed to be around one year.14
3.3.5 Results
The results given here represent a mere overview. Since the goal of this thesis is to
compare the results of the three different approaches with regard to the degree of com-
mitment, it would not make any sense to give detailed numerical values as provided by
the study of Klein/R´ıos-Rull. This is, in my opinion, particularly reasonable as an ana-
lytical approach was used in chapter 2 while Klein/R´ıos-Rull and later Nunes/Debortoli
achieve their results over numerical techniques. Looking at the results in a more quali-
tative way does therefore make more sense than the enumeration of quantitative results
in absence of any possibility of comparison. At first just the results of the baseline
model with standard calibration, quoted above, will be presented. Different cases will
be treated afterwards.
14Klein/R´ıos-Rull 2003, p. 1227
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Full Commitment In the full-commitment scenario the results gained by Klein/R´ıos-
Rull in essence strongly support those gained in chapter 2, particularly in section 2.7.
The optimal capital income tax rate is in average at zero, but it is however very volatile.
The standard deviation is at 0.18. A standard deviation of 0.13 for the expected capital
income tax is in line with this. Labor taxes who constitute the main source of revenues for
governments with an average of 31% are in contrast very smooth exhibiting a standard
deviation of just 0.009. Klein/R´ıos-Rull attribute the difference in volatility between the
two taxes to the role of the balanced budget constraint in force in this model economy.
Labor taxes therefore finance the major part of government’s income while capital income
taxes more serve as a shock absorber. This interpretation is also supported by a positive
correlation between government purchases and capital income tax rates.15
No Commitment In the no-commitment scenario, capital income taxes and labor taxes
change roles. Here capital income taxes which are at average at 65% carry the major
burden of financing public expenditures. Labor taxes are in contrast just around 12%
in mean. Again capital income tax rates are much more volatile than labor income tax
rates, showing a standard deviation of 0.11 while the latter exhibit a standard deviation
of 0.031. The lower labor income tax rate can be explained by the fact that in an
economy without commitment technology, much higher levels of capital income tax rates
are sustainable, since here they are partly unforeseen and don’t result into such a strong
distortion of capital accumulation. The reader is referred to the intuitive interpretation
concerning positive capital income taxes in taxation models without commitment in
section 3.2. As both types of taxes play different roles they are negatively correlated to
each other. This is also reflected in the fact that capital income taxes have a positive
correlation with output while the correlation between labor taxes and output is negative.
In the full-commitment scenario both taxes appeared to be countercyclical. Klein/R´ıos-
Rull also suggest that since the autocorrelation of the tax rates is lower than in the
full-commitment case and also lower than the autocorrelation of the output, there has
to be a connection between capital stock and the particular tax policy. Further in the
no-commitment case, mean output is lower in level and variation than in the scenario
with full-commitment.
It is also interesting to look at the dynamic evolution of a system where governments
are initially able to commit but then loose this ability: One imagines a situation in
which the loss of commitment is anticipated to happen in period t = 0. Ahead to this
loss of commitment, working hours fall and the taxes on labor income eventually go up
as the budget still has to be balanced. In period t = 0 capital deccumulation starts
which is however connected to an inversely hike in capital income taxation. Working
hours start to rebound again which leads labor taxes back to pre-shock level and even
15Klein/R´ıos-Rull 2003, p. 1229-1230
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lower. The output level which initially plunged in anticipation of the loss of commitment
technology accelerates again but doesn’t find its way back to the pre-shock level. Vice-
versa, Klein/R´ıos-Rull calculated the case in which a government suddenly gains the
ability to commit. This would be connected with high welfare gains which can be
mainly tracked to an increase in consumption. The authors state that a commitment
technology could outweigh a 34% dissolution of capital stock.
The impact of calibration The described results are qualitatively robust. As far as the
quantitative impact is concerned they are however sensitive to the particular calibration
one chooses. The most sensitive values are therefore the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution 1/σ and the length of periods. Both values were calibrated at 1 in the
baseline model.16 Klein/R´ıos-Rull also conduct calculations for cases with a period
length of 2 and 4 years and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution valued ceteris
paribus 0.2. In an economy with a higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution, capital
income taxes are generally lower since work effort and saving behavior react much more
sensitively to changes in capital tax policy than in scenarios with a lower intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. The same is true vice versa: If the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is low, the cost to increase taxes on capital income is lower and the
government is more likely to do so. A lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution
however causes a higher volatility in taxation for both capital income taxes and labor
taxes. The same is true for the variability of the output which is much higher than in
economy’s with a high elasticity of substitution.17
Intuitively, an extension of the length of periods can be interpreted as a gain in com-
mitment. This is also supported by the figures: The longer the length of the period the
lower the taxes on capital income and the higher the taxes on labor income are. In a
model economy without commitment but with an extended period length, figures behave
much more like in the full-commitment scenario. Implications from period length on the
economic volatility are however negligible.18
Elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure The CRRA utility func-
tion, see equation (3.3.26), used in the baseline model assumes the elasticity of sub-
stitution between consumption and leisure to be one. To examine the effect of other
elasticities of substitution deviating from the baseline model, and therefore a different
intratemporal substitution behavior, it is necessary to use a different utility function.
16since the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure σ was calibrated to be one in the
baseline model.
17Klein/R´ıos-Rull 2003, p. 1234 - 1236
18Klein/R´ıos-Rull 2003, p. 1234 - 1236
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The for this purpose specified utility function by Klein/R´ıos-Rull is given by equation
(3.3.28).
u(c, h) =
c1−σ1 − 1
1− σ1 + γ
(1− h)1−σ2 − 1
1− σ2 (3.3.28)
The variables σ1 and σ2 give the curvature for consumption and leisure respectively. If
one would set σ1 = σ2 = 1, one would receive results corresponding to the results in
the baseline model with a period length of 2. To make a comparison with the baseline
model meaningful however, it is necessary to recalibrate and fix values as the share of
the government expenditures g on total production, which was assumed to be at 20%
before, or as the choice for working hours h in the case σ1 = σ2 = 1.
Without recalibration, an increase in σ1 (the curvature for consumption) implies a de-
crease of capital income taxes leaving the taxes on labor unchanged. An increase of
σ2, which implies an increase of the preference to leisure goes along with an increase in
labor taxes as well as capital income taxes and slightly elevates the share of government
consumption to total output, g/y. This coherence is also true in the other direction.
Leaving the share of government consumption to total output g/y unchanged however
alters the result drastically. Here an increased curvature of consumption σ1 reduces cap-
ital income taxes and increases labor income taxes. The interpretation is clear: A higher
σ1 elevates the preferences with respect to consumption and decreases the willingness
to save. Agent’s preferences to work, however, stay the same with the difference that
they now have to satisfy higher consumption preferences which suggests labor income
taxation to be the better source of revenues for the government. An increased curvature
for leisure σ2 implies a reduced willingness to work forcing the government to increase
both taxes to furthermore satisfy the balanced budget constraint.
Leaving working hours unchanged to the model with σ1 = σ2 = 1, an increase in
σ1 implies lower capital income taxes and slightly higher labor taxes. An increased
curvature for leisure σ2 increases capital income taxation as well as labor taxes.19
Separating the shocks Looking at the effect of the shocks on government expenditures,
g, and productivity, z, separately allows to better understand the forces at work which
are decisive for the particular optimal tax rates. Only looking on the effect of govern-
ment expenditure, g, shocks, such a shock could be thought of in the case of wars or
environmental catastrophes, and setting the productivity z to its average shows merely
the same results as before where both sources of fluctuation randomly occurred at the
19In this last case the text exhibits a contradiction between the figures and the interpretation given by
Klein/R´ıos-Rull. I assumed the figures in the table to be correct. See: Klein/R´ıos-Rull 2003, p. 1237
- 1239, Table 6.
83
3 Optimal Fiscal Policy without Commitment
same time; in the full-commitment scenario the capital income tax is around zero. Nearly
the total tax burden with a rate of 31% lies on labor. In the the no-commitment case
things are again different; one observes very high capital income tax rates at around
65% in average. Labor here is only taxed with 12% on average. Again the standard
deviation for capital income taxes is significantly lower in the no-commitment than in
the full-commitment scenario. For labor income taxes the exact opposite is true. The
correlation between g and the labor-and capital-tax respectively is in both cases small
and negative in the full-commitment scenario. In the no-commitment scenario, τ corre-
lates positively if even on a small scale with g where as the correlation between θ and g
is again small and negative. In a dynamic analysis this is reflected by the fact that in
the full-commitment scenario expenditure shocks are predominantly financed by capital
income taxation. In the no-commitment case the process is more complex. An expendi-
ture shock first leads to a slight decrease in labor taxes and to a strong hike of capital
income taxes. In the course of the adjustment process after the shock the additional
expenditures are mainly financed by capital income taxes. But as capital deccumulation
becomes too strong, taxes on capital income sink again and labor taxes are increased.
Capital income tax rates end below and labor income tax rates above their pre-shock
levels after the adjustment process.20
Only looking at productivity shocks, the general results regarding the average rates
for capital income taxes and labor taxes as well as their volatility for the full- and no-
commitment scenario are the same as in the cases where the shocks occurred parallel and
as in the case with only expenditure shocks described above. The dynamics after a shock
are however different. In times of an economic boom triggered by a positive shock on
productivity z, the taxes on capital income are cut. In an economy without commitment,
this effect is stronger than in a scenario with full-commitment. In an economy without
commitment, a boom phase goes along with an increase in labor taxation. In the scenario
with full-commitment, labor income taxes eventually stay constant. In the adjustment
process after a productivity shock in a no-commitment scenario, taxes on capital income
rise again while labor taxes go down. Both taxes end up on a higher and lower level
respectively, compared to the pre-shock situation. In the full-commitment scenario,
capital income taxation rises again after the shock and ends up on a level higher than
before the shock.21
3.4 Alternative approaches to model the lack of commitment
Aside the direct approach to study optimal fiscal without commitment in the context of
a Markov perfect equilibrium, which is, as discussed before, time-consistent by construc-
20Klein/R´ıos-Rull 2003, p. 1238 - 1240
21Klein/R´ıos-Rull 2003, p. 1240 - 1241
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tion, also alternative concepts emerged to control for the problem of time-inconsistency
as it is evident in the traditional Ramsey optimal taxation models. The perhaps most
renowned of these alternative approaches stems from Jesse Benhabib and Aldo Rusti-
chini22. Their conceptual approach is frequently used and was gradually refined and
extended by other authors as for example Catarina Reis23 and Begona Dominguez24.
For the sake of completeness it appears reasonable to briefly present the core ideas of
this approach. Beside, this a basic understanding of this concept might be helpful in
context of the next section. There one of the shortcomings of the models hitherto pre-
sented in this chapter, namely the period-by-period balanced budget assumption, will
be discussed. Two of the three papers addressing this problem follow the method of
Benhabib/Rustichini.
Benhabib/Rustichini address the problem of time-inconsistency in the traditional Ram-
sey taxation literature, in contrast to the Markov approach, only indirectly. As was
already mentioned several times before the results of a limiting zero capital tax within
the Ramsey equilibrium hinges on the fact that the government suppositionally possesses
a commitment technology which makes it immune to incentives to deviate from the once
chosen sequence of policies. It was however also argued that such a solution is not in-
centive compatible and therefore obviously also not time-consistent. It is plausible that
a situation originates which harbors incentives similar to that in the initial period in the
full commitment case, namely to levy high taxes on capital, incidentally in the interest
of the private sector, in order to lower distortionary taxation in the future: From the
perspective of the respective current planner the existent capital stock is considered as
being inelastically supplied as the investments which were necessary for its accumulation
are sunk. For a contemporary planner, without the need to choose a whole sequence of
policies for all future periods as the fully committed planner has to do it, capital taxa-
tion would hence be regarded as being not distortionary. This is were the idea of Ben-
habib/Rustichini starts off. Instead of allowing for periodical deviations, as the Markov
approach does, Benhabib/Rustichini impose an incentive compatibility constraint on the
government’s maximization problem. This incentive compatibility constraint overrides
the incentives of the government to defect as it serves as a kind of sanctioning mechanism
in the case the planner defaults on preannounced policies. Solutions in such an environ-
ment are therefore obviously incentive compatible and time-consistent. In the paper by
Benhabib/Rustichini the government has to maximize a function of the form,
∞∑
t=i
βt−iu(ct, ht) > V D(ki, bi)
22Benhabib/Rustichini 1997
23Reis 2006
24Dominguez, Begona, 2007. ”Public debt and optimal taxes without commitment,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, vol. 135(1), pp. 159-170.
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with respect to it’s budget constraint, the economy’s resource constraint and under con-
sideration of the optimal allocations found in the private sector. The function V D(ki, bi)
denotes the deviation value, hence the welfare value of defaulting to the previously an-
nounced policy. By definition of the constraint the discounted utility of commitment,
which implies a continuation of the previously announced policy, has to be at least as
large as the discounted utility of default, which implies a deviation from the prean-
nounced policy. The consequences of default, captured by the deviation value, can be
interpreted as a complete loss of reputation which leads the private sector to expect cap-
ital taxation to be at the maximum level for all future periods and hence to stop or at
least reduce capital accumulation substantially. The government therefore has to ponder
costs and benefits of deviation in each period. In example, does it payoff to increase capi-
tal taxation in order to lower distortions caused by labor taxation. Benhabib/Rustichini
examine this model at the steady state where the incentive constraint is binding, called
an ”incentive constrained steady state”, and find that there is a range of compatible
levels of the capital stocks below and above the commitment value with respective asso-
ciated capital tax rates. The commitment value and the associated zero capital tax rate
is not sustainable as it is not credible. It turns out that the only sustainable capital tax
rate is negative and thus represents a subsidy. The induced higher accumulation rate of
capital is widening the inequality above (between the value of commitment and default),
lets a one time capital levy in the manner of the full commitment case appear more and
more unattractive and thus serves as a commitment device.25 Hence, as in the case of
the Markov perfect equilibrium also this example for time-consistent optimal taxation
yields capital tax rates different to zero, even if the results by Klein/R´ıos-Rull point in
the opposite directions. It has to be stated however that Benhabib/Rustichini’s results
are calculated for linear preferences only and for an economy where a balanced budget
constraint applies. They indeed characterize their model at first under the consideration
of public borrowing (see above), the analytical and numerical solutions are however done
under a balanced budget assumption. This issue will be addressed in the next section.
3.5 The role of the balanced budget assumption
In sections 2.5 and 2.6 it was shown that a planner who possesses the ability to fully
commit to a sequence of policies for all future periods tends to tax capital extremely
high in the initial period in order to be able to lower distortionary taxation in later
periods. As pointed out prior several times, investments which lead to the capital stock
in the initial period are sunk, hence capital is already installed, and its taxation is
thus regarded as being not distortionary. The phenomenon of permanently positive
capital tax rates in the no-commitment Markov environment was argued conversely:
25compare to Benhabib/Rustichini 1997 and Dominguez 2007
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First, a contemporary planner regards the present capital stock as installed and hence
its taxation as not distortionary, second, a planner without commitment is obviously not
able to front load distortions and to transfer resources to later periods as the Ramsey
planner does it. The front-loading of distortions and the transfer of resources to later
periods, as presented in section 2.6, however hinges essentially on the fact that the
government possesses saving respectively borrowing instruments. In the models hitherto
examined in the no-commitment environment such instruments are however missing.
Klein/R´ıos-Rull note that the allowance of public borrowing could indeed change their
result.26 Literature on this issue is unfortunately not very comprehensive. The results
of the few available papers however support the intuition that the existence of public
saving/borrowing devices is a very relevant factor. To my knowledge there are only
three papers controlling for the issue of public borrowing under the assumption that the
planner possesses no commitment technology. Two of these papers, one by Catarina
Reis27 and one by Begona Dominguez28, follow the approach by Benhabib/Rustichini29
(outlined in section 3.4). The third one by Marina Azzimonti-Renzo, Pierre-Daniel Sarte
and Jorge Soares30 follows a Markov approach and might thus, in the context of this
chapter hitherto where we mainly focused on Markov equilibria, be regarded as the most
relevant. All three works however come to quite similar results. Dominguez and Reis
find that under the assumption that there is no commitment technology available to
the planner but the possibility to borrow and to save, capital taxes are optimally zero
in the steady and in the long run respectively. Similar to Benhabib/Rustichini they
conclude that the accumulation of assets, debt and capital, serves as a commitment
device and renders default unattractive. Reis further points out a mechanism which
seems similar to the front-loading argument brought forward in section 2.6: In the short
run the government accumulate assets, it backloads resources, until, along the same logic
as in the paper of Benhabib/Rustichini, the incentive constraint is no longer binding and
the economy is back in the full-commitment solution where the tax rate on capital is
optimally zero. Azzimonti-Renzo et al. find their solution in a Markov framework as
it was mainly discussed hitherto in this chapter. They show that in an economy where
the planner is not able to commit but borrowing/saving devices are available capital
taxes are zero in a stationary Markov equilibrium. For a finite horizon version of their
economy the authors even show that a front-loading of taxation takes place, also in the
presence of an upper limit on capital taxes, as it is known from the full-commitment
Ramsey environment.31
26Klein/R´ıos-Rull, p. 1243
27Reis 2006
28Dominguez 2007
29Benhabib/Rustichini 1997
30Azzimonti-Renzo et al. 2006
31Azzimonti-Renzo et al. 2006, pp. 1 - 14
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3.6 Summary and Interpretation
In contrast to chapter 2 the central assumption in chapter 3 was that the government
doesn’t have access to a commitment technology which would allow to stick to an in
advance decided upon sequence of policies. As defined introductorily to this chapter and
considered in the exemplary two period model, policy decisions under a no-commitment
assumption are taken sequentially and lead to completely different policy outcomes than
in the case, where the planner has access to a commitment technology. The model
framework used by Klein/R´ıos-Rull is slightly different. The government bequeaths a
vector of state contingent capital taxes to its successor but has no control over tax policy
beyond the next period. Since a balanced budget constraint applies and the from the
predecessor inherited capital tax rates are state contingent the use of labor taxes is
very limited as they simply serve the purpose of balancing the budget. Also here the
optimal policies differ considerably to the full-commitment case: Both examined model
economy’s exhibit strictly positive tax rates on capital income which is in stark contrast
to the optimally prescribed zero capital tax result in the full-commitment approach. An
intuitive explanation for this was already given in section 3.2. The results can be argued
by taking recourse to the argumentation which was used in chapter two to explain the
result that capital taxes should be optimally zero in the long run: First it was argued that
a positive capital tax amounts to a differential tax rate on private consumption goods
which is a contradiction to the steady state assumptions and represents an intertemporal
wedge which distorts the saving/consumption behavior. Second, it was reasoned that a
planner equipped with a commitment technology is able to front load distortions (capital
taxes), transfer resources to future periods and can thus lower distortionary taxation in
the future. That capital taxes are positive in the no commitment case can therefore
be reasoned by a reversion of these arguments: First, in the absence of a commitment
technology each government in every period is confronted with a situation similar to the
initial period in the full commitment case. Capital is already installed, hence inelastically
supplied, the tax policy in the running period has no influence on the capital stock in
the current period, and its taxation is thus regarded as being non distortionary. Second,
since the government by assumption possesses no commitment technology it doesn’t have
the ability to front load distortions as it is practiced by the planner who has the ability
to commit to a sequence of tax rates. As however discussed in section 3.5 these results
centrally hinge on the balanced budget assumption which is effective in our exemplary
two-period model as well as in the model by Klein/R´ıos-Rull. If the the planner has
access to borrowing/saving devices one can show that the results for the cases of full-
and no-commitment are very similar: Most notably in the context of this chapter is
the work by Azzimonti-Renzo et al.32 who, in contrast to Reis and Dominguez, solve
for a Markov equilibrium. They find that in an economy where the planner doesn’t
32Azzimonti-Renzo et al. 2006, pp. 1 - 14
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have access to a commitment technology but is able to borrow/save capital taxes are
optimally zero in stationary Markov equilibrium. In a version of their model with finite
horizon they even observe front-loading of distortions which in its manner is similar to
the full commitment case.
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The paper by Davide Debortoli and Ricardo Nunes1, which should be examined subse-
quently, chooses a middle course compared to the approach in chapters 2 and 3. Their ap-
proach reflects the assumption that neither the full-commitment nor the no-commitment
approach renders the situation in reality. Debortoli/Nunes therefore consider a model
in which default on past promises, no-commitment, can occur by a certain probability
in each period. In the first step this probability is exogenously given. In the second step
the authors reformulate the model in a way that the probability for default now depends
on endogenous economic variables. The solution process for a Markov equilibrium in
the loose commitment case follows, with small differences, a similar concept as in the
Klein/R´ıos-Rull paper or the definition of the general Markov equilibrium in section
3.1.
4.1 The basic model and notations
4.1.1 Notations
In the model economy described by Debortoli/Nunes, households gain utility by three
factors: private consumption ct, public consumption gt and leisure (1 − ht). Endowed
with one unit of time each period, households take an allocational decisions between
leisure (1− ht) and labor ht. Households not only supply labor to firms, they also par-
ticipate on the capital markets by renting out capital kt to firms. Incomes from labor
and capital are subject to the taxes τt and θt respectively. Further Debortoli/Nunes
assume a capital utilization rate vt, which allows the share of capital rented out to firms
to be written as vtkt. The depreciation of capital δ(vt) is a function of this utiliza-
tion rate. The Output in the model economy is produced according to the production
function F (kt, vt, ht) = (ktvt)σh1−σt . As it is assumed that factor markets are perfectly
competitive, factor prices for labor and capital can be expressed as wt = Fh(kt, vt, ht)
1Debortoli/Nunes 2007
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and Fk(kt, vt, ht) = rt respectively. Taking the taxes τt and θt as well as the prices wt
and rt by now as given, we can write down the household’s maximization problem.
max
kt+1,ct,ht
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, gt, ht) (4.1.1)
s.t.
ct + kt+1 = (1− θt)rtvtkt + (1− τt)wtht + (1− δ(vt))kt (4.1.2)
βt represents the discount rate applied by agents. Eo is the expectation operator.
4.1.2 Solution procedure and structure
The equilibrium for the here described model properties is to be found in a Markov
setting. Although the approach by Debortoli/Nunes follows the same concept as in
chapter 3, the specific solution procedure is slightly different. In chapter 3, sections
3.1 to 3.3, it was assumed that the planner can only commit to the tax rates in the
present or in the next period respectively. In the model by Debortoli/Nunes the phases
of commitment could possibly take longer. One can imagine the concept used in this
scenario as a kind of interlaced finite Ramsey sequences. In the standard no-commitment
scenario it is assumed that a new government comes into office each period, which means
that there is a hundred percent chance that default on past policy promises happens in
each period. Each planner therefore also has to take account for the best response of
the successive government in the next period regarding the state in which it inherits the
economy. In the loose commitment case however the current government has to consider
that there is a certain likeliness of default in each period. The actual default however
might happen in one, two or even more periods and each government has to consider the
reaction of its successor which would then eventually come into office. After a default a
new Ramsey sequence begins which last until the next default. In comparison one might
state that the Ramsey sequence in the definition of the standard Markov equilibrium of
section 3.1 in contrast only lasts one period.
In the following subsection 4.1.3 the private sector optimality conditions are derived.
Section 4.3 discusses the problem of the government. As shown in section 4.3.1 the same
mechanisms become evident as in the standard Markov formulation: Governments opti-
mize in anticipation of a potential default which might happen with a certain probability
in every of the upcoming periods. The problem of the government in such an environ-
ment is threefold: First, the government has to consider its own history depending on
how long it is in office already. After every default a new government comes into office.
In such a situation no promises are to be kept and solely the state of the government
is inherited from the predecessor. Second, the planner has to consider the future for
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the case default happens in the current period and another planner comes into office
in the next period. Third, the planner has to consider the future for the case he is
able to commit and stays in office. It turns out that, as all other histories have been
maximized by other planners already and every planner only considers a single history
under the presumption that default has not yet happened. In chapter 4.3.2 the optimiz-
ing conditions of the government and the private sector are combined. It is shown that
the solutions of the overall optimization problem are ”time-invariant and depend on a
finite set of states.”2 and are therefore fixed point problems as in the standard Markov
formulation. In section 4.4 such an equilibrium is defined and solved for analytically.
Section 4.5 examines a case in which the probability to commit is not exogenously given
but depends on endogenous state variables. In section 4.6 and 4.7 the calibration is
discussed and an overview of the numerical solutions is given respectively.
4.1.3 The private sector optimality conditions
The problem formulated in equations (4.1.1) and (4.1.2) can be written down in the
Lagrange form and solved for the first order conditions.
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{u(ct, gt, ht) + λt[ct + kt+1 − (1− θt)rtvtkt − (1− τt)wtht − (1− δ(vt))kt]}
(4.1.3)
∂L
∂ct
: λt = −uc(ct, gt, ht) (4.1.4)
∂L
∂kt+1
: λt − βEtλt+1[(1− θt+1)rt+1vt+1 + (1− δ(vt+1))] = 0 (4.1.5)
∂L
∂ht
: uh(ct, gt, ht)− λt(1− τt)wt = 0 (4.1.6)
∂L
∂vt
: −λt(1− θt)rtkt + λtδv(vt)kt = 0→ (1− θt)rt − δv(vt) = 0 (4.1.7)
The respective combinations of equations (4.1.4) and (4.1.5), as well as (4.1.4) and (4.1.6)
and equation (4.1.7) yields the following optimality conditions.
uc(ct, gt, ht)− βEtuc(ct+1, gt+1, ht+1){(1− θt+1)rt+1vt+1 + (1− δ(vt+1))} = 0 (4.1.8)
uh(ct, gt, ht) + uc(ct, gt, ht)(1− τt)wt = 0 (4.1.9)
(1− θt)rt − δv(vt) = 0 (4.1.10)
2Debortoli/Nunes 2007, p. 15
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The interpretation of these optimality conditions is straightforward and similar to the
optimality conditions derived in the course of chapter 2: Equation (4.1.8), the house-
hold’s Euler equation, points out the intertemporal dimension of the household’s decision
problem. The household’s consumption behavior depends on expectations over future
variables as for example the expected future return on capital. Equation (4.1.9) states
the intratemporal allocation problem between leisure and consumption in terms of op-
portunity costs. One unit more of leisure has to be indirectly bought for (1− τt)wt less
consumption. Equation (4.1.10) gives the connection between capital income taxation
and the capital utilization rate: The higher the taxes on capital income are, the lower
the utilization rate of capital is.
The role of the government in this model is standard: In anticipation of the optimal
behavior of the households, it has to set tax rates τ and θ and the scale of govern-
ment expenditures g in order to maximize the social welfare function and to satisfy the
government’s budget constraint given by equation (4.1.11).
gt = θtrtvtkt + τtwtht (4.1.11)
The household’s and government’s budget constraints, represented by equations (4.1.2)
and (4.1.11) respectively, can be combined to give the feasibility constraint (equation
(4.1.12)) which is effective in this model economy.
ct + kt+1 = (1− θt)rtvtkt + (1− τt)wtht + (1− δ(vt))kt
ct + kt+1 + θtrtvtkt + τtwtht︸ ︷︷ ︸
gt
= rtvtkt + wtht︸ ︷︷ ︸
yt
+(1− δ(vt))kt
yt = ct + kt+1 + gt − (1− δ(vt))kt (4.1.12)
Given the above results, Debortoli/Nunes denote the variables vt3, ct4 and gt5 as func-
tions to simplify the notation.
vt = v(kt, ht, θt)
ct = c(kt+1, kt, ht, θt, τt)
gt = g(kt, ht, θt, τt)
Combining the first order conditions (4.1.8) and (4.1.9) and using the simplifications for
vt, ct and gt along Debortoli/Nunes allows to write down the optimality conditions of
3using first order condition (4.1.10)
4using the household’s and government’s budget constraint
5using the household’s and government’s budget constraint
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the households in a more compact and therefore more manageable form.
b1(xt(ωt), kt(ωt)) + βEtb2(xt+1(ωt+1), kt+1(ωt+1)) = 0 (4.1.13)
b1 and b2 are function vectors summarizing the dependencies in the first order conditions
(4.1.8) and (4.1.9), xt ≡ (kt+1, ht.θt, τt) bundles the control variables in the current
period, kt represents the state variable and ωt stands for the history up to period t.
4.2 The probabilistic model
4.2.1 Supplementary notation
The first step in the loose commitment approach is to rewrite the model in order to
simulate a situation in which default can appear in every period by an exogenously
given probability. The social planner takes his decision in a context in which he cannot
be sure whether its promises will be kept or not. This forces him to take into account
this indeterminacy and the anticipation of this uncertainty by the households.
The random variable {st}∞t=1, which is driven by a stochastic Markov process6, gives
the realization of the two possible events default D or commitment ND in period t.
Alternatively expressed, s¯t ∈ Φ ≡ {D,ND}. Ωt ≡ {ωt = {D, {s¯j}tj=1} : s¯j ∈ Φ,∀j =
1, . . . , t} represents the set of possible histories up to time period t, where only histories
ω = {D, s¯1, s¯2, . . . , s¯t} are considered which begin with a default D. In the period after
a default a new government comes into office. In this situation there are no promises
which have to be kept.
4.2.2 The perspective of the individual agent
The individual agent or household takes the announced policies (promises) of the planner
currently in offices for granted. Considering future planners however, agents take into
account that there is certain probability at which future policies might deviate from the
policies initially promised. Agents therefore anticipate a possibility for default. Since
there is a possibility for a default in every successive period, with the exception of
periods which directly come after a period where default occurred, it is reasonable to
write down future control variables upon which one cannot fully commit as functions of
state variables, i.e. xt+1({ωt, D}) = Ψ(kt+1({ωt, D}). Here, the expression {ωt, D} =
{ωt, s¯t+1 = D} represents a situation where the planner defaults on his past promises
in the upcoming period. Ψ(.) is a policy vector which was initially expected by rational
6For a definition of a stochastic Markov process the reader is referred to section 2.7.5.
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agents to be enacted in upcoming periods if there would have been no default. Equation
(4.1.13), representing the individual maximization problem, can now be rewritten.
b1(xt(ωt), kt(ωt)) + βProb({ωt, ND}|ωt)b2(xt+1({ωt, ND}), kt+1({ωt, ND})
+ βProb({ωt, D}|ωt)b2(Ψ(kt+1({ωt, D}), kt+1({ωt, D})) = 0 (4.2.1)
The first term in the first line of equation (4.2.1) represents the current decision; the
second term reflects the future rationality with respect to probability of non-default.
The second line of equation (4.2.1) stands for the rational future decision, taking into
account the probability of default in the next period. In this case agents cannot con-
trol the variable xt+1(.) anymore, which then solely depends on the state variables as
reflected in the notation for Ψ(.) explained above. Since in contrast kt+1(.) is a state
variable, the notation for the commitment and no-commitment case stays the same, or
alternatively expressed, kt+1({ωt, ND}) = kt+1({ωt, D})∀ωt. In words, the expression
Prob({ωt, ND}|ωt) gives the probability of non-default in period t + 1 with respect to
the past t periods since the history started after the last default. It can more formally
be denoted as Prob({ωt, ND}|ωt) = Prob({sj}t+1j=0) = {ωt, ND}|{sj}tj=0 = ωt).
4.3 The perspective of the planner
If default occurs, a new planner comes to office who will from then on make the decisions.
By distinguishing all histories by the point of time at which default occurred the first
time, we can attribute each history to a certain planner. Taking a hypothetical point
in time i, we can separated the histories into a subset where only commitment was
the case until period i, ΩtND ≡ {ωt = {D, {s¯j}tj=1} : s¯j = ND ∀ j = 1, . . . , t} and
into a subset where the planners defaulted in period i, ΩtD,i ≡ {ωt = {D, {s¯j}tj=1} :
(s¯i = D) ∧ (s¯j = ND) ∀ j = 1, . . . , i − 1 if i 6 t} and ΩtD,i ≡ ∅, if i > t.
Expressed in an easier way one can write ΩtND ∩ {D, s¯1 = ND, . . . , s¯t = ND} and
ΩtD,i ∩ {D, s¯1 = ND, . . . , ¯si−1 = ND, s¯i = D}. Along this scheme one can express the
set of possible histories Ωt as a partitioned set {ΩtND,ΩtD,1,ΩtD,2, . . . ,ΩtD,t}.
4.3.1 The problem of the current planner
Taking into account the way of notation denoted above, the general problem of the
current planner can be written down, ignoring the constraint he faces as done in equation
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(4.3.1).
W (k0) = max{xt(ωt}∞t=0
ωt∈Ωt
 ∞∑
t=0
∑
ωtND
βt{Prob(ωt)u(xt(ωt), kt(ωt))}
+ max
{xt(ωt}∞t=1
ωt∈ΩtD,1

∞∑
t=1
∑
ωt∈ΩtD,1
βt{Prob(ωt)u(xt(ωt), kt(ωt))}

+ max
{xt(ωt}∞t=2
ωt∈ΩtD,2

∞∑
t=2
∑
ωt∈ΩtD,2
βt{Prob(ωt)u(xt(ωt), kt(ωt))}
+ . . .
 (4.3.1)
Clearly, already in the problem of the current planner the behavior of other possible
welfare maximizing planners in their administrative periods (after a potential default
of the current planner) is included. If {ΩtND,ΩtD,1,ΩtD,2, . . . ,ΩtD,t} is as said before a
partition of the set Ωt, all possible histories are included in the formulation (4.3.1) of
the problem faced by the current planner above. The current planner has to maximize
welfare, incorporating the possibility that he stays in office as well as the odds that he
might be forced to default and another maximizing planner comes into office, be it in
one, two or three (et cetera) periods seen from the respective current period. Since the
situation is the same for all planners in a period directly after a default, or expressed
more formally ∀t > i, ΩtD,i = {ωiD,i, {s¯j}tj=1}, the probabilities for ωt ∈ ΩtD,i can be
rewritten.
Prob(ωt) = Prob(ωiD,i ∧ ωt) = Prob(ωt|ωiD,i)Prob(ωiD,i), ∀ ωt ∈ ΩtD,i (4.3.2)
Expression (4.3.2), which gives the probability for the history ωt with the probability
that history started newly in period i, can be substituted into the equation representing
the current planner’s problem, equation (4.3.1), as done in equation (4.3.3).
W (k0) = max{xt(ωt}∞t=0
ωt∈Ωt

∞∑
t=0
∑
ωtND
βt{Prob(ωt)u(xt(ωt), kt(ωt))}
+
∞∑
i=1
βiProb(ωiD,i)
 max{xt(ωt}∞t=i
ωt∈ΩtD,i
∞∑
t=i
∑
ωt∈ΩtD,i
βt−i{Prob(ωt|ωiD,i)u(xt(ωt), kt(ωt))}


(4.3.3)
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The current planner therefore maximizes the problem he faces with respect to the max-
imization of other planners who’s tenures might start in upcoming periods after the
current planner might default. Under the assumption that any future planner behaves
rational as well, one can define a value function:
ξi(ki(ωiD,i)) ≡ max{xt(ωt}∞t=i
ωt∈ΩtD,i
∞∑
t=i
∑
ωt∈ΩtD,i
βt−i{Prob(ωt|ωiD,i)u(xt(ωt), kt(ωt))} (4.3.4)
The value function ξi(ki(ωiD,i)), defined in equation (4.3.4), gives the decision process
after the first default in period i by future planners. The choices of future planners
are however independent from each other or more formally expressed ΩtD,i ∩ ΩjD,i = ∅
for i = j. Nevertheless Debortoli/Nunes assume that all planners are facing the same
institutional setting. It is therefore debarred that some social planners have, in contrast
to the rest, access to a (full-)commitment technology. The value function can therefore
be generalized for all agents, ξi(ki) = ξ(ki) ∀ i.
As all histories {ΩtND,ΩtD,1,ΩtD,2, . . . ,ΩtD,t} are already maximized by other planners,
it is appropriate to assume that the initial planner only takes into account the history
{ωt : ωt ∈ ΩtND} ≡ ωtND instead of all histories ωt ∈ Ωt. This allows us to further
simplify the current planner’s problem for the initial period of equation (4.3.3) as done
in equation (4.3.5).
W (k0) =
max
{xt(ωtND}∞t=0
ωt∈Ωt
{ ∞∑
t=0
{βt{Prob(ωtND)u(xt(ωtND), kt(ωtND))}}+
∞∑
i=1
βiProb(ωiD,i)ξ(ki(ω
i
D,i))
}
(4.3.5)
Under the assumption that the random variable st, mentioned introductorily, is indepen-
dent and identically distributed, Debortoli/Nunes rewrite the formulation from above
to the form of Markov processes (compare to section 2.7.5). The probability to com-
mit after history ωt is denoted by pi = Prob({ωt, ND}|ωt), whereas the probability to
default after history ωt is denoted by (1 − pi) = Prob({ωt, D}|ωt). Along this scheme
the expressions Prob(ωtND) = pi
t and Prob(ωtD,t) = pi
t−1(1−pi) give the probabilities for
commitment and default in period t respectively. The part pit−1 represents the proba-
bility that there was no default up to period t − 1. With these simplifications we can
again rewrite and simplify equation (4.3.5).
W (k0) = max{xt(ωtND}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtpit{u(xt(ωtND), kt(ωtND)) + β(1− pi)ξ(kt+1(ωt+1D,t+1)} (4.3.6)
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Along the same procedure we can also substitute for the Prob(.) expressions in the
private household’s optimality condition, captured by equation (4.2.1).
b1(xt(ωtND), kt(ω
t
ND)) + βpib2(xt+1(ω
t+1
ND), kt+1(ω
t+1
ND)
+ β(1− pi)b2(Ψ(kt+1({ωtND, D})), kt+1({ωtND, D})) = 0 (4.3.7)
4.3.2 Recursive Formulation
Using equation (4.3.6) for the planner’s problem and equation (4.3.7), which captures
the optimality conditions of the private households, now the problem of the planner can
be written down in recursive form.
max
{xt(ωtND}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtpit{u(xt(ωtND), kt(ωtND)) + β(1− pi)ξ(kt+1(ωt+1D,t+1)} (4.3.8)
s.t.
b1(xt(ωtND), kt(ω
t
ND)) + βpib2(xt+1(ω
t+1
ND), kt+1(ω
t+1
ND)
+ β(1− pi)b2(Ψ(kt+1({ωtND, D})), kt+1({ωtND, D})) = 0 (4.3.9)
Since the formulation above exhibits future control constraints, namely in the term
βpib2(xt+1(ωt+1ND), kt+1(ω
t+1
ND)) of the sub-condition, a usual condition for Bellman equa-
tions is violated. Using the methods put forward by Albert Marcet and Ramon Mari-
mon7, Debortoli/Nunes rewrite the problem above to a saddle point functional equation
in order to show that it could be generalized to a usual Bellman equation.8 Since the
planner always faces the same institutional setting, history dependencies can be dropped.
Further, Debortoli/Nunes redefine certain terms as functions in order to display the
problem in a more clearly laid out manner.
r(xt, kt) ≡ u(xt, kt) + β(1− pi)ξ(kt+1)
g1(xt, kt) ≡ b1(xt, kt) + β(1− pi)b2(Ψ(kt+1), kt+1)
g2(xt+1, kt+1) ≡ b2(xt+1, kt+1)
7Marcet, Albert & Marimon, Ramon, 1994. ”Recursive Contracts,” Economics Working Papers 337,
Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 1998.
8Debortoli/Nunes 2007, p. 14
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Rewriting the planner’s problem along this scheme gives:
max
{xt(ωtND}∞t=0
ωt=ωtND
∞∑
t=0
βtpit{r(xt, kt)} (4.3.10)
s.t.
g1(xt, kt) + βpig2(xt+1, kt+1) = 0 (4.3.11)
Since βpi can be considered as a discount rate and since the planner only accounts
for situations of the kind ωtND (as all other histories are already maximized by other
planners9), the stochastic problem from before has transformed into a non-stochastic
one. Along Debortoli/Nunes the problem can therefore be expressed as a saddle point
functional equation.
W (k, γ) = min
λ>0
max
x
{H(x, k, λ, γ) + β(1− pi)ξ(k′) + βpiW (k′, γ′)} (4.3.12)
s.t.
γ′ = λ, γ0 = 0 (4.3.13)
where
H(x, k, λ, γ) = u(x, k) + λg1(x, k) + γg2(x, k)
g1(x, k) = b1(x, k) + β(1− pi)b2(Ψ(k′), k′)
g2(x, k) = b2(x, k)
The interpretation of formulation (4.3.12) & (4.3.13) is as follows: Term H(x, k, λ, γ)
captures the problem of the current planner in the present. The second term β(1−pi)ξ(k′)
displays the behavior of future planners which will come into office after a default.
Term βpiW (k′, γ′) represents the current planner’s behavior if he is able to commit and
therefore able to prolong his tenure. The Lagrange multipliers λ and γ, which work
as costate variables here, capture the intertemporal dynamics. Along Debortoli/Nunes,
γ′ can be interpreted as an aggregation of promises made in the past. Since they stay
effective as the current government continues in office, preconditioned the government
was able to commit, it is contained in the term βpiW (k′, γ′). In the other term β(1 −
pi)ξ(k′), only the state variable k′ is included, as it represents a situation in which default
occurred directly before and therefore there are no promises to be kept. Using Marcet
and Marimon10, Debortoli/Nunes show that the solution of the system (4.3.8) & (4.3.9),
a policy function ψ(k, γ), is time invariant: Again the solution resembles a fixed point
9for the argumentation of this see section 4.3.1
10Marcet/Marimon 1994
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problem as in the standard Markov setting11.
ψ(k, γ) ∈ arg min
λ>0
max
x
{H(x, k, λ, γ) + β(1− pi)ξ(k′) + βpiW (k′, γ′)} (4.3.14)
s.t.
γ′ = λ, γ0 = 0 (4.3.15)
4.4 Defining an Equilibrium
4.4.1 Preconditions and properties of an Equilibrium
In the recursive formulation of the problem above, it was assumed that all future plan-
ners after a default of the current planner face the same institutional setting. This
assumption was further extended to the current planner in time period t = 0. Taking
these assumptions for granted, the solution for the Markov-perfect equilibrium along
Debortoli/Nunes12 has to satisfy the following conditions:
1. Policy function Ψ(.) and value function ξ(.) being given, the system (4.3.8) &
(4.3.9) is solved by a sequence {xt}.
2. The problems faced by the initial and by future planners have to be equal. The
value function Wk,γ therefore satisfies ξ(k) = W (k, 0) = W (k). In the case of a new
planner in office, there are no promises which have to be kept. The costate γ which
captures the intertemporal dynamics, already mentioned before, is therefore zero.
This is always the case after a planner succumbed to the temptation of default.
3. The policy function ψ(k, γ = 0), which is expected to be implemented in the case
of a default, has to be optimal and consistent with the optimal policy function
Ψ(k).
4. The equilibrium is Markov-perfect, as the optimal policy function Ψ(.) solely relies
on the state variable k.
5. Individual agents are utility maximizers and they have correct beliefs.
6. In maximizing, the planner takes ψ and ξ = W as given.
11compare to sections 3.1 and 3.3.3
12Debortoli/Nunes 2007, p. 15 - 16
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4.4.2 Analytically solving for the Equilibrium
The basic recursive problem of the planner is given by the formulation of system (4.3.10)
& (4.3.11) rewritten in equations (4.4.1) & (4.4.2) respectively.
max
{xt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
(βpi)t{u(xt, kt) + β(1− pi)ξ(kt+1)} (4.4.1)
s.t.
g1(xt, kt) + βpig2(xt+1, kt+1) = 0 (4.4.2)
Based on the system (4.4.1) and (4.4.2), one can set up the corresponding Lagrangian.
min
{λt}∞t=0
max
{xt}∞t=0
L =
∞∑
t=0
(βpi)t{u(xt, kt) + β(1− pi)W (kt+1) + λt(g1(xt, kt) + βpig2(xt+1, kt+1))}
(4.4.3)
At this point it is reasonable to recall the identities g1(x, k) = b1(x, k)+β(1−pi)b2(Ψ(k′), k′),
g2(x, k) = b2(x, k) and xt ≡ (kt+1, ht, θt, τt) from before. The argument min{λt}∞t=0 under-
lines that it is part of the planner’s problem to optimally avoid default; like γ, mentioned
in the last section within the preconditions for a Markov-perfect equilibrium, λ here is
a costate which captures the intertemporal dynamics. It is only different to zero in the
case of default, for which the probability is (1 − pi). Since xt contains a state variable
with kt+1, it cannot be used as a control variable. Based on xt we define a new variable
zt ≡ (ht, θt, τt), with respect to which one can now derive the Lagrange function. The
first-order conditions for the planner’s problem are therefore given by:
∂L
∂zt
: uzt,t + λtg1,zt,t + λt−1g2,zt,t = 0 (4.4.4)
∂L
∂kt+1
: ukt+1,t + β(1− pi)Wkt+1,t+1 + λt(g1,kt+1,t + βpig2,kt+1,t+1)
+ βpi(ukt+1,t+1 + λt+1g1,kt+1,t+1)− λt−1g2,kt+1,t = 0 (4.4.5)
∂L
∂λt
: g1 + βpig2 = 0 (4.4.6)
where
g1,xt,t = b1,xt,t g1,kt,t = b1,kt,t
g2,xt,t = b2,xt,t g2,kt,t = b2,kt,t
g2,kt+1,t = b2,kt+1,t
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Having derived the results, some words should be said about the notation: Functions con-
tained in the maximization problem are concerned more than once when derived with re-
spect to kt+1. For example, u(xt, kt) contains kt+1 in period t, since xt ≡ (kt+1, ht, θt, τt),
and in period t+ 1 via the original kt. The same is the case for the function g1(xt, kt).
Being derived with respect to kt+1, term g2(xt+1, kt+1) is concerned in period t− 1 via
xt+1(.) and in period t via kt+1. Therefore, the subscripts in the first order conditions
(4.4.4) to (4.4.6) give the variables with respect to which the functions were derived as
well as the respective time period concerned.
One significant property of the first order conditions above is the appearance of the value
function Wkt+1,t+1 or ξkt+1,t+1 to follow the notation of Debortoli/Nunes in equation
(4.4.5). The value function ξ(kt+1) gives the welfare of the agents with a new planner
coming into office at period t + 1. A new planner in period t + 1 however has no
influence on the level of the state variable kt+1, whereas the initial planner in period t
does influence it strategically. The optimal policies can now be solved for, due to the first
order conditions (4.4.4) to (4.4.6). Debortoli/Nunes do so in reducing the problem to a
fixed point problem by application of the envelope theorem. This is appropriate, as it was
assumed that all planners are facing the same problem or maximizing the same function,
ξ(kt) = W (kt) or ξk,t+1 = Wk,t+1, respectively. All variables are therefore solved for with
the optimal policy of a planner new in office in period t, presumably after a default, and
with a given kt. The envelope results by Debortoli/Nunes are therefore:
∂W (kt)
∂kt
=
∂u(xt(kt), kt)
∂kt
+ λtg1kt,t (4.4.7)
Using these results, Debortoli/Nunes substitute for ξk,t+1 = Wk,t+1 within the first
order conditions. Remaining is a problem which solely depends on the policy functions
ψ(kt, λt−1) and Ψ(k) with ψ(kt, 0) = Ψ(k) ∀ k.
4.5 The probability of default is endogenous
In the initial model examined hitherto in this chapter, the probability for default/commitment
was given exogenously. In a next step Debortoli/Nunes study an economy where the
probability for default/commitment of a respective period depends on the state of econ-
omy and therefore on the capital stock k. Instead of pi, the probability of commitment
in the successive period is now given by the function P (kt+1). In the first period, where
there are no promises to be kept, P (.) = 1. The initial capital stock k0 in this model
is given. Otherwise the probability operator P (.) would depend on a non-existent vari-
able, which would cause time-inconsistency problems as Debortoli/Nunes admit. Private
agents, who are aware of the fact that the probability for commitment depends on the
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capital stock k, take the aggregated capital stock as given and accumulate their capital
by optimizing the maximization problem subject to their budget constraints just as be-
fore. The optimization problem with endogenous probabilities for commitment can be
written down as follows.
max
{xt(ωtND}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt
∏t
j=0(P (kj))
P (k0)
{u(xt(ωtND), kt(ωtND)) + β(1− P (kt+1))ξ(kt+1(ωt+1D,t+1)}
(4.5.1)
s.t.
b1(xt(ωtND), kt(ω
t
ND)) + βP (kt+1)b2(xt+1(ω
t+1
ND), kt+1(ω
t+1
ND)
+ β(1− P (kt+1))b2(Ψ(kt+1({ωtND, D})), kt+1({ωtND, D})) = 0 (4.5.2)
The term
Qt
j=0(P (kj))
P (k0)
in the planner’s problem gives the probability that there was no
default up to period t. Clearly in period t = 0 this operator would be unity. Again the
definitions from above, this time of course with the endogenous probability operator,
allow us to rewrite and simplify the notation.
r(xt, kt) ≡ u(xt, kt) + β(1− P (kt+1))ξ(kt+1)
g1(xt, kt) ≡ b1(xt, kt) + β(1− P (kt+1))b2(Ψ(kt+1), kt+1)
g2(xt+1, kt+1) ≡ b2(xt+1, kt+1)
Rewriting the planner’s problem along this scheme gives:
max
{xt(ωtND}∞t=0
ωt=ωtND
∞∑
t=0
βt
∏t
j=0(P (kj))
P (k0)
{r(xt, kt)} (4.5.3)
s.t.
g1(xt, kt) + βP (kt+1)g2(xt+1, kt+1) = 0 (4.5.4)
Since the problem above again exhibits future control constraints as in the case with
exogenous probabilities before, Debortoli/Nunes prove that it also can be rewritten to
a saddle point functional equation. The Lagrange formulation of the system (4.5.3) &
(4.5.4) shows certain characteristics:
min
{λt,ϕ}∞t=0
max
{xt}∞t=0
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt{κt(u(xt, kt) + β(1− P (kt+1))ξ(kt+1))
+ λtκt(g1(xt, kt) + βP (kt+1)g2(xt+1, kt+1)) + ϕt(κt+1 − κtP (kt+1))}
(4.5.5)
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The term ϕt(κt+1 − κtP (kt+1)) in the formulation above represents the evolution of
the endogenous probability operator P (kt+1), which applies to the other terms of the
equation. If a new planner comes into office subsequently to a default and there are no
promises which have to be kept, hence κ = 1. In such a case the Lagrange multiplier λt
which captures the intertemporal dynamics is zero. Again a new variable zt ≡ (ht, θt, τt)
is defined which in contrast to the original xt, on which it is based, doesn’t contain
the state variable kt+1 and can therefore be used as a control variable. The first order
conditions to this problem are:
∂L
∂zt
: uzt,t + λtg1,zt,t + λt−1g2,zt,t = 0 (4.5.6)
∂L
∂kt+1
: ukt+1,t + β(1− P (kt+1))Wkt+1,t+1 + λt(g1,kt+1,t + βP (kt+1)g2,kt+1,t+1)
+ βP (kt+1)(ukt+1,t+1 + λt+1g1,kt+1,t+1)− λt−1g2,kt+1,t
− βPkt+1(kt+1)W (kt+1)− ϕtPkt+1(kt+1) + λtPkt+1(kt+1)(b2(xt+1, kt+1)
− b2(Ψ(kt+1), kt+1)) = 0 (4.5.7)
∂L
∂λt
: g1 + βP (kt+1)g2 = 0 (4.5.8)
∂L
∂ϕt
: κt+1 − κtP (kt+1) = 0 (4.5.9)
∂L
∂κt+1
: β(ut+1 + β(1− P (kt+2))W (kt+2)) + ϕt − βϕt+1P (kt+2) = 0 (4.5.10)
The first order conditions are valid for ∀ t = 0, . . . ,∞ and since there are no promises
to be kept in the first period, as already mentioned several times before, the costate
λt60 = 0. The first order conditions (4.5.6) and (4.5.7) have been simplified by sub-
stituting for κt+1 from first order condition (4.5.9) and thereafter by dividing by βtκt.
Equation (4.5.10) can be unformed to express ϕt. Forward iteration, this means itera-
tively substituting for ϕj+1, finally yields the expression in the general form (4.5.11).
−ϕt = β(ut+1 + β(1− P (kt+2))W (kt+2))− βϕt+1P (kt+2)
= β [(ut+1 + β(1− P (kt+2))W (kt+2))− ϕt+1P (kt+2)]
= βP (kt+2)
[
1
P (kt+2)
(ut+1 + β(1− P (kt+2))W (kt+2))− ϕt+1
]
→
−ϕt = β
∞∑
i=t+1
βi−1
∏i
j=0(P (kj))
P (kt+2)
(u(xi, ki) + β(1− β(1− P (ki+1))W (ki+1)) (4.5.11)
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New dynamics through endogenous probability Expression (4.5.11) implies that −ϕ
equals the value function under commitment, beginning in period t+1 times the discount
factor β. One can therefore write −ϕt = βW (kt+1, λt) for which one can substitute in
the first order condition (4.5.7), giving:
∂L
∂kt+1
: ukt+1,t + β(1− P (kt+1))Wkt+1,t+1 + λt(g1,kt+1,t + βP (kt+1)g2,kt+1,t+1)
+ βP (kt+1)(ukt+1,t+1 + λt+1g1,kt+1,t+1)− λt−1g2,kt+1,t
+ βPkt+1(kt+1)(W (kt+1, λt)−W (kt+1)) + λtPkt+1(kt+1)(b2(xt+1, kt+1)
− b2(Ψ(kt+1), kt+1)) = 0 (4.5.12)
The first order condition which was calculated by the derivation of the Lagrange func-
tion with respect to capital is insofar interesting as the accumulation of capital is the
deciding factor for the probability to commit and therefore also the only parameter
which the current government can try to influence in order to increase its commitment
probability to stay in office. This is reflected by the fact that this first order condition
exhibits additional terms compared to the same first order condition in the case where
probabilities where endogenous. The most interesting new term in the first order condi-
tion (4.5.12) is the part βPkt+1(kt+1)(W (kt+1, λt) −W (kt+1)) in the third line. By the
accumulation of capital the probability for commitment is increased by the factor Pkt+1 ,
which would mean a gain in utility in the case of commitment by W (kt+1, λt), a loss
however in the case of default by W (kt+1). In the next section I will shortly address the
calibration Debortoli/Nunes choose. Thereafter the numerical results will be presented
and discussed.
4.6 Calibration
For the numerical solution Debortoli/Nunes use an utility function of the form.
u(ct, gt, ht) = (1− φg)[φclog(ct) + (1− φc)log(1− ht)] + φglog(gt) (4.6.1)
The depreciation rate of capital is given by the function:
δ(vt) =
χo
χ1
vχ1t (4.6.2)
The production function, as already stated before, is of the form:
F (kt, vt, ht) = (ktvt)σh1−σt (4.6.3)
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The parameters φc and φg represent a measure weighting consumption in relation to
leisure and public consumption in relation to private consumption in the preferences
of the households respectively. Their values were calibrated to 0.285 and 0.119. The
discount factor β and the capital share in the production process σ are determined to
have the values 0.96 and 0.36 respectively. The parameters χ0 and χ1 are calibrated
(to the values 0.171 and 1, 521 respectively) that way that a capital utilization rate vt
of 0.8 corresponds to a depreciation rate δt of 0.08. The basis for the calibration of
Debortoli/Nunes is annual data of the US economy.
While in the first setting probabilities for commitment where exogenously given, in the
second part they are a function of the capital stock kt and therefore endogenous. The
function reflecting these endogenous probabilities is given by:
P (kt) = 1− 1
(kt
k˜
)p + 1
(4.6.4)
As already pointed out above, a higher level of capital increases the probability of com-
mitment and therefore the likeliness for a government to stay in office. Parameter k˜
normalizes the function such that P (k˜) = 0.5. p is a parameter reflecting the sensitivity
of the function with respect to changes in the level of capital: If p = 0 the probability is
constant. The higher p is, the stronger it reacts to fluctuations of the capital stock and
the higher is the incentive for the planner to encourage capital accumulation with his
policies in order to stay in office. The values for k˜ and p are calibrated in order equalize
the average capital allocation to the case with an exogenous probability of pi = 0.5 (for
commitment), such that the results are better comparable. For the calculation of the
specific numerical results Debortoli/Nunes indicate to have used global approximation
methods as put forward by Kenneth Judd.13
4.7 Results
Table 4.1 in summary displays the numerical results for the model of Debortoli/Nunes:
It indicates the long-run average values for the variables in the first column which where
calculated for different probabilities in the exogenous probability setting and as well
for the endogenous probability case. The probability to commit for the endogenous
probability setting corresponds to an average value of 0.799. In the context of the
models presented before it makes sense to first look at tax policies, and here especially
13Judd, Kenneth L., 1992. ”Projection methods for solving aggregate growth models,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pp. 410-452. and Judd, Kenneth L., 2004. ”Existence, unique-
ness, and computational theory for time consistent equilibria: A hyperbolic discounting example,”
Stanford University, Manuscript.
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pi 1.000 0.750 0.500 0.250 0.000 end. prob
k 1.122 0.947 0.899 0.880 0.870 0.932
λ -0.536 -0.177 -0.080 -0.030 0.000 -0.064
g 0.093 0.076 0.072 0.070 0.069 0.082
c 0.196 0.216 0.220 0.222 0.224 0.209
y 0.378 0.368 0.364 0.363 0.362 0.365
θ 0.000 0.131 0.163 0.178 0.187 0.153
τ 0.384 0.251 0.218 0.203 0.191 0.268
h 0.233 0.245 0.248 0.250 0.250 0.246
u 0.798 0.799 0.801 0.800 0.799 0.790
p¯i 1.000 0.750 0.500 0.250 0.000 0.738
Table 4.1: Numerical Results - Loose Commitment
at the extreme cases of full- and no-commitment. In the case of full-commitment, which
here corresponds to a value pi = 1.000, the results calculated by Debortoli/Nunes are
completely in line with the findings of chapter 2 and chapter 3: Under the assumption
of full-commitment the optimal capital income tax is zero. In this case the tax burden
to finance government expenditures fully lies on labor income which is taxed at a rate
of 38%. Let aside their specific calibration Klein/R´ıos-Rull find a figure which is with
31% not that different to the result of Debortoli/Nunes.14 In the case of no-commitment
the average capital income tax rate lies at around 18.7%. The average labor income tax
is with 19.1% just slightly higher. These results are insofar in line with the findings of
chapter 3 as the average capital income tax rate is considerably different to zero. In the
case of the Klein/R´ıos-Rull model however the value for the capital income tax rate is
independently from the calibration much higher.15
These results go hand in hand with the interpretation of the other variables. Concerning
capital income taxation one can state summarizing: the higher the commitment proba-
bility the lower capital income taxation is. This has direct consequences for the capital
accumulation. One observes a significantly higher capital stock in the cases with a higher
commitment probability. As a matter of fact, as capital income taxes are low labor in-
come taxes have to be higher in order to balance the budget as defined introductorily in
the basic model assumptions. The figures for τ displayed in Table 4.1 reflect this trivial
conclusion. Accordingly labor supply should also decrease with higher income tax rates.
The h-values in Table 4.1 support this conclusion.
In the endogenous probability setting the average capital income tax rate lies at around
15.3% in average. Taxation on labor income carries the biggest burden to finance govern-
14Klein/R´ıos-Rull 2003, p. 1230
15Klein/R´ıos-Rull 2003, p. 1231
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ment expenditures: wages are taxed with 26.8% in average. As already stressed before,
in the section about the calibration which Debortoli/Nunes use in their calculations, the
endogenous probability model was adjusted to correspond to the pi = 0.50 setting in
the exogenous probability model as far as capital allocation is concerned. The pi = 0.50
case is therefore the most interesting reference to compare. The endogenous probability
setting in contrast exhibits an average probability to commit of p¯i = 0.738. Eye-catching
however is primarily the high average capital stock in the endogenous probability setting.
The average value for k here is 0.932. For the pi = 0.50-case on the contrary this value is
only at 0.899. This difference can be explained by the forces and incentives which are at
work in the endogenous probability setting: Governments in the endogenous probability
setting try to implement policies which encourage capital accumulation since a higher
capital stock increases the commitment power, namely the probability of commitment
P (kt), and in the same way the likeliness that the current government can stay in office.
The instrument of choice for this purpose is a lower capital income tax rate. This line of
argumentation is also supported by the figures for θ in Table 4.1: The capital income tax
in the pi = 0.50 case is with 16.3% higher than in the endogenous probability setting. As
governments can therefore influence their commitment probability, it is not surprising
that the overall results in the endogenous probability setting resemble more those of the
full-commitment rather than those of the no-commitment scenario.
4.8 Summary and Interpretation
The loose commitment approach by Debortoli/Nunes represents a compromise between
the full- and no-commitment assumption effective in chapters 2 and 3 respectively. In
contrast to this two extreme cases the authors assume the default on past promises can
occur in every period with a certain probability. At first this probability is exogenously
given, then it is assumed that planners could enhance it’s probability to commit, hence its
probability to stay in office, by implementing policies which encourage capital accumu-
lation. Depending on the respective calibrations (of the default probability) the results
are in line with the full- and the no-commitment case. Setting the default probability to
one, the model resembles a standard Markov perfect equilibrium while setting it to zero
it resembles a Ramsey equilibrium. Consequently the intuition regarding the results is
the same as in the cases of full- or no-commitment in chapters 2 and 3 respectively.
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5 Conclusion
The goal of this thesis was to illustrate the role of commitment for fiscal policy. It
was shown that the assumption wether a planner has the ability to commit to a chosen
sequence of policies or not, is a central factor in determining the methodic approach as
well as the effective policy outcomes. Particularly two approaches were discussed, which
control for the factor commitment: In the case of full-commitment the government can
decide for a sequence of policies once for all successive periods. Such a situation is
captured in a Ramsey equilibrium. Solutions found in such a setting are regarded as
being time-inconsistent as they are not incentive compatible over time. If it is however
assumed, that governments don’t possess a commitment technology, agents incorporate
the potential discretion of the successive government. Such an environment resembles an
infinitely repeated non-cooperative game in which government policies represent mutual
best responses to the past (state of the economy left back by the former government)
and the future (expected discretion by its successor). In such a context an equilibrium
can be found in a Markov setting, which incorporates the time-inconsistency of once
taken policy decisions and therefore delivers time-consistent solutions.
In the full-commitment case the central result is that capital taxation in the limit should
be optimally zero. The famous result initially derived by Kenneth Judd and Christophe
Chamley hinges on the fact, that capital taxation represents an intertemporal wedge dis-
torting the consumption/saving behavior of households. The planner wants to minimize
distortions and sets capital taxes to zero in the long run. In the initial period however
the government has incentives to tax capital. Capital in the initial period is already
installed and it’s taxation is hence considered as being non-distortionary. Capital taxes
in the initial period are usually very high and serve the purpose of building up a capital
base with which’s proceeds the government can lower distortionary taxation in the fu-
ture. The government therefore front-loads distortions and transfers resources to future
periods. This was shown in a converse argument: Positive capital taxes implicitly imply
a differential taxation of private good consumption and therefore incentives for house-
holds to prepone consumption. Contrary to these incentives it was shown that a transfer
of resources to the future, which would be implied by a front-loading of distortionary
taxation, is welfare increasing. Such procedures can obviously only be accomplished by
a planner who has the ability to fully commit to a once chosen sequence of policies.
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In the most extreme form of no-commitment however, as it was presented introductorily
to chapter 3, the planner can only decide upon the policy for the actual period. He
does this with regard to the state of the economy he inherited from his predecessor and,
as he in turn bequeaths the economy to another government in the following period,
to the reaction, the best response, of his successor. The planner without commitment
technology is confronted with a situation each period which is similar to that in the
initial period in the full-commitment scenario. Investments which lead to the current
capital stock are regarded as being sunk. The taxation of capital is thus viewed as
being not distortionary. As discussed in section 3.5 these results however hinge on
the assumption that the government has to honor a balanced budget constraint. In
the case the government is allowed to issue bonds, and hence has a saving/borrowing
instrument, the results gained in a Markov setting resemble those in a Ramsey setting
with full commitment: Capital taxes are zero at a stationary Markov equilibrium and
planners accomplish transactions similar to the front-loading which was observed in the
full-commitment setting. It however has to be noted that the literature on this issue is
not very comprehensive yet.
The loose commitment case presented in chapter 4 presents a compromise between the
full- and no-commitment setting. In contrast to the other two cases default on past
promises can occur with a certain probability in each period. Depending on the respec-
tive calibration the results/methods gained/used in the loose commitment environment
resemble those in the full- or no-commitment case respectively. The intuitions behind
the outcomes within this setting are therefore similar to the full- and no-commitment
case.
Although there is a wide variety of literature on the topic of fiscal policy and commit-
ment, it seems that yet all questions haven’t been answered. For the full-commitment
assumption it is for example known that the zero capital tax result, which might seem
universally valid after the foregoing discussions, is for example not robust to assumption
of incomplete taxation or non-linear (i.e. progressive) taxation.1 A variety of still open
question lets us expect that optimal fiscal policy in the context of the commitment issue
will remain a vivid field of research for the years to come. A pretty common observation
however is that commitment is welfare increasing.2 It would therefore also be essential
to look more closely at the institutional causes for commitment and default. Especially
interesting in this context is the literature about political budget cycles as for example
1Erosa, Andres & Gervais, Martin 2002. ”Optimal Taxation in Life-Cycle Economies,” Journal of
Economic Theory, vol. 105, pp. 338-69.; Mirrlees James A., 1971. ”An Exploration in the Theory
of Optimum Income Taxation,” Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pp.
175-208.
2i.e. Klein/R´ıos-Rull 2003
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by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini3 or Kenneth Rogoff 4 for it underlines the sig-
nificance of institutional settings for the degree of commitment. Bringing these two lines
of research together, optimal policy and political economy research, would for sure be
fruitful in the future.
3Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido 2005. ”The Economic Effects of Constitutions,” MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1.
4Rogoff, Kenneth 1990. ”Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles,” NBER Working Papers 2428, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.; Rogoff, Kenneth & Sibert, Anne, 1988. ”Elections and
Macroeconomic Policy Cycles,” Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(1), pp.
1-16.
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Abstract
English The subject of this thesis is to clarify the role of commitment and hence time-
consistency in optimal fiscal policy theory. It is shown that the assumption of full-
commitment demands a completely different modeling approach compared to the case
where it is assumed that the planner doesn’t possess a perfect commitment technol-
ogy. In the case where a planner possesses a commitment technology he decides upon
a sequence of policies for all future periods. Possible incentives, which might appear in
future periods to reevaluate these policy decisions are simply elided. Such an assumption
is captured in a Ramsey equilibrium. Results found in such an environment are however
not incentive compatible and time-inconsistent. If the planner in contrast is assumed not
to possess a commitment technology, the decision mechanism evolves sequentially rather
than at one point in time and resembles a non-cooperative game between planners in
consecutive periods. Suchlike assumptions are reflected in a Markov perfect equilibrium,
which yields time-consistent results. It turns out, that planners under these two concepts
have completely different perceptions of intertemporal distortions, which result into dif-
ferent policy decisions. Around this basic conceptual framework the thesis discusses and
presents different varieties of modeling approaches being found in literature.
German Gegenstand dieser Diplomarbeit ist die Rolle von Verbindlichkeit, ”commit-
ment”, und Zeitkonsistenz in der Steuertheorie. Es wird gezeigt, dass unterschiedliche
Annahmen u¨ber die Verbindlichkeit von Steuerentscheidungen verschiedene Modellierungs-
methoden verlangen und zu verschiedenen Ergebnissen fu¨hren. Unter der Annahme
von vollsta¨ndiger Verbindlichkeit hat der Planer die Mo¨glichkeit u¨ber eine Sequenz von
Steuerpolitiken ein fu¨r alle Mal zu entscheiden. Mo¨gliche zuku¨nftige Anreize von dieser
Entscheidung abzuweichen sind per Annahme ausgeschlossen. Lo¨sungen unter diesen
Annahmenkomplex werden in einem Ramseygleichgewicht gefunden. Diese sind jedoch
zeitinkonsistent und anreizinkompatibel. Unterstellt man hingegen, dass der Planer
nicht die Mo¨glichkeit besitzt sich glaubwu¨rdig an eine Politikentscheidung zu binden
erfolgt der Entscheidungsprozess sequentiell in der Form von nicht-kooperativen Spie-
len zwischen Planern in aufeinander folgenden Perioden, die jeweils die beste Antwort
auf die Politiken des jeweils folgenden/vorhergehenden Planers geben. Lo¨sungen unter
der Annahme von nicht vollsta¨ndiger Verbindlichkeit werden in einem Markov perfek-
ten Gleichgewicht gefunden. Diese gelten als zeitkonsistent. Es zeigt sich, dass Planer
in beiden Konzepten intertemporale Verzerrungen ausgelo¨st durch Steuerpolitik in un-
terschiedlicher Weise wahrnehmen, was sich in der Implementierung unterschiedlicher
Steuerpolitiken niederschla¨gt. Um diese beiden Grundkonzepte werden verschiedene, in
der Literatur ga¨ngige, Weiterentwicklungen der Modelle diskutiert.
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